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Abstract 
The central question of this thesis is: How does the way we come to know an author resemble 
the way we come to know a person socially? I argue that the experience of reading shares 
emotional ground with our social lives and that literary studies need to pay attention to 
affective attachments readers experience that resemble those they might have with the people 
in their lives. To make this argument, I examine a variety of essayistic writing that features 
a prominent authorial personal voice. By ‘personal voice,’ I mean the object with which the 
reader forms an attachment as they come to believe in the author figure, envisioning the kind 
of person who would have written the words they are reading, and shaped by any additional 
knowledge they have of the author. 
The methodology of this project is particularly indebted to the fields of ordinary language 
philosophy and postcritique. My vision of ordinary language philosophy as it applies to 
literary studies is shaped primarily by the writing of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell, 
and Toril Moi. This way of thinking opens a path for understanding texts as experiences that 
reward attention to details and particulars, rather than as representations from which one can 
generalise. (One might speak of friendship in the same way.) In the field of postcritique, Rita 
Felski’s work in particular shows how attending to modes of interpretation other than 
demystification can provide fresh ways of talking about literature’s potency. This thesis is 
also significantly influenced by the work of Sianne Ngai, Lauren Berlant, Alexander Nehamas, 
Heather Love, Leo Bersani, Adam Phillips, and John Frow, each of whom model ways of 
describing the aesthetic, affective, and political conditions that influence intimacy and artistic 
experience.  
In order to build an understanding of the social contours of the reader-author relation, I 
examine writing by, among others, Joan Didion, David Foster Wallace, Maggie Nelson, Ben 
Lerner, Kevin Young, and Janet Malcolm. Each of these authors is interested in charisma, 
trust, and their relationship with the reader. I read their work in order to think through why 
a reader might say that they know―or are getting to know―an author, or claim that an 
author knows them. What is it about authorial presence that permits this claim to intimacy? 
What is the difference between being in a writer’s presence, and being in the presence of a 
friend? Why does an essay’s argument feel more or less convincing or credible depending on 
who seems to be making it? 
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Each chapter is dedicated to a particular feature of reading that shapes the reader’s picture 
of the author. The first, ‘Belief,’ examines how a reader can come to believe in an author as a 
person. The second, ‘Friendliness,’ investigates the affect and aesthetic of friendliness that 
can manifest in a writer’s work. The third, ‘Persuasion,’ undertakes a close reading of a 
persuasive essay to examine how an author might use rhetorical devices to ingratiate 
themselves with their reader. The fourth, ‘Knowingness,’ argues that tracing a demeanour of 
authorial knowingness can reveal how an author’s personal voice might facilitate a reader-
author relationship, for better or worse. The final chapter, ‘Identification,’ studies how a 
reader’s relating to or identifying with an author constitutes an intimacy that resembles the 
intimacy of social experience. 
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Introduction 
Writing, when properly managed (as you may be sure I think mine is) is but a different name for 
conversation. 
Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy 
-- 
How does the way we come to know an author resemble the way we come to know a person 
socially (perhaps as a friend, a crush, an acquaintance, an adversary)? This thesis comprises 
five linked responses to this question with a chapter dedicated to each. I intend to show that 
describing reading as an experience that shares emotional ground with our social lives 
prompts us to attend to the kinds of affective attachments that frequently resist description 
by, or encourage disdain among, scholars of literature, such as relatability, friendliness, and 
identification. These attachments can facilitate insight, comfort, vanity, or naïvety, but 
whatever their effect they should not be ignored.  
Throughout, I examine writing of, or adjacent to, the essay genre. Of the number of 
reasons I focus on the essayistic, two are particularly significant. First, it makes the scope of 
the project manageable; this thesis does not attempt to arrive at a totalising theory that 
accounts for every kind of literature; rather it is an attempt to test out a way of thinking by 
applying it to a series of comparable texts. Second, essays allow me to survey and compare 
texts in which the author is either explicitly or implicitly prominent as a character. That is, 
the author may describe themselves, their motivations, or their attitudes towards their 
subject, or the reader may simply be able to infer the author’s presence and character. My 
mode of inquiry is by no means exclusively applicable to essays, but nor need it be applicable 
to every text (or every essay) in order to be valid. My methods will be more or less compatible 
with any particular reading depending on the invitations that the text makes, and the posture 
that the reader adopts. Indeed, my sense is that any methodological incompatibility is just as 
interesting as any compatibility. Both, equally, tell the reader something about the text and 
their relationship to it. I employ a reasonably broad definition of essayistic, and feel it is 
sufficient to say that what I mean when I describe a text as essayistic is that the text has 
features that an ordinary person would understand to be those characteristic of an essay. 
However, I do like Adorno’s description of the genre as thinking ‘in fragments, just as reality 
is fragmentary, and find[ing] its unity in and through the breaks and not by glossing them 
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over.’1 Over the ensuing pages, I intend to show that the authorial voice is not entirely 
detached from the personhood of the author, and that a reader need not experience the 
presence of the author as incomplete. Rather, its unity, conveyed by the essay’s form, 
resembles the unity of a social relationship, founded on an acknowledgment of the other’s 
presence.  
While I would like this thesis to be relatively free of jargon, there is one term on which 
the argument depends: personal voice. In this thesis, the concept of a text’s personal voice is 
simple enough: it is the object to which the reader forms an attachment as they come to believe 
in the author figure, envisioning the kind of person who would have written the words they 
are reading. I use the word ‘personal’ because it implies that the voice is associated with a 
particular figure and with that figure’s persona (when I say persona, I don’t mean to imply 
that this voice is purely performance, or necessarily separate from some truer version of the 
figure). I do not mean to invest the words with any particular metaphysical or theoretical 
weight; there is nothing rarefied about a personal voice. My use of this phrase is more or less 
an ordinary one, in that it refers to the degree to which the author and their attitude appears 
to be represented in and by the text. When I talk about a reader forming an attachment to a 
text’s personal voice, I am referring to the connection that is experienced with a conflation of 
the reader’s actual and inferred knowledge of an author from both within and beyond the text. 
The reader might, for instance, have read an interview with an author that shapes or modifies 
the personal voice that they recognise when reading the text; or perhaps the particular 
arrangement of an essay collection influences the personal voice conveyed by each essay, 
enriching the context that influences the reception of each subsequent piece of writing.  
The concept of the personal voice is not necessarily meant to displace or reject concepts to 
do with the ethical nature of the reader-author relation such as Wayne Booth’s ‘implied 
author,’ or those to do with authorial absence and intention such as Foucault’s ‘author-
function.’ Rather, I am interested in a kind of blend between a social relation and the reader-
author relation, somewhat similar to that which Phillipe LeJeune describes in ‘The 
Autobiographical Pact’: 
                                               
1 Theodor Adorno, Notes to Literature Vol. 1, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991), 16. 
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For the reader, who does not know the real person, all the while believing in his 
existence, the author is defined as a person capable of producing this discourse, and so 
he imagines what he is like from what he produces.2 
LeJeune calls this a ‘referential pact,’ and I discuss it in more detail, along with my 
modifications to it, in chapter two. For now, I will simply say that a premise of this thesis is 
that to read an essay (or essayistic text) is to learn about its author while assuming that the 
author exists as a person, and that anything the reader already knows about the author, or 
infers about the author from the text, will shape the text’s reception.  
A text’s personal voice can be more or less present, more or less friendly, more or less self-
reflexive, more or less accessible, but it is a useful object to attend to when comparing a 
reader’s experience of a text to their social world. If a reader feels that they are in something 
approaching a conversation with a text, I take them to be in conversation with that text’s 
personal voice. Of course, this particular conceptualisation of reading has implications for a 
reader’s evaluation of a text and its author, but I am not claiming that a particularly strong 
or weak attachment to the personal voice has necessary implications for the quality of the 
work or the morality of the author. I am simply interested in the effects of this presence. 
Influences 
The two fields of thinking to which this thesis is most indebted are ordinary language 
philosophy (OLP) and postcritique. Both methodologies suggest that the affective experience 
of reading can be taken seriously, showing that undertaking such work is no less rigorous or 
more naïve than critique or suspicious reading. They also prove the value of investigating 
examples as scholarly practice, without falling back on the impulse to make the value of an 
argument contingent on its potential for universal applicability. This thesis is also 
significantly influenced by the work of Sianne Ngai, Lauren Berlant, Alexander Nehamas, 
Heather Love, Leo Bersani, Adam Phillips, and John Frow, each of whom model ways of 
describing the aesthetic, affective, and political conditions that shape intimacy and artistic 
experience.  
When I speak of OLP, I am referring primarily to the tradition founded by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, extended by Stanley Cavell, and applied to literary studies by 
Toril Moi, particularly in her book Revolution of the Ordinary. While Moi is not the first to 
                                               
2 Phillipe LeJeune, On Autobiography, trans. Katherine Leary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 11. 
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apply OLP to literary studies, her work in the field is the truest and most comprehensive 
representation of Wittgenstein and Cavell’s conception of ordinary language, as I understand 
it, in the field of literature.  
The questions asked by this thesis take up the spirit of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, 
which is exemplified by his final book, Philosophical Investigations. If this philosophy can be 
summarised by a single claim, it is that ‘The meaning of a word is its use in the language.’3 
To encapsulate the significance of this spirit, I will turn to Moi’s explanation of the edict that 
‘meaning is use,’ and why the sense of ‘use’ is ‘hard to grasp’: 
We don’t pay attention to use, because we look for something firmer, deeper, 
something that can ground use itself, something like the ultimate explanation of 
meaning as such. Wittgenstein’s most fundamental conviction—and the hardest to 
follow—is that the request for such an ultimate explanation is meaningless precisely 
because it presupposes a picture in which meaning, or use, has a ground. Because he 
considers that picture to be profoundly misguided, no answer offered in response to 
questions based on it will make sense.4 
This conviction is relevant to the central question of this thesis because I wish to avoid the 
sense that the reader’s connection to a text’s personal voice is either identical to or entirely 
distinct from, for example, a friendship. Therefore, the questions I ask are guided by the sense 
that I am investigating particular examples to attain a clear picture of what the personal voice 
can be, rather than what it always is or is not. To do this, I interrogate what Wittgenstein 
calls the grammar of certain words and phrases. ‘By ‘grammar’,’ Moi writes, 
Wittgenstein means the criteria, rules, or conditions of use for a word or phrase…His 
point—that there isn’t a specific set of features that make up the concept, a set of 
features that will account for all possible cases of use now and in the future—is the 
same whether he is talking about ‘thinking’ and ‘wishing’ or about ‘games.’ All we ever 
have and will have are examples of use. No attempt at generalization (attempts at 
theory) will exhaust the concept or catch all its nuances. We get clear on specific 
                                               
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Rev. 4th ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and 
Joachim Schulte, eds. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 25. 
4 Toril Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary Studies After Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press), 35. 
 
  
 
5 
regions of use by examining specific cases. (This is what Wittgenstein calls a 
‘grammatical’ investigation.)5 
In this vein, I like to think of this thesis as a grammatical investigation. I am interested in 
describing particular essays and testing out the applications of particular descriptions and 
words. (Wittgenstein, Moi writes, ‘teaches us to give up theory’s craving for generality and 
instead look to examples.’6) For instance, my second chapter investigates whether the term 
‘friendliness’ can be usefully applied when reading a particular essay by Janet Malcolm and a 
particular essay by Montaigne. Does it make sense, I wonder, to refer to an author as a friend? 
Why might it make sense to describe Malcolm as a friendly or unfriendly author? What would 
I mean if I were to say that it felt as if Montaigne knew me, or that I felt I knew him? While 
answers to these questions will not resolve any universal concerns about an author’s essential 
nature, they may map out ways of identifying and describing various attachments that readers 
can form with works of literature.  
Among the central claims of Philosophical Investigations is that ‘To imagine a language is 
to imagine a form of life.’7 For Wittgenstein, a form of life is a particular way of looking at 
the world, developed by the sort of conventions we share that allow us to be understood and 
to understand. A neat analogy for this notion is offered by Cavell, who describes tonality in 
music as ‘part of a particular form of life’.8 If something being called a piece of music does not 
feature the tonality with which we are familiar, we are prompted to question whether what 
we are hearing can be properly referred to as music. ‘If a lion could talk,’ writes Wittgenstein, 
‘we wouldn’t be able to understand it.’9 This is because we do not share a lion’s form of life. 
Forms of life are built into the ways we communicate, interact, and perceive our environment. 
They are developed in the social realm, and I am interested in how a text’s reception is shaped 
by a reader’s social assumptions, how a reader pictures the author as a social figure. To 
identify or recognise a voice in a work is to locate a shared form of life. 
One reason reading can be pleasurable is that it provides the opportunity for a reader to 
discover how their form of life interacts with that of the author, how the contexts shaping 
their worldviews are shared. This connection is bound up with experiences of recognition, 
                                               
5 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 97. 
6 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 1. 
7 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 8. 
8 Stanley Cavell, ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,’ in Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969), 78. 
9 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 235. 
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acknowledgment, and belief, and requires a reader to place at least some trust in a writer. I 
do not mean that a reader must believe that an author always tells the truth, or that a reader 
must recognise an author’s experience in their own life, or that a reader cannot be critical of 
an author’s perspective or suspicious of their intentions. Rather, I want to say that the way 
we attend to an author’s personhood when reading their work looks a lot like the attention 
we pay to our interlocutor in conversation. And to listen requires some trust. Not necessarily 
trust in the soundness of their argument or their perspective on the world, but trust that what 
they are writing is representative of their mind, their humanity. It could even be said that 
both reading and conversation require the listener to, momentarily, stop philosophising. 
For Wittgenstein, a philosophical problem is resolved when it disappears. ‘The real 
discovery,’ he writes, ‘is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to.’10 
I am interested in how easily a reader can cease philosophising about the nature of the author 
and simply believe in what they write, as we might come to believe in a friend, without 
approaching them in a spirit of scepticism, fearing that they may not mean what they say, or 
that we may not know what they mean. Taking up the spirit of OLP, I intend to describe 
those moments of reading during which philosophy can become unnecessary, those moments 
when we (often automatically) dispense with scepticism and come to believe in an author.  
The use of OLP in literary studies is also remarkably compatible with postcritique, because 
both fields are motivated by misgivings about the theoretical approaches that depend on 
generalities. And, indeed, much recent postcritical writing is underpinned by the thinking of 
Wittgenstein and Cavell. When I discuss postcritique, I am referring to the field of literary 
studies most recently advanced by Rita Felski in her books Uses of Literature and The Limits 
of Critique, and the essay collection Critique and Postcritique, which was co-edited by Felski 
and Elizabeth S. Anker, and in which Moi has a chapter. I also take Revolution of the Ordinary 
to be undertaking a postcritical inquiry, although extending postcritique is not its primary 
concern. While discussions in the field are ongoing, this style of thinking can be traced back 
to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s ‘Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,’ Susan Sontag’s 
‘Against Interpretation,’ and Bruno Latour’s ‘Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?’.  
In his essay, Latour argues that critique has turned into such a consuming ideology that 
critics in the humanities have become like ‘mechanical toys that endlessly make the same 
                                               
10 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 57. 
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gesture.’ He suggests that we try an alternative: ‘to associate the word criticism with a whole 
set of new positive metaphors, gestures, attitudes, knee-jerk reactions, habits of thoughts’ and 
imagines the critic becoming ‘not the one who debunks but the one who assembles.’11 In most 
of my readings, I presume a certain social generosity or congeniality, the sort one might 
afford a friend or even a new acquaintance, adopting the approach of critic-as-assembler that 
Latour advocates. (I should also note that my way of reading could be reoriented to read with, 
for instance, the disdain with which we might treat an acquaintance if in a bad mood, because 
such a response still requires a trust or belief in the personhood of the disdained.) 
However, embracing postcritical ways of thinking does not mean advocating for an 
abandonment of critique. In Critique and Postcritique, Felski and Anker describe their ambition 
as a renewal of attention to the oft-ignored assumptions that critical stances entail. In Limits, 
Felski argues that ‘critique overestimates the transcendent force of its own self-consciousness 
and the extent to which it can liberate itself from convention,’12 and that ‘works of art cannot 
help being social, sociable, connected, worldly, immanent—and yet they can also be felt, 
without contradiction, to be incandescent, extraordinary, sublime, utterly special.’13 Moi 
writes that ‘The only thing the hermeneutics of suspicion makes us do is read texts in a spirit 
of suspicion. While that spirit may sometimes be justified, it is not always helpful, or even 
interesting.’14 To adhere unquestioningly to the principles of critique is to presume that to 
experience recognition when reading is to risk being seduced, and thus become guileless, 
missing the conditions which demand to be criticised. So we must look elsewhere, beyond 
critique, in order to find a way of examining the sense of intimacy that a reader feels growing 
between themselves and an author, or the sense that a text can be an act of kindness. ‘Why,’ 
Felski asks, ‘are we so hyperarticulate about our adversaries and so excruciatingly tongue-
tied about our loves?’15 
Cavell is a rare example of a scholar who is frequently hyperarticulate about his loves. 
Seeking a way to describe reading as redemptive, he lays out a picture of psychoanalytic 
reading that is generous rather than suspicious, a reading that stakes its claim on the 
possibility that reading can be, as Moi would say, a practice of acknowledgment rather than 
a deciphering or theorising. In ‘Politics as Opposed to What?’ Cavell imagines a relationship 
                                               
11 Bruno Latour, ‘Why has Critique Run Out of Steam? from Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,’ in Critical 
Inquiry, 30, no. 2, 2004, 246-7. 
12 Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 51. 
13 Felski, The Limits of Critique, 11. 
14 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 5. 
15 Felski, The Limits of Critique, 13. 
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in which a reader experiences themselves being interpreted by the text, rather than 
interpreting it:  
The practice suggested to me by turning the picture of interpreting a text into one of 
being interpreted by it would I think be guided by three principal ideas: first, access 
to the text is provided not by the mechanism of projection but by that of 
transference…second, the pleasures of appreciation are succeeded by the risks of 
seduction; and third, the risks are worth running because the goal of the encounter is 
not consummation but freedom.16  
I find this passage so persuasive that, in fact, I would say it effectively summarises the spirit 
of inquiry that this thesis attempts to put into practice. Following scholars like Felski, Cavell, 
and Moi, I undertake particular readings in order to understand what risks might be taken 
by a reader who comes to feel that they are in the presence of an author, and that the author 
is present before them, and why those risks might be worthwhile.  
Writers and Readers 
For the most part, the writers examined in this thesis are recent and contemporary essayists. 
They include Joan Didion, David Foster Wallace, Ben Lerner, Kevin Young, Janet Malcolm, 
and Maggie Nelson, among others. One temporal and geographical outlier is Montaigne, 
whom I write about in the second chapter because he shows that even at its beginnings, the 
genre of the essay was explicitly concerned with the conversational, and with provoking the 
reader to imagine a particular kind of author. I also write on some texts that would be found 
in the fiction section of a bookshop, such as Ben Lerner’s 10:04. Lerner’s novel is clearly not 
an essay. However, the lines between author and narrator are repeatedly and deliberately 
blurred in a way that makes the voice of the novel essayistic, by which I mean there is a strong 
sense of the first-person author, manifesting a presence in the way a literary journalist or 
memoirist might. Reading the work of these writers, a reader might say that they know―or 
are getting to know―them, or else claim that an author seems to know them. Another way of 
putting this is that a characteristic shared among the texts I examine is the possession of a 
strong personal voice.  
My notion of the reader-author relationship not only requires a picture of a particular 
author, it also requires a picture of a reader and assumptions about how they might respond. 
                                               
16 Stanley Cavell, ‘Politics as Opposed to what?’ in Critical Inquiry, 9, no. 1, 1982, 176. 
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Yet I wish to avoid generalising or speculating about how a reader will always respond and I 
will not pretend that there is an optimal or exhaustively mapped out position for my imagined 
reader to occupy. Throughout this thesis, I make claims about the position and attitude of the 
reader in relation to particular authors. At times, I describe my own responses, affective and 
otherwise; at times I assume a likely response. I do not, of course, believe that I speak for 
every possible reader. So, when I speak of a reader and their response to a given text, my 
assumption is that they are someone who is attuned to the text, someone who takes up the 
text’s invitations.  
In the March, 2017 issue of PMLA, eight scholars responded to Rita Felski’s Limits of 
Critique. The first of the respondents is Sarah Beckwith who sees in The Limits Of Critique a 
way of thinking that has significant implications for the contemporary humanities, and 
describes the postcritical as meaning that ‘We come after critique and through it rather than 
that we have dispensed with it.’17 In her subsequent response, Felski describes Beckwith as 
‘preternaturally attuned’ to her method and way of thinking.18 
Beckwith makes a particular claim about The Limits of Critique which I believe is also 
applicable to this thesis: ‘The power of Felski’s book will rest on whether its characterizations 
of critique are recognizable: whether we can see what she sees.’19 Felski picks up on this, 
contemplating the nature of ‘attunement,’ noting certain critics of postcritique who did not 
take issue with particular details of Felski’s argument, but rather were simply not attuned to 
it: ‘others do not see what I see,’ she writes.20 
So the fundamental assumption I make about a reader, when I imagine their response, is 
that they are more or less attuned to see what the author sees. They may, at times, find 
themselves falling out of attunement, or they may be overwhelmed by the shared vision, but 
I write about readers as if they were taking up the invitations offered by the text, because to 
read is to seek to engage, even if such engagement takes an adversarial form.   
The reading I am describing is the sort that Moi describes as ‘a practice of 
acknowledgment.’ This way of reading ‘is always specific.’ Understanding reading as 
acknowledgment dethrones the teleology of ‘certainty’ and instead places the emphasis ‘on 
                                               
17 Sarah Beckwith, ‘Reading for our Lives’ in PMLA 132 no. 2, 2017, 332. 
18 Rita Felski, ‘Response’ in PMLA, no, 2, 2017, 384. 
19 Beckwith, ‘Reading for our Lives,’ 333. 
20 Felski, ‘Response,’ 384. 
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response, on action and self-revelation.’ For Moi, the notion explains ‘why even the most 
stunning reading of a text doesn’t block the way for new ones’: 
Rather, different readings reveal different readers’ different ways of acknowledging 
the text. To acknowledge the text in the right way, each reader needs to work out his 
or her own position in relation to it. This requires humility, self-knowledge, and good 
judgment.21 
In my readings, rather than dictating the response that the correct reading should comprise, 
I try to leave space for the reader’s humility, self-knowledge, and good judgment and, in doing 
so, allow for a multitude of possible positions and responses that could be entailed in 
acknowledgment. 
Reading as Social 
The relationship that exists in our ordinary lives which I am most interested in comparing 
with the reader-author relation is friendship. I do not propose that the reader-author relation 
is actually a friendship, or even a social relation. For one, if I were to claim friendship with an 
author whom I had encountered only through their work, I would rightly be thought to be 
either lying or deluded. Rather, what I want to attend to is how the reader’s experience of a 
text can be shaped by their figure of the author, and how that figure compares to those they 
know socially. (Although this may be an interesting inquiry in itself, this thesis is not 
concerned with the author’s perception, or lack thereof, of the reader).  
In the issue of PMLA in which scholars responded to Felski and postcritique, James 
Simpson describes his own model of reading, which involves picturing texts as friends:  
I try to make friends with texts. I try, that is, to follow the finally luminous hero of 
The Lives of Others, moving between the small subset of texts that deserve suspicion 
to that much wider, infinitely more life-enhancing set of texts—companionable 
forms—with which one can be friends.22  
Responding in the pages of PMLA, Felski answers James Simpson’s suggestion for a ‘friendly 
hermeneutics,’ writing that 
                                               
21 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 208-09. 
22 James Simpson, ‘Interrogation Over’ in PMLA 132 no. 2, 2017, 381. 
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the language of books as friends doesn’t fully resonate with me—perhaps because I’m 
often drawn to narrators who are demented, deranged, sadistic, solipsistic, or 
perverse. It is difficult, for example to envision a work by Thomas Bernhard as a 
friend. 
She goes on to warn that the vocabulary of friendship can engender a ‘clubby, in-group tone’.23 
I find both these responses to Simpson persuasive, yet I believe that the notion of the social, 
and friendliness in particular, can be a powerful tool for thinking through literature. Unlike 
Simpson, I do not think of texts themselves as friends. Rather, I find it more useful to think 
of a reader finding and connecting to a text’s personal voice as resembling the development 
of a social relationship. It is less succinct, but better captures the spirit of reading as I see it. 
Second, I focus mostly on essays rather than novels because essays usually have a more 
distinct relationship between narrator and text, and therefore narrator and reader. I do think 
my claims may well be compatible with various of genres and styles of narration, but my 
arguments here are applicable only to the texts examined in these pages.  
Even so, I remain a little resistant to Felski’s rejoinder. I would counter Felski’s first point 
by suggesting that part of what makes, for example, Bernhard’s Extinction such an 
overwhelming novel is the narrator’s relentless orneriness, or perhaps even social 
derangement. Here, it is useful to think about why we might be drawn to such a narratorial 
voice despite its lack of friendliness. Or is the vast well of personal details in which the 
narrator drenches the reader a malformed friendly gesture, thus generating a kind of twisted 
intimacy? And what are the assumptions we make about Bernhard due to his inflicting on us 
(or treating us to) such a protagonist? While the way in which the reader comes to understand 
the author, by engaging with a personal voice, may not fit the traditional mould of a friendship 
(if such an archetype exists), it can still be viewed as more or less friendly. And as Nehamas 
argues in On Friendship, the value or success of a friendship needn’t be dependent on its 
morality.24 
On Felski’s second point, I accept it is indeed a risk that we will end up speaking of books 
with a ‘clubby in-group tone’. However, part of the goal of this thesis is to account for that 
risk by examining the dangers of relatability or overidentification, especially as a result of 
authorial knowingness. This demeanour forms the focus of the fourth chapter, in which I 
                                               
23 Felski, ‘Response,’ 386-87. 
24 Alexander Nehamas, On Friendship (New York: Basic Books), 196. 
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describe how certain authors (particularly Wallace and Didion) invite both intense empathy 
and relatability, placing the reader-author relation at risk of being reduced to identified 
similarities between reader and writer, and thus marginalising critical voices.  
Indeed, the goal of this thesis is not to have readers or scholars treat authors exactly as 
they treat their friends, colleagues, acquaintances, and enemies, nor to have them read so 
generously that they forgive manipulation or cruelty or deception. Rather, what I hope to do 
is show how we might appreciate our connections to authors with the same degree of 
particularity with which we appreciate our connections to the people in our lives. To come to 
know another person is to cultivate insight and wonder about both distinction and likeness; 
it is to learn what we can and can’t give up, what we can and can’t forgive; it is to have our 
perception reshaped by the contours of the other’s experience; it is to illuminate ourselves in 
the light of the other’s gaze. How is reading different? 
Overview 
Each chapter of this thesis is a response to the question: What distinguishes the way in which 
we come to know an author from the way in which we come to know a person socially? In 
responding to this question, I also seek to describe the similarities between an author’s 
presence and the presence of a person in our lives. 
The first chapter, ‘Belief,’ examines the openings of four pieces of writing by Didion, 
Nelson, Wallace, and Lerner, in order to appreciate how the reader can come to believe in an 
essayist. This enquiry is modelled on Cavell’s essay, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ taking up his 
analysis of King Lear and the audience’s experience of ‘continuous presentness’ as a way of 
thinking about authorial presence. I also develop an understanding of the essayist as a 
character constructed in the text by drawing on John Frow’s description of literary characters 
in Character & Person. In doing this, I argue that a reader’s recognition of an essayist-as-
character exists on a spectrum with social relations. This being the case, I suggest that 
thinking about the reader connecting to the writer as requiring suspension of disbelief is 
misguided, as it would be strange to describe the developing of a social relation as requiring 
suspension of disbelief.  
The second chapter, ‘Friendliness,’ develops a model of friendliness as a literary aesthetic, 
drawing on a number of sources, including philosophical work by Nehamas on friendship, 
Felski on affective responses to literature, Moi on knowledge and examples, and Ngai on 
aesthetics and judgment. Using a brief essay by Janet Malcolm and another by Montaigne, I 
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undertake a grammatical investigation to establish what it can mean to describe an essay as 
feeling more or less friendly. Especially vital to the thesis here is Nehamas’s conception of 
friendship as a relationship that cannot be generalised. My argument is that describing the 
friendliness or otherwise of a text’s personal voice can lead to a productive way of reading 
that does not depend on theorising, and instead necessitates a focus on describing examples, 
engaging in the sort of reading advocated by Moi.  
The third chapter, ‘Persuasion,’ analyses Wallace’s essay ‘Up, Simba,’ exploring its 
seductive use of humour, self-deprecation, self-reflexivity, and multiple layers of narration, 
all of which are deployed to persuade the reader of its argument. This chapter is the most 
straightforward extended close reading in the thesis, and attempts to implement the style of 
reading that has been described in the previous two. I use Wallace as an example because he 
is among the most responded to and idolised of recent American writers. In ‘Up, Simba,’ he 
is as much a subject of the essay as its explicit subject, John McCain. What is especially 
interesting about this essay is that Wallace assumes the reader’s political cynicism and 
exhorts them to put it aside and believe in politics, which doubles as an implicit invitation to 
believe (in) the author. Here, I am particularly interested in the practicalities of authorial 
presence: how it can manifest as an invitation to the reader, how it is developed, how it might 
keep the reader’s interest, and what it might mean when we say that a reader overidentifies 
with an author.  
The fourth chapter, ‘Knowingness,’ looks at political writing (or writing that engages with 
political themes) by Kevin Young, Joan Didion, and Ben Lerner, examining how the 
sentiment of knowingness prompts the reader to imagine themselves as part of the political 
collective that these writers articulate. By knowingness I mean a sentiment which implies 
that a person has the shrewd possession of special knowledge, a knowledge to which that 
person controls access. By examining ‘knowing’ political writing, I try to show how a reader, 
in viewing their own connection with the author as a social relation, might avoid the pitfalls 
of knowingness, or use the sentiment productively and generously, thereby preventing the 
suspicion the sentiment encourages from overcoming the attachment it initiates. While 
knowingness has been almost exclusively treated as a product of excessive suspicion, I argue 
that while indulging in knowingness can reduce a reading to self-congratulatory recognition, 
it can also function as the beginning of a connection and, in some political writing, the 
conceptualisation of a collective. 
The fifth chapter, ‘Identification,’ draws together a number of themes explored 
throughout, along with the vocabulary of the ordinary and postcritique, to think about the 
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grounds upon which a reader might accept or reject a writer. I return my focus to Wallace 
and Didion, examining how they invite or resist relatability and identification by shifting 
between generalising their experience and confessing the specifics of their experience, often 
revealing details that would, socially, only be disclosed in an intimate setting. Additionally, 
influenced by Ngai’s investigation of aesthetic categories, I attempt to treat the reader-author 
relationship as aesthetically and affectively open and ongoing, rather than as an object that 
demands a finalising resolution or judgment. In other words, I argue that the reader’s 
attachment to the personal voice more closely resembles a conversation than a puzzle.  
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  1 
Belief 
One reason a critic is drawn to words is, immediately, that attention to characters has often in fact 
been given apart from attention to the specific words granted them, so it looks as if attention to 
character is a distraction from the only, or the final, evidence there is for a reading of a literary work, 
namely the words themselves. But it is then unclear what the words are to be used as evidence for. 
Stanley Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love’ 
 
Thus, reader, myself am the matter of my book: there’s no reason thou shouldst employ thy leisure 
about so frivolous and vain a subject. Therefore farewell. 
Montaigne, Essays 
-- 
As a child, I ran crying from a live performance of The Three Little Pigs because I feared the 
wolf and did not comprehend the unreality of the stage. So how do we learn to remain invested 
yet remain seated? When we watch a film or read a novel it is said that we suspend our 
disbelief, and there are limits to its suspension. But is this exclusive to art? How does 
suspension of disbelief differ from belief? The notion of our disbelief being suspended implies 
that we can be ‘taken out of the experience’ or ‘brought back to reality’. Is there a social 
equivalent? When we speak with a friend, do we suspend our scepticism? Scepticism that they 
do not mean what they say, or do not know what they mean? Or do we simply speak and 
accept that we will be understood, or listen and accept that we know what they mean? ‘To 
suspend’, in relation to art, implies that when we leave the cinema or library and emerge into 
daylight, our disbelief returns. But of course it is more complicated than that. We can discuss 
the characters in a play or film outside the theatre or cinema as if we had met them. We tend 
not to simultaneously share the experience of prose in the way we can share visual arts but 
we can still discuss a novel as if its characters and world were part of our own, or discuss an 
essay as if its author had personally challenged or persuaded us. And for most people, it seems, 
believing (in) an essay or film or play comes naturally, requiring the right ritualised 
conditions but without purposeful effort.  
  
 
16 
This chapter concerns how readers can come to be persuaded by essays and come to believe 
in their authors. I am particularly interested in confessional essays that engage with what it 
means to enter the text’s present and the author’s presence; what it means for the reader to 
experience the author’s present tense as if it were their own. In the first half of this chapter, I 
lay the groundwork for my analysis by drawing on Stanley Cavell’s notions of belief and 
acknowledgment as developed in ‘The Avoidance of Love: a Reading of King Lear’ and John 
Frow’s understanding of literary character as developed in Character & Person. While these 
concepts are originally deployed in relation to theatre in Cavell’s case and fiction in Frow’s 
case, I show how they are equally useful in describing the essay genre. In the chapter’s second 
half, I apply my theory to the opening passages of four essayistic texts by Joan Didion, Maggie 
Nelson, David Foster Wallace, and Ben Lerner, and describe how these writers establish 
themselves as characters in their own work, characters we can believe in, who get us on side 
and accompany us. I begin with Didion’s essay ‘In the Islands’, arguing that she inhabits a 
confessional mode and temporal space in which she demands the reader account for her 
individuality. Then, I describe how Nelson, in The Argonauts, adopts a mode of address and 
self-exposure that encourages the reader to account for their own sense of self as they enter 
into a relation with the text and its author. I then examine how Wallace establishes a range 
of authorial perspectives to draw the reader into an intimate space, as if by sharing secrets. 
Finally, I look at Lerner’s 10:04—a novel that earns my attention by being distinctly, perhaps 
provocatively, essayistic—and argue that this book shows that the explicit constructedness 
of a textual space and the artificial temporality of its present is no obstruction to a reader’s 
belief in the writer and their shared world. While Lerner’s piece is not an essay, its differences 
and similarities to the preceding three texts illuminate a number of features of essayistic 
intersubjectivity, most significant of all, the importance of sharing an intimate, impersonal 
temporality. 
My argument begins with a consideration of how and why we use the term ‘suspension of 
disbelief’. I am particularly interested in how the writers discussed in the second half of this 
chapter—all American, charismatic, and confessional—establish a kind of conversational 
social relation with the reader, in which belief in the essay and essayist can develop naturally. 
Adorno describes the essay as a form that ‘thinks in fragments, just as reality is fragmentary, 
and finds its unity in and through the breaks and not by glossing them over.’1 Each text I 
                                               
1 Theodor Adorno, Notes to Literature Vol. 1, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991), 16. 
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describe in this chapter manages to undertake this task in its own way, conjuring from 
fragments a coherent voice that denotes a believable author.  
The Author is Present 
So what does it mean to believe in an author, and how do we come to know them? For some, 
the temptation to believe that it is possible, or desirable, to know a text or person fully, that 
the answer to who they really are is just around the corner, is difficult to abandon.2 We might 
approach an essay with the assumption that its author is knowable and the correct reading 
will reveal them. However, the reading is better conceived of as an acknowledgment of 
another (to use Stanley Cavell’s term) rather than an attempt to know another. Cavell explains 
that because it seems that to forgo knowing as a condition of experience is to abandon reason,  
we think skepticism must mean that we cannot know the world exists, and hence that 
perhaps there isn’t one (a conclusion some profess to admire and others to fear). 
Whereas what skepticism suggests is that since we cannot know the world exists, its 
presentness to us cannot be a function of knowing.3 
This claim provokes questions about how facts appear to us, and how it might make sense to 
arrive at certainty. Similarly, part of the experience of reading an essay is to experience the 
author as being present. To make sense of an essay, we are invited to believe in the coherence 
of the author. We are asked to accept that its premise shares our form of life, and to interpret 
the essay as, in part, a demonstration of shared concepts. To do this is to presume that the 
author is present in the same way that we assume a ray of light is present when it warms our 
skin, or Mickey Mouse and his sentient broom are present in The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, or that 
a friend is present, sitting across from us at the café table. We experience and understand the 
presence to be meaningful and distinctive. This means that if someone were to suggest we 
were wrong to believe in an author, if they pointed to the text, and exclaimed ‘You fool, the 
author is not there,’ or, ‘You cannot be certain that the author is there,’ they would be failing 
to understand the act of reading. 
The prospect of this kind of scepticism with respect to the author’s presence is significant 
here because to believe in an author is to overcome our scepticism that they are constructed 
in some way that fails to invite our acknowledgment. It is not useful or valuable to think of 
                                               
2 I discuss this difficulty, as exemplified by the work of David Foster Wallace, towards the end of Chapter 3.  
3 Stanley Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ in Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969), 298. 
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our sense of the author’s presence as a function of knowing. We simultaneously know the 
author (‘Yes, I know Joan Didion well’) and do not know the author (‘Of course I’ve never 
met Joan Didion and don’t believe she’d like me if I did’): both claims are self-evident and 
barely need arguing, and neither claim is especially interesting. This is because the question 
of our knowledge of the author need not present as a problem. Rita Felski summarises Cavell’s 
position on knowledge and scepticism as follows: ‘what it really means to know other people 
has less to do with questions of epistemological certainty than with the strength of our 
personal commitments.’4 This is because, in the tradition of Wittgenstein, personal 
commitments can be accounted for as part of our ordinary experience (meaning that if I’m 
asked whether or not I know someone, arriving at an answer does not require the solving of 
a philosophical problem), but epistemological certainty is contingent on a metaphysical 
dedication. We can commit, for instance, to believing that a person writhing around on the 
floor is, in fact, in pain, or that a friend is engaging with us in sincere conversation, but if we 
are asked to prove the fact of another’s experience beyond doubt, we are entering a new (and, 
I would argue, a less interesting and less productive) epistemological framework. That is to 
say, there is nothing magical about suspension of disbelief; it is a perfectly ordinary act. 
In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein discusses ‘odd-job’ words, words that cause 
philosophical difficulty. He offers the word ‘meaning’ as an example. ‘What causes most 
trouble in philosophy,’ he explains ‘is that we are tempted to describe the use of important 
odd-job words as though they were words with regular functions.’5 I take ‘belief’ and 
‘knowledge’ to fall into this category of odd-job words. Wittgenstein’s interrogation of these 
types of words includes establishing how they don’t work, examining cases where their 
meaning falls flat. In Philosophical Investigations, he declares that ‘If there were a verb meaning 
“to believe falsely,” it would not have any significant first person, present indicative.’6 And, 
more famously, ‘It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in 
pain’ (because saying so would imply that he might have needed to verify his pain with some 
external authority).7 Wittgenstein shows the limits of language and indicates that often 
words that seem metaphysically significant are being deployed nonsensically. Inherent in 
Wittgenstein’s identification of these last two claims as approaching nonsense is the nature 
                                               
4 Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 30. 
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations: Generally Known as the Blue and 
Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958) 48. 
6 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Rev. 4th ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and 
Joachim Schulte, eds. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 199. 
7 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 96. 
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of the inescapable presentness of belief and pain. Their apparentness to us is not a function of 
knowledge. I argue that it is useful to picture our belief and trust in an essayist as being 
functions of such presentness.  
In discussing how the action of King Lear relates to its audience, Cavell describes 
presentness as follows:  
The perception or attitude demanded in following this drama is one which demands a 
continuous attention to what is happening at each here and now, as if everything of 
significance is happening at this moment, while each thing that happens turns a leaf 
of time. I think of it as an experience of continuous presentness.8 
In an essay, I believe that this kind of presentness influences the establishment and style of 
the text’s personal voice.  
Every text is an invitation to the reader, requesting acknowledgment, but this can be 
erased (or trampled on) by excessive suspicion or deciphering. And, if read generously, the 
writing of Didion, Nelson, Wallace, and Lerner—writers who inhabit a distinct essayistic 
style that is equivocating and self-reflexive—perform a similar identifying function to the 
tragedy of King Lear as interpreted by Cavell. It is important to note, as Moi writes, that ‘To 
accept or acknowledge isn’t the same thing as to admire or approve.’9 The generosity required 
to trust in an essayist need not be dependent on agreement. But it is necessary to undertake 
a kind of identification that suggests some complicity in the text’s action.  
Why, Cavell asks, when Edgar delays revealing himself to his father, is the audience 
complicit? ‘What is the point or mechanism of this identification?’ Cavell believes the answer 
is to do with the audience being in the stage’s present: 
The medium is one which keeps all significance continuously before our senses, so that 
when it comes over us that we have missed it, this discovery will reveal our ignorance 
to have been willful, complicitous, a refusal to see.10  
In Cavell’s reading of Lear, recognition and discovery are intertwined with complicity. For 
example, Regan orders the gouging out of Gloucester’s eyes before, without reason, sending 
him to Dover. Cavell proposes that she does this because ‘In her mind, the man she is sending 
                                               
8 Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ 296. 
9 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 60. 
10 Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ 288. 
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on his way to Dover is the man she knows is sent on his way to Dover [i.e., Lear]: in her 
paroxysms of cruelty, she imagines that she has just participated in blinding her father.’ 
Equally, ‘We “do not notice” Regan’s confusion of identity because we share it.’11  
Cavell wants us to remember that to see a play is to listen to the characters and believe in 
the world they inhabit. This relies on theatre’s appeal to an audience’s trust. In theatre, the 
nature of the audience’s attention is regulated by the space. To watch a play is to enter a 
particular space of belief. While Cavell is, of course, talking about the temporal presentness 
of theatre, I want to suggest that an author’s ontological presence can operate in a similar 
manner. All the excerpts I examine in this chapter include an invitation from the author to 
experience their temporal present.  
When, at an essay’s beginning, the scene is established (which can be thought of as the 
introduction to a new, suspended present), the reader is invited to undertake, or become 
invested in, two relationships with the text: one with the writing, the other with the writer. 
Each speaks to the other and, although I just separated them, the two are not distinct. 
Conflated, these account for the personal voice. This chapter is about the vital and unstable 
moment of establishing identification with this voice as it is shaped by the presence of the 
author, who takes the form of a character in their text. I argue that this identification paves 
the way for the affective engagement (emphasising concepts of friendliness and sociality) that 
takes the focus of later chapters.  
The writers I examine in this chapter are included because they invite the reader to 
recognise them or identify with them, while remaining uncertain about what they can 
effectively convey. These authors invite belief by charismatically persuading the reader to 
trust in their (the author’s) personhood. They all begin with uncertainty, and the uncertainty 
is used as an animating force. This is not so different, I argue, from how friendships develop 
(an argument I make more explicitly in chapter two of this thesis). To show this, I focus on 
two organising features shared by the essays examined: the essayist appearing as a character 
or figure in the essay (not necessarily as the protagonist); and the use of techniques which 
invite the reader to trust that the essayist is a person writing in good faith. These features do 
not so much dispel the uncertainty as manage it, and this management encourages intimacy.  
  
                                               
11 Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ 259. 
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Suspending Disbelief 
Before I begin my analysis of how belief and the character of the essayist inform the reader-
author relationship, I want to explain what I mean by suspension of disbelief. The first use of 
the expression occurs in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria. The term arises in 
the recounting of his conversations with Wordsworth, during which they discuss what 
Coleridge refers to as ‘the two cardinal points of poetry, the power of exciting the sympathy 
of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth of nature, and the power of giving the interest 
of novelty by the modifying colours of imagination.’12 Coleridge describes a project entitled 
Lyrical Ballads, which emerged from these conversations, and to which he and Wordsworth 
both contributed poetry. They divided the labour along aesthetic lines, Coleridge writing that 
his own endeavours 
should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so 
as to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth 
sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of 
disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith.13 
In contrast, Wordsworth’s task is to ‘give the charm of the novelty to things of every day.’14 
Coleridge is to familiarise the strange; Wordsworth is to defamiliarise the everyday. 
Coleridge speaks of ‘suspension of disbelief’ to describe a rather specific task, the creation 
of a fantastic narrative (which turned out to be The Rime of the Ancient Mariner), but he defines 
the phrase broadly, as constituting the invoking of ‘poetic faith’. He acknowledges that it is a 
more significant challenge to bring the reader’s imagination into such a state when working 
with fantastic material but does not claim that this is the only material that requires a reader’s 
poetic faith. Presumably, this state must be aroused in order for any reading of poetry to be 
successful. And, Coleridge suggests, it is primarily the author’s task to procure the 
suspension, rather than its being a decision made by the reader.  
Much of this brief chapter in Biographia Literaria is dedicated to making a case for what 
constitutes a poem. Coleridge insists that it must have several features, although he prioritises 
the achievement of affective goals over a poem’s form. Coleridge pronounces that pleasure in 
                                               
12 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), 52. 
13 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 52. 
14 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 53. 
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itself cannot be the poem’s end. Instead, ‘truth, either moral or intellectual, ought to be the 
ultimate end.’15 Yet he maintains that pleasure should be the poem’s ‘immediate object’ and that 
a reader should be compelled to read not simply by wanting to achieve the poem’s end, but 
‘by the pleasurable activity of mind excited by the attractions of the journey itself.’16 He 
advocates for a kind of experiential unity as being fundamental to what distinguishes poetry. 
Coleridge argues that the definition of a ‘legitimate poem’ then ‘must be one, the parts of which 
mutually support and explain each other; all in their proportion harmonising with, and 
supporting the purposes and known influences of metrical arrangements.’ He goes on to 
accept that poetry does not even necessarily require metre, and that specific formal 
characteristics are subordinate to the poem’s ‘harmonious whole’.17 
Coleridge is simultaneously advocating for his particular definition of what a poem must 
entail and describing the conditions necessary for a reader to suspend disbelief and come to 
believe in the poet. (Regarding the questions ‘What is poetry?’ and ‘What is a poet?’ Coleridge 
writes that ‘the answer to the one is involved in the solution of the other.’18) Not only must 
the reader be invited in with promises of particular types of pleasure and truth but, most 
importantly, the form, content, and various component parts must converge harmonically 
and, ‘support and explain each other.’19 Coleridge understands the necessity of artistic 
harmony, or what he calls a ‘graceful and intelligent whole.’20 Similar to Coleridge’s picture 
of the best poetry, the essays in which I’m interested are arranged to simultaneously point 
towards a kind of truth, and convince the reader of their value by eliciting belief. As Coleridge 
writes, ‘nothing can permanently please, which does not contain in itself the reason why it is 
so, and not otherwise.’21 Yet the formal and teleological properties of poetry are obviously 
distinct from those of the texts examined in this thesis. In particular, the poetic imagination 
(as Coleridge describes it) and the essayistic imagination differ in that the former depends 
more on harmonious unity. The latter, in Adorno’s definition, finds harmony in convincing 
the reader of its value by eliciting belief.  
While Coleridge’s original use is significant, it would be nonsensical simply to pluck the 
phrase ‘suspension of disbelief’ from an essay written in the first decades of the nineteenth 
                                               
15 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 55. 
16 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 56. 
17 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 56-7. 
18 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 57. 
19 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 56. 
20 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 58. 
21 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 55-6. 
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century and presume that its meaning can remain identical when used today. Why did the 
term catch on? Why are we so compelled to describe a range of artistic experiences as 
requiring ‘suspension of disbelief’? And why does its present use typically imply a deliberate 
action on the part of the reader or viewer to put their rationality aside in order to enter the 
irrational world of art and entertainment? I argue that this present formulation—divergent 
from Coleridge’s, which ascribed the responsibility of evoking suspension to the poet—is 
misleading. Accepting social relations requires a constant movement between belief and 
unbelief, and the tolerance of circumstances that threaten our belief. Artistic experiences are 
similar. To watch a play, or a film, or to trust a friend, or fall in love, all require trust. That 
is to say, if we become or remain sceptical of the interaction, it cannot be felicitous. This 
chapter attempts to show how, when reading an essay, this trust can arise. In this context, I 
am speaking specifically about how a reader develops their trust in a text’s personal voice, 
their knowledge that the text is another person’s coherent and meaningful expression, and 
belief that the expression is meant in good faith. Trust in essays (or essayists) differs from the 
trust we place in novels, or the trust we place in friends, and its differences tell us something 
about these companion relationships. In each context, circumstances usually prevent us from 
falling into total scepticism. Trust is required because determining the authenticity of the 
other is rarely a matter of verification. What would it mean, in this context, to arrive at 
verifiable certainty about the other’s fundamental nature? Rejecting the position that a 
reader’s experience of an essay’s personal voice depends on their feeling that they know the 
author exhaustively, I argue that the author’s presentness to us exists on the irreducible 
spectrum of social relations. We are left with a social unity as real (or as present) as any other.  
The Conditions of Criticism 
Near the beginning of his essay on King Lear, Cavell wonders  
How could any serious critic ever have forgotten that to care about a specific character 
is to care about the utterly specific words he says when and as he says them; or that 
we care about the utterly specific words of a play because certain men and women are 
having to give voice to them.22  
                                               
22 Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ 248.  
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One answer: The practice of criticism tends to reward the divorcing of language from its context.23 
That is not to say that critics ignore the conditions of an utterance or believes them to be 
separable, but that criticism tends to proceed as if the utterance were a question and the 
conditions an answer, failing to perform what Wittgenstein would refer to as a grammatical 
investigation. This failure can include taking the audience’s relationship with a speaker or 
author for granted. Toril Moi elegantly describes the Wittgensteinian position in Revolution 
of the Ordinary:  
Wittgenstein thinks that grammatical investigations are particularly useful to 
philosophers, who often land themselves in deep metaphysical trouble because they 
have, without noticing it, removed words from the language games in which they are 
ordinarily at home. But, as we have now seen, to carry out a grammatical investigation 
is to investigate use.24 
Cavell compares the challenge of attending to a speaker with the difficulty, clarified by 
Wittgenstein, of knowing when to stop philosophising. As Wittgenstein tells us in 
Philosophical Investigations, ‘If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock and 
my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”’25  
While Wittgenstein, with his spade, is speaking of the practice of philosophy, scepticism 
hits similar bedrock. It has practical limits. We don’t refuse to sit because the existence of 
chairs cannot be proven beyond doubt. And if we were to accept our failure to know for sure 
the motivations of our friends as reason for constant scepticism as to their intentions, we 
would be poor friends. In reading, as in life, this kind of paranoia (to use Eve Sedgwick’s term) 
is debilitating when we abide by it exclusively or as an orienting principle. At some point, the 
reader must accept a premise.  
To make reading coherent—to enjoy it!—the reader must assume that they can 
understand (or approximate) the author’s position. This is a form of generosity. It need not, 
or perhaps cannot, be fixed. It could be that the assumed position is reoriented or overturned 
as the text progresses—and this could contribute to the reading—but the process must start 
somewhere. All texts create an initial position, one that will change from reading to reading. 
The interpretation of a position could depend on the author’s corpus, or interviews with the 
                                               
23 Cavell is primarily responding to New Critics but it is difficult in any critical discourse to escape this impulse 
entirely.  
24 Toril Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017), 53. 
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author, or the tradition in which we locate them, or simply have to do with the kind of person 
we imagine would write the sort of text we are reading. By position, I mean something like 
the context that enables authority, or the conditions that clarify the author’s responsibility to 
their subject and reader. What makes the author’s recorded experience worth my time and 
attention? With these stakes in mind, I will reformulate and build on Cavell’s question about 
character. My central question is this: If we care about the utterly specific words of an essay 
because a certain person has written them, how do we come to care about (or know about) the 
expression of this person we find in the text’s personal voice?  
In his preface to The Claim of Reason, Cavell retrospectively describes ‘The Avoidance of 
Love’ as including the ‘thought that skepticism concerning other minds is not skepticism but 
is tragedy.’26 Ultimately, Cavell believes Lear’s downfall to be brought about by his scepticism 
of other minds, meaning his wish for an entirely knowable declaration of love. So, if a tragic 
fall awaits those who refuse to settle for the acknowledgement of other minds, how does one 
come to disbelieve or believe in others? What makes another believable? What prevents us 
from being overwhelmed by disbelief and dismissing words on a page as nothing more? An 
essay in which the essayist is present invites the reader to comprehend or conceptualise the 
essayist. So the existential risk taken by an essay is not that we will disagree with its author, 
but that we will not believe in them.27 Disbelief does not mean the reader concludes that the 
essay fails to objectively record the author’s experience, but rather that the reader takes the 
meaning to be irrelevant or incoherent. If this is the case, the role of the author is to position 
themselves so as to bring forth the conditions under which their arguments or descriptions 
are believable and obvious. And Cavell’s sense of the obvious in criticism depends on a critical 
process of acknowledgment in which claims are made that would be invalid if presumed to 
function as totalising knowledge. Underlying the reading, Cavell explains, is the assumption 
that the logic of this sort of philosophical literary criticism ‘is inherently immodest and 
melodramatic.’28 That is not to say it relies on certainty; rather it is due to criticism’s 
operating as an act of exposure.29 He writes that ‘if philosophy can be thought of as the world 
of a particular culture brought to consciousness of itself, then one mode of criticism (call it 
                                               
26 Cavell, The Claim of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), xix. 
27 Or will ‘rule him out as a competent interlocutor’ (Cavell, ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,’ in Must 
We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 92. 
28 Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ 286. 
29 Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ 289. 
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philosophical criticism) can be thought of as the world of a particular work brought to 
consciousness of itself.’30 However, while such a claim about a work may ‘present itself as the 
whole truth of a work,’ such a claim to totality need not be a generalising claim. An error made 
by traditional critics, writes Cavell, is that ‘They take a claim to obviousness as a claim to 
certainty, and they take the claim to totality as a claim to exhaustiveness.’31 I take this 
particular claim of Cavell’s to resemble the logic of postcritique (a logic his work influenced), 
as undertaken by scholars such as Felski and Moi. By attending closely to a particular work, 
a critic can stake out a meaning or implication without assuming that the claim accounts for 
every possible experience of, or response to, a given text.   
In describing how this manner of critical discovery might differ from a scientific discovery, 
Cavell imagines 
a major scientific insight occurring to a man along with an impulse to race into the 
streets with it, out of relief and out of the happy knowledge that it is of relevance to 
his townsmen; whereas the joy in a major critical insight may be unshareable if one 
lacks the friends, and even not need to be spoken (while perhaps hoping that another 
will find it for himself).32 
By employing this methodology, and operating with the assumption that texts and critical 
discoveries function as invitations, Cavell finds that Lear is a tragedy rather than a melodrama 
because of the play’s depiction of ‘refusal expressed as a failure to acknowledge.’33 This is vital 
to my argument in this thesis, as the quality and nature of social relations and reading are 
more or less determined by how invitations are identified, and then either taken up or 
spurned.  
Let’s Pretend 
How does this space of theatrical belief compare to the space of belief invoked by an essay? Is 
it so strange to call the author a friend? If a reader imagines a degree of intimacy with an 
author or permits an author to persuade them, to what extent are these actions sane? The 
relationship is made to seem sane, or ordinary, by persuasions that include ritual and 
familiarity. 
                                               
30 Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ 288. 
31 Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ 287. 
32 Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ 287. 
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Cavell writes that 
the first task of the dramatist is to gather us and then to silence and immobilize us. Or 
say that it is the poster which has gathered us and the dimming house-lights which 
silence us. Then the first task of the dramatist is to reward this disruption, to show 
that this very extraordinary behavior, sitting in a crowd in the dark, is very sane.34 
These are instances of what John Frow calls ‘the fragile “let’s pretend” moment that precedes 
all narration…which all narrative texts have devices to handle.’35  
These supporting structures are not exclusive to narrative texts. Social relations also rely 
on (or comprise) devices to handle ‘let’s pretend’ moments (or phatic propositions): ‘Let’s get 
a drink some time’; ‘I’d love to catch up but I’m extremely busy’; ‘I’ll be in touch’; ‘I’m so 
sorry.’ We slip seamlessly into believing essays and novels and theatre because we are 
accustomed to believing. Any system of etiquette is a system of pretence, organised to 
minimise instability. Freud might have described civilisation as a ‘fragile “let’s pretend” 
moment’. In their fragility, these moments are inexplicable, or inarticulable. An attempt to 
describe them exhaustively might cause them to break or slip through our fingers. And, as 
readers, we cannot be instructed to suspend our disbelief (unless sitting in an audience or 
dimming house-lights are forms of instruction); it must happen automatically. ‘The worse 
your art is,’ John Ashbery told The Paris Review, ‘the easier it is to talk about.’36 And King 
Lear is very good. Wondering at the impossibility of a final interpretation of Lear, Cavell 
reminds us that an ideal performance ‘is no more possible, or comprehensible, than an 
experiment which is to verify every implication of a theory.’ Of course an action in a 
performance ‘cannot contain the totality of a human life’ and ‘Some have no meaning for us 
at all, others have more resonance than they can express—as a resultant force answers to 
forces not visible in the one direction it selects.’37 I take a similar consequence to be true of 
reading an essay, with the unavoidable voice of its writer in mind: ‘What is necessary to a 
performance is what is necessary to action in the present, that it have its autonomy, and that 
it be in character, or out, and that it have a specific context and motive.’38  
                                               
34 Cavell, ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ 300-301. 
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The temporal and social conditions of these media (theatre and essay) differ, but the point 
at which they converge is of interest. Theatrical tragedy works so well to exemplify the 
argument of ‘The Avoidance of Love’ because the audience is confronted with characters 
behaving like people, and the audience behaviour is prescribed, yet the audience feeling is not 
(or is differently prescribed). While the theatrical is absent (or, at least, radically altered or 
managed) in the essay, we are still confronted with, to use Frow’s phrase, ‘person-shaped 
figures.’39 They are simply a different shape of person. The form taken by the essayists in 
question is that of an ordinary social presence. We can allow this presence to be made familiar 
to us, and thus take it seriously, existing in a shared experience. We invest in tragedy because 
it strikes us, in its grounding, as familiar or ordinary; an essay simply takes a distinct route 
to establish the ordinary. And in order to take an essay seriously, to find its ordinary context, 
we must take the author-as-character in their own text seriously, as we take characters in 
plays seriously.  
Cavell’s invective against dismissing theatre as simply pretending—‘Othello is not 
pretending’40—opens doors to more broadly theorising how our interpretation of characters 
resembles our interpretation of people. He imagines an interlocutor objecting to his treating 
the characters in Lear as people: 
…You forget this is theater; that they are characters up there, not persons; that their 
existence is fictional; that it is not up to us to confront them morally, actually enter 
their lives.41 
But, Cavell points out, the audience does not forget that they are in a theatre. And it is not 
that the people on stage are ‘none of my business,’ nor that he is to keep himself from 
becoming invested in the action, but that, as in all relations, there are limits to the possibilities 
of interaction:  
How do I know I am to do nothing, confronted by such events? The answer, ‘Because 
it is an aesthetic context’ is no answer, partly because no one knows what an aesthetic 
context is, partly because, if it means anything, a factor of its meaning is ‘a context in 
which I am to do nothing’; which is the trouble.42 
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Cavell takes the tragedy of King Lear to be refusal.43 The heart of the essay’s brilliance is that 
it takes most criticism of the play to have been misguided by the very desire to know that 
plagues its characters and leads them to tragedy. ‘Lear abdicates sanity for the usual reason: 
it is his way not to know what he knows, or to know only what he knows.’44 And critics are 
misled, Cavell believes, by the challenge of accepting the limits of knowledge, by failing to 
escape a pattern of thought that evaluates within a metric of knowledge. This error is 
dependent on the assumption that the way we know literature is fundamentally different from 
the way we know (or acknowledge) the world.  
In a theatre, despite sharing a temporality with the action, the audience cannot prevent the 
tragedy. So the audience involvement might seem incongruous. But obviously it is not. We 
do not expect that Othello will strangle Desdemona in the same way that we expect the sun 
will rise tomorrow:  
Do I believe he will go through with it? I know he will, it is a certainty fixed forever; 
but I hope against hope he will come to his senses; I appeal to him, in silent shouts. 
And Cavell shows that this silent audience conviction is the condition that makes tragedies 
vivid:  
Why do I do nothing, faced with tragic events? If I do nothing because I am distracted 
by the pleasures of witnessing this folly, or out of my knowledge of the proprieties of 
the place I am in, or because I think there will be some more appropriate time in which 
to act, or because I feel helpless to un-do events of such proportion, then I continue 
my sponsorship of evil in the world, its sway waiting upon these forms of inaction. I 
exit running. But if I do nothing because there is nothing to do, where that means that 
I have given over the time and space in which action is mine and consequently that I 
am in awe before the fact that I cannot do and suffer what it is another’s to do and 
suffer, then I confirm the final fact of our separateness. And that is the unity of our 
condition.45  
The context that illuminates the tragic events of King Lear, or the instability of Didion’s 
1960s, or the uneven temporality of Lerner’s Manhattan, is the context of the ordinary. Cavell 
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insists that those who have understood the abdication scene in King Lear as a fairy tale, or a 
mildly nonsensical narrative device, have failed to recognise that nearly everyone on stage 
finds Lear’s behaviour extraordinary, and the narrative strategy of the scene works ‘to break 
up our sense of the ordinary (which is not the same as a strategy whose point is to present us 
with spectacularly extraordinary events).’46 Lear’s behaviour is tragic (in that it leads to 
tragedy), but it is not metaphysically extraordinary. And the tragedy is felt because the 
audience accepts the premise as ordinary. The essayists discussed in this chapter break up the 
sense of the ordinary by entering the textual stage as characters in their own writing, before 
going on to examine the implications of their established, inhabited worlds. 
The Concept of Character 
In Character & Person, Frow confronts a powerful but misleading desire to know that resembles 
the desire described by Cavell, drawing out the implications of our longing to distinguish 
fictional and real figures (characters and people), and the possibilities that become available 
to us when we accept that this is a peculiar thing to wish for.  
‘The Avoidance of Love’ describes themes that take the focus of Character & Person; two 
are of particular relevance here. First, the importance of how the scene of textual action affects 
the meaning and reception of words spoken by characters: a character only forms in the 
context of their particular narrative. Second, both point to the places in which there can be 
no clear distinction between how we perceive characters on a stage (or in literature) and how 
we perceive the people in our lives.  
The book’s argument, Frow explains,  
can be briefly stated: persons exist across a range of modalities. Some people are real 
and physically present to us; others are real but we know them only by repute…or 
they exist in our memories; others may or may not be real, or imaginary qualities may 
be grafted onto real people; and others may be fictitious, with varying degrees of 
resemblance to real people.47 
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This may indeed be brief (and perhaps even uncontroversial), but it is not simple. Frow is 
interested in ‘the way these different modes of existence relate to each other.’48 A revelation 
that comes from this study is that placing characters and people on a spectrum shows that 
they are both textual beings yet requires that they be ‘thought of in terms of presence—of 
“real” personhood—rather than in terms of textuality’.49  
I wish to emphasise three notions from Character & Person that theorise how the characters 
emerge in relation to the reader. First, discussing how characters are recognised, Frow writes 
that ‘Fictional character is a person-shaped figure made salient by a narrative ground’50. 
Accepting this notion, a character can be thought of both as a device that draws attention to 
(or calls on the reader to prioritise) their words and actions, and a character’s words and 
actions can be thought of as devices that draw attention to the character. In this, they are all 
inextricable. Second, discussing how characters are clarified, or enter the foreground, Frow 
writes that ‘Identification takes place in relation to positions of enunciation before it takes 
place in relation to characters.’51 This is a way of thinking about texts as contexts, in which 
figures are unfixed, their meaning open to interpretation but dependent upon presentation. 
The third key notion: How to account for the reader’s position in this mutually constitutive 
relationship? It is not fixed, nor determining of some final interpretation. The term Frow 
uses to describe a presence that both is and is not quite the reader is ‘the paredros’: ‘the 
familiar who accompanies a group, the non-human but figured absence from which all 
narrative figuration emerges. One name for this daemonic other is the reader.’52 Later, the 
paredros is described as appearing in Chaucer as ‘the ‘associated’ and uncanny figure’, as ‘the 
familiar who walks always beside you’ and, with a T.S. Eliot line, as ‘the third who always 
walks beside you.’53 This term accounts for the space in between the general audience and the 
individual to whom texts are inevitably directed, the fact that every act of interpretation is 
only the act of a single mind, yet each individual’s interpretation exists as the component of 
an audience interpretation.  
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These concepts—characters as person-shaped figures against a narrative background, 
identification as dependent on positions of enunciation, and the figure of the paredros—
provide a foundation for thinking through the reader-author relationship. The rest of this 
chapter is interested in beginnings, because that is where the authorial person-shaped figure 
first appears. The four passages are formally and thematically similar, yet they have telling 
distinctions. They are ‘enunciations’ (a term used by Frow in a similar manner to that of 
Barthes and Benveniste) and they all position the author in relation to a paredros and, in so 
doing, convince all stakeholders of the described situation’s ordinariness.54   
Joan Didion 
Here is the opening of ‘In the Islands,’ which begins the fourth section of The White Album, a 
section pointedly titled ‘Sojourns’: 
1969: I had better tell you where I am, and why. I am sitting in a high-ceilinged room 
in the Royal Hawaiian Hotel in Honolulu watching the long translucent curtains 
billow in the trade wind and trying to put my life back together. My husband is here, 
and our daughter, age three. She is blond and barefoot, a child of paradise in a 
frangipani lei, and she does not understand why she cannot go to the beach because 
there has been an earthquake in the Aleutians, 7.5 on the Richter scale, and a tidal 
wave is expected. 
Didion monitors the television with her husband, telling us that ‘The Bulletin, when it comes, 
is a distinct anticlimax: Midway reports no unusual wave action,’ before disclosing that ‘We 
are here on this island in lieu of filing for divorce. I tell you this not as aimless revelation but 
because I want you to know, as you read me, precisely who I am and where I am and what is 
on my mind.’ 55 
This essay first appeared in the December 5, 1969 issue of Life magazine and was later 
published in The White Album. This opening describes a distended, equivocating instant. In 
order for it to work, the reader does not need to be certain of the veracity of Didion’s claim 
that she wrote this confessional essay while sitting at a typewriter in a Honolulu hotel room, 
awaiting a possible tidal wave. However, a felicitous reading would entail the reader taking 
the claim seriously as representing the author’s position in the narrative present, thus 
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showing the reader how to locate Didion in relation to themselves. If we do this, we accept 
Didion’s continuous presentness and this character’s context as constructing a world in which 
the essayistic substance conveyed is convincing or at least evaluable, something to which we 
can connect.  
Reading critically, there is a temptation to render the scene metaphysically and 
metaphorically significant, as if somehow to liberate the author and ourselves. If writing 
comes of struggle, then taking Didion’s confessed suffering as a kind of sacrifice in the name 
of some societal virtue (to assume that conveying the suffering makes it valuable or 
worthwhile) might redeem the experience. Leo Bersani describes this impulse in The Culture 
of Redemption, warning against the belief ‘that a certain type of repetition of experience in art 
repairs inherently damaged or valueless experience.’ This assumption, Bersani argues, is 
dependent ‘on a devaluation of historical experience and of art.’56 This becomes clear when 
we compare reading a text to a social experience: we should not necessarily mine another’s 
trauma for value, sometimes we are simply invited to recognise or acknowledge it. Didion’s 
essay invites the reader to locate her character, but not to redeem her character. I, the reader, 
am not 1969’s Joan Didion. She cannot save me, and if I read and sympathise, that will not 
save her. On the following page, Didion refuses to be reduced to a synecdoche: ‘I am not the 
society in microcosm. I am a thirty-four-year-old woman with long straight hair and an old 
bikini bathing suit and bad nerves.’57 
The paradox here is that nobody is the society in microcosm, least of all the reader (who, 
in reading, knows themselves, their distinctions, better than anyone). So Didion is 
representative of a lack of representation (I return to and expand on this feature of her writing 
in chapter five), a societal fragmentation. No matter how she tries, some sort of representation 
is inevitable, even if in its own negation. That is not to say that every reader will deeply 
empathise or ‘connect’ with a thirty-four-year-old woman with bad nerves, but that the claim 
against representation does little to ward off potential recognition. This is only compounded 
by the fact that the unnamed husband is John Gregory Dunne, a novelist and screenwriter 
who would have been known to the informed Life reader. Both Didion’s and her husband’s 
celebrity—the sense that some readers will have that they already ‘know’ her—amplifies the 
account’s significance and contributes to the text’s personal voice, shaping the sense of who 
we are reading. This writing, already so self-conscious, brings to mind Cavell’s claim that the 
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work of criticism is to bring a work to consciousness of itself. So how might we do that here? 
By taking its consciousness seriously and closely examining the obvious.   
How is the scene set? We are given the year, the hotel, a naïve child, the weather, and an 
impending natural disaster in the present tense. Didion is positioning the conditions that will 
allow for what she is able to tell us—what we don’t yet know. The details are given 
reluctantly: ‘I had better tell you’. But what does it mean to confess reluctantly when there 
have been no prior demands? Who has coaxed her? Can an essay be a form of interrogation 
in which the author imagines the questions they might be asked? If so, what does the 
presumption of reading nonfiction as a kind of interrogation permit? As Paul de Man writes 
in Allegories of Reading ‘shame used as excuse permits repression to function as revelation and 
thus to make pleasure and guilt interchangeable.’58 If permission can be granted only by 
another, it is given to Didion by the essay’s paredros, the one to whom (or with whom) she 
‘better tell’ her story.   
The key confession is that the family is taking a vacation ‘in lieu of filing for divorce’. Not 
to save the marriage, or improve the relationship, or to give the daughter an illusion of 
stability. Rather, if Didion and Dunne’s lives were not occupied with the trip to Hawaii, the 
absence would be filled by divorce. This orients the reader to think of the vacation, and thus 
its description, as a replacement, a holding pattern. To use de Man’s notion of the 
interchangeable, divorce (guilt) and Hawaii (pleasure) are fungible, dependent on a currency 
of time and attention. These confessions are, in a way, ratified by publication. It is unlikely (I 
hope…) that Didion would have approached a stranger in a bar to declare that her marriage 
was on the brink, yet she is willing to confess it to innumerable strangers (and, presumably, 
at the same time, friends, family, and acquaintances), on the record. There is nothing that 
entirely distinguishes these as different types of confessions; there are no clear differences.  
So how is this social relation developed? The first sentence is addressed in the second 
person, to ‘you,’ employing the reader in an explicit collaboration. Suddenly in direct 
conversation with the author, who presumes that you desire something (and you’re human, 
so you do, and you’re reading, so you do), the reader is reminded of their complicity. And, as 
in Cavell’s reading of Lear, we are complicit and unable to intervene. Lacking the possibility 
of redemption or representation, the reader is left with a moment of pleasure and belief in 
which they can exist. But how is this belief achieved? 
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In order to believe, the reader needn’t commit to a belief in the essay as a reliable collection 
of facts, but must rather acknowledge it as being affectively coherent. This is what is meant 
when I describe belief in the personal voice. So when we take a side, with or against the author 
(or some admixture of both), it will not be based on an exhaustive report, in Cavell’s sense, 
but on a total one. An essay makes certain things obvious, and how we read them depends on 
what and how these things are made obvious. It is obvious that Didion is in a particular place 
and at a particular time. It is not obvious that she will improve her lot. Because the latter isn’t 
obvious, we take it that she herself is not sure, and this indeterminacy becomes the essay’s 
point. 
Adorno’s description of the essay in ‘The Essay as Form’ treats this feature as fundamental 
to the genre’s virtues:  
The essay uses equivocations not out of sloppiness, nor in ignorance of the scientific 
ban on them, but to make it clear—something the critique of equivocation, which 
merely separates meanings, seldom succeeds in doing—that when a word covers 
different things they are not completely different; the unity of the word calls to mind 
a unity, however hidden, in the object itself.59   
What these equivocations require on the reader’s part is similar (although not identical) to 
what Cavell describes as the theatre audience’s role, putting themselves in the present of the 
characters on a stage: 
We are not in, and cannot put ourselves in, the presence of the characters; but we are 
in, or can put ourselves in, their present. It is in making their present ours, their 
moments as they occur, that we complete our acknowledgment of them. But this 
requires making their present theirs.60 
In order to understand our own position in relation to the character we must, Cavell writes, 
‘piece it out totally,’61 which is what we do when confronted with our sudden relation to the 
thirty-four-year-old Joan Didion, accusing us, in her old bikini bathing suit. Whether or not 
we are familiar with other essays by Didion, or her fiction, or biography, ‘In the Islands’ offers 
all the information we need to establish an acknowledgment of this particular personal voice. 
What happens next depends on the expectations formed by the initial acknowledgment.  
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Placed alongside Wallace, Nelson, and Lerner, Didion seems the odd one out. She is 
writing nearly thirty years before Wallace boarded the infamous cruise ship, and more than 
forty years before 10:04 and The Argonauts contemplated the descriptive possibilities of 
literature in the twenty-first century. Her concern with postmodern irony’s destructive 
capabilities has a different emphasis, seeking to maintain a grip on modernist authenticity and 
individualism, rather than accepting what she considered a movement of nihilistic self-
indulgence. In what could unfairly be termed her naïvety, Didion foreshadows a resistance to 
meaninglessness—something we see again in Nelson and Lerner—that is both obvious and 
impossible to describe. ‘I want you to know, as you read me, exactly who I am,’ Didion writes. 
The determination driving this absurd claim dispenses with problems of apodictic knowledge. 
To know exactly who Didion is, here, means to read the essay and imagine her writing it, and 
to hope for anything more exhaustive would be to hope nonsensically.  
Maggie Nelson 
Here is the opening of The Argonauts: 
October, 2007. The Santa Ana winds are shredding the bark off the eucalyptus trees 
in long white stripes. A friend and I risk the widowmakers by having lunch outside, 
during which she suggests I tattoo the words HARD TO GET across my knuckles, 
as a reminder of the pose’s possible fruits. Instead the words I love you come tumbling 
out of my mouth in an incantation the first time you fuck me in the ass, my face 
smashed against the cement floor of your dank and charming bachelor pad. You had 
Molloy by your bedside and a stack of cocks in a shadowy unused shower stall. Does 
it get any better? What’s your pleasure? you asked, then stuck around for an answer. 
 
Before we met, I had spent a lifetime devoted to Wittgenstein’s idea that the 
inexpressible is contained—inexpressibly!—in the expressed. This idea gets less air 
time than his more reverential Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent, 
but it is, I think, the deeper idea, its paradox is, quite literally, why I write, or how I 
feel able to keep writing.62 
There are similarities to the opening of ‘In the Islands’: the year, the location, the violent risks 
of nature, an unnamed partner. But the partner is ‘you,’ and it refers to only one reader (almost 
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certainly not you), establishing the narrative as being addressed, intimately, to Nelson’s 
partner, to whom the book is dedicated, Harry. Any other reader is caught in a kind of 
implicitly permitted voyeurism.  
Like Didion, Nelson introduces the idea of substitution. Instead of having HARD TO GET 
tattooed across her knuckles, she declares her love, or, the words tumble from her, thinly 
separated from her agency. Like Hawaii and divorce, we do not typically see these items as 
exchangeable; and, in this dissonance, Didion and Nelson admit a lack of control. Without 
the structured, perhaps ritualised, event (sex, Hawaii), Nelson and Didion would be moving 
towards solitude or separation, instead of unity. But solitude is deliberately replaced, doubling 
as a picture of the act of reading. It is exchanged for a different type of solitude that reaches 
towards a relation, offering the opportunity to learn about (or experience) other people’s 
yearning. 
This learning occurs within a system of assumed obligations: The reader and writer expect 
one another. Didion opens with the assumption that the figure addressed is asking a question: 
‘Where are you and why?’ The figure Nelson is addressing asks a very explicit question: 
‘What’s your pleasure?’ Where Didion is rhetorically reluctant to cede personal information 
and then ruthlessly defensive of what she reveals (‘I am not the society in microcosm’), Nelson 
is (or gives the impression of being) shamelessly exposed. And the opening is a litmus test: If 
you are not prepared for sex or Wittgenstein, shut the book. Alternately, you can stick around 
for an answer. This is the enunciation, and the reader is invited to place themselves against 
it.  
According to Bersani, ‘The analytic exchange is psychoanalysis’s brilliant discovery of a 
relational context that needs, indeed allows for nothing more than the virtual being.’63 Essays 
allow for a similarly virtual exchange of being. Essays encourage a kind of reader-author 
exchange, in which the author offers a structure in which they can observe the reader acting 
in their place. It is a kind of ‘what-if’ experiment. What if I went on a cruise? What if I 
holidayed in Hawaii to indefinitely defer divorce? What if I was Harry, or a poet who loved 
him, or something in between? A reading of an essay will likely have a ‘What if?’ appended, 
and the exchange it provokes depends on how the reader invests in that question.  
So if the reader of The Argonauts is not Harry, does the reader occupy a position of address 
in lieu of Harry? Against the enunciation’s background, what sort of character is the reader? 
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Is the paredros in The Argonauts a figure placed on a spectrum covering the particular partner 
and the general reader? Yet each reader experiences the text as an individual. Any reading of 
The Argonauts is a particular reading, just as any conversation, though the words may have 
all been spoken before, is a particular conversation. Within the interaction, the reader and 
writer speak for one another, and thus make one another new.   
As the book approaches its climax, during the birth of Nelson and Harry’s son, Harry’s 
voice enters the text, his writing in italics, signified by his name in the margins. This 
retroactively refigures the space the reader has lived in. The addressed addresses. But, at the 
book’s beginning, the reader only knows that they have been grounded in intimacy; they do 
now know what will happen next, but might sense that answers to what this intimacy could 
mean lie in the following pages. If you care, and if you are happy to be Harry—not to pretend 
to be Harry, but to be addressed as him, to respond as he (the pronoun representing the 
information that has been made available so far, the information the reader has before them 
in the continuous present) might—then stay.  
To return to the question that opened this article, this procedure of contextualisation 
makes the text believable in the same way an interlocutor makes a conversation believable, 
by adhering to certain types of convention and consistency that remind us of our ordinary 
obligations and investments. What conventions are at play here? Cavell explains why he, as 
an audience member, cannot intervene in a performance. Because ‘I cannot do and suffer what 
it is another’s to do and suffer, then I confirm the final fact of our separateness. And that is 
the unity of our condition.’64 We are unified by address because we have all experienced other 
people. They address us, we address them. We are all accustomed to interpreting address. 
And after we are swept up in Nelson’s enunciation, we are told that Wittgensteinian 
inexpressibility allows her to write (the italicised ‘why I write’ alluding to Didion’s [or 
Orwell’s] essay with that title). This context clarifies that Harry’s sticking around to get an 
answer does not at all guarantee him an answer. And the reader, becoming the person who 
sticks around for an answer, cannot know whether they will get one, or what form it might 
take. ‘The proof is not a movement,’ Wittgenstein writes, ‘but a route.’65 The Argonauts is one 
such route. What does The Argonauts prove? Something resembling what Cavell refers to as 
the fact of separateness being the final unity of our condition.  
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David Foster Wallace  
Here is the first sentence of ‘A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again’: 
Right now it’s Saturday 18 March and I’m sitting in the extremely full coffee shop of 
the Fort Lauderdale Airport, killing the four hours between when I had to be off the 
cruise ship and when my flight to Chicago leaves by trying to summon up a kind of 
hypnotic sensuous collage of all the stuff I’ve seen and heard and done as a result of 
the journalistic assignment just ended. 66 
The first two words bring the reader into Wallace’s present. The reader is led to acknowledge 
the moment, situating themselves within this particular day, at this particular airport. The 
date is offered as if with a collective first-person pronoun embedded, with the reader existing 
in this new ‘right now’. This sort of proposition is more a gift than an invitation, in that it is 
difficult to refuse, or we would only think about refusing it in a limited set of circumstances.  
This opening is followed by a list that covers several pages, the ‘hypnotic sensuous collage’: 
‘I have learned that there are actually intensities of blue beyond very, very bright blue,’ ‘I have 
now heard—and am powerless to describe—reggae elevator music,’ ‘I have felt as bleak as 
I’ve felt since puberty, and have filled almost three Mead notebooks trying to figure out 
whether it was Them or Just Me.’67 It immerses the reader in Wallace’s fractured process of 
remembering, and thus implicates us in the narrative that follows, which will make these 
fragments whole (or total).  
Like Nelson and Didion, Wallace begins by reminding us of the writing method, that he 
must be compelled to write (whether because he is called on to articulate or comprehend a 
problem, or because it is preferable to spending four hours doing nothing in an airport), and 
that it is effortful. And again, writing is a substitution. The opening is written to kill four 
hours, the implication being that it replaces boredom, or a more hollow absence (because to 
be bored is to be bored with something). Again, the text emerges as a replacement, or part of 
an exchange, just beyond the author’s control. Didion finds herself in Hawaii (not in the 
spiritual sense of self-discovery, but as one finds oneself called to jury duty or a funeral), 
Nelson finds herself in Harry’s apartment, and Wallace finds himself in Fort Lauderdale as 
the result of necessary logistics. Writing is happening because writing is what is left to be 
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done, and it requires the uncovering—or recovering—of a defined self who can write, and fix 
themselves to the words, replacing (or standing in for) the unrecorded, amorphous figure 
typing them.  
In order to conceptualise Wallace’s connection with his audience, we can imagine his 
personal voice as emerging from a variety of stages, each occupying a distinct present. It is 
useful to think through how Wallace’s presence at each stage resembles the Cavellian 
presence of stage actors, contextualised by enunciations and rituals permitting belief. By 
describing the opening as ‘a result of the journalistic assignment just ended,’ Wallace creates 
two textual stages: inside and outside the journalistic assignment. Is this description part of 
the journalistic assignment, a kind of preface, or both? Is it more narratively honest than the 
sections with less explicit metatextuality? What are its structuring assumptions? ‘A 
Supposedly Fun Thing’ has three levels of narration, each offering different answers to these 
questions, each with its own beginning, and each contributing to the overall shape of the 
personal voice that the reader can come to identify. The first brings the reader into the 
moment of writing and reminds them that it is a process of making, and that someone is doing 
the making while drinking coffee and killing time, the second sets up an analytic or thematic 
framework, and the third opens a more or less chronological, if sometimes unfocussed, 
travelogue.  
The essay is divided into 13 numbered sections, and the reader is resituated at the 
beginning of section 2, and then again in section 5. Section 2’s beginning immediately follows 
the sensuous collage: 
More specifically: From 11 to 18 March 1995 I, voluntarily and for pay, underwent a 
7-night Caribbean (7NC) Cruise on board the m.v. Zenith, a 57,255-ton ship owned 
by Celebrity Cruises Inc., one of over twenty cruise lines that currently operate south 
of Florida. 68 
What information is actually important to you? Wallace seems to ask. It is typical of his style, 
darting from technical details to confession to intense (though often ironically distant) affect, 
playing them off against one another. Section 3 continues as a kind of thesis statement, 
theorising that the cruise ship experience is ‘unbearably sad,’69 an attempt to escape the fear 
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of death (‘It makes your existence seem noncontingent.’70) that may just end up reminding 
you of it (especially if you are David Foster Wallace); Section 4 analyses the tone of the 
cruiseliner’s marketing brochure (‘The promise is not that you can experience great pleasure 
but that you will.’71). These sections, contextualised by the second beginning, set the tone, 
and familiarise the reader with Wallace’s attitude. They establish where Wallace is coming 
from, his demeanour.  
And then, there is a third beginning, or situating: section 5 returns to the experiential 
present. We travel to a new present: Wallace is again at Fort Lauderdale but this time 
commencing the trip. After flying to the Caribbean, the reader is brought into a new now: 
‘Right now it’s Saturday 11 March, 1020h., and we are deplaning.’72 What follows is a more 
or less straightforward present tense recount.  
Usually, the interpretation of a beginning depends on what follows. A fascinating example 
of how this sort of enunciation can operate is ‘Forty-One False Starts,’ Janet Malcolm’s essay 
on New York artist David Salle.73 This essay comprises 41 numbered sections, each section a 
possible beginning terminated before it can become anything more than a beginning. The 
result is a boldly self-deprecatory criss-crossing of themes, moments, and angles, assembled 
to form an essay organised by its equivocating. Repeated, explicit descriptions of the subject 
gradually illuminate the relationship between subject and writer as a relationship about 
making. It never resolves, except perhaps at an authorial-structural level, where Malcolm 
visibly arranges the forty-one introductions in a particular order and selects the point at 
which to terminate each of them, where she can go no further.  
Wallace is performing a similar operation, but the supporting structures are less obvious. 
By opening with a description of the beginning of writing, he reminds the reader that these 
words did not always exist, they inhabit or create a present of their own. As with his essay 
‘Up, Simba’—the subject of chapter three of this thesis—the reader is encouraged, with the 
first two beginnings, to take up a position outside the journalistic assignment. It is as if instead 
of writing journalism, Wallace is writing about what happens when a journalistic assignment 
is commissioned, and this meta-layer means that the reader gets to be in on the making. 
                                               
70 Wallace, ‘A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again,’ 264. 
71 Wallace, ‘A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again,’ 267. 
72 Wallace, ‘A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again,’ 269. 
73 Janet Malcolm, ‘Forty-One False Starts,’ in Forty-One False Starts (London: Granta, 2013), 3-38. 
 
  
 
42 
There are many instances of this separation of substance and narration. In section 3, 
Wallace qualifies a description of his childhood penchant for memorising shark-attack fatality 
data with ‘I predict this’ll get cut by the editor.’74 This personal detail facilitates intimacy, and 
it can simultaneously be said that the reader knows more than the author—Wallace 
predicting that the passage will be cut—and is invited to acknowledge the superior author-
figure who is employing the aside as a literary device, because of course the segment was not 
cut. These acknowledgments are not mutually exclusive and taken together they illuminate 
the shared experience (the creation, or invocation of the feeling of what it might be like to 
take a Carnival Cruise and think really hard about it) as an intimate, social belief. It is not 
that there are two Wallaces, but that we are shown multiple aspects of this figure, as we 
might, across time, witness the varying traits and tendencies of a friend, allowing us to build 
a fuller picture of the author as  a person.  
The passage describing the shark attacks is footnoted with the claim that ‘I’m doing this 
from memory.’75 Wallace recognises that any thoughtful reader would understand that the 
stylistic spontaneity does not necessarily reflect the writing process, but he is insisting that 
here, at least, it does (implying that elsewhere it might not). But the reader has no more 
reason to believe this claim than they do that he is in fact ‘right now’ sitting in Fort 
Lauderdale International Airport. Yet this need not cause disbelief, because the social and 
narrative weight of these claims is not dependent on a relation between subject and object 
that must be verified against the external universe. The collapsed, intimate world of the essay 
follows its own rules and establishes its own stakes, and equivocation reinforces rather than 
undermines them.  
Wallace achieves the essay’s sense of intimate continuous presentness by allowing his 
varying levels of authorial authority to supplement one another, like spotlights illuminating 
an object from multiple angles, constructing the text’s personal voice. As the authorial 
attitude is presented from various perspectives, Wallace is clarified and narrowed, and the 
reader is offered the task of pointing the spotlights, and the opportunity to share in Wallace’s 
‘right now’. 
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Ben Lerner 
While Didion, Nelson, and Wallace’s enunciations are in the present tense, the opening 
passage of 10:04 begins in the past continuous: 
The city had converted an elevated length of abandoned railway spur into an aerial 
greenway and the agent and I were walking south along it in the unseasonable warmth 
after an outrageously expensive celebratory meal in Chelsea that included baby 
octopuses the chef had literally massaged to death. We had ingested the impossibly 
tender things entire, the first intact head I had ever consumed, let alone of an animal 
that decorates its lair, has been observed at complicated play.…A few months before, 
the agent had e-mailed me that she could get a ‘strong six-figure’ advance based on a 
story of mine that had appeared in The New Yorker; all I had to do was promise to 
turn it into a novel. I managed to draft an earnest if indefinite proposal and soon there 
was a competitive auction among the major New York houses and we were eating 
cephalopods in what would become the opening scene. ‘How exactly will you expand 
the story?’ she’d asked, far look in her eyes because she was calculating tip. 
‘I’ll project myself into several futures simultaneously,’ I should have said, ‘a minor 
tremor in my hand; I’ll work my way from irony to sincerity in the sinking city, a 
would-be Whitman of the vulnerable grid.’76  
This passage resists analysis because it so explicitly reads itself. However, there are things to 
learn by thinking through its tense and its imagined reader. 10:04 shows how the author-
figure can be temporally unstable while remaining in the reader’s present, creating a stable 
or at least still-recognisable personal voice. The way in which the opening of 10:04 troubles 
the reader, or is untroubling to the reader, is contingent on the reader’s knowing it is a novel. 
If this were the opening of a memoir or biography, the metatextuality would differently 
refigure expectations and temporality; it would be differently subversive.  
The present of 10:04 (a novel named for a moment), equivalent to Wallace’s ‘right now,’ is 
inextricably linked with its mode of address, to the ‘still-uninhabited second person plural’. 
This is the pronoun that the narrator takes to be art’s addressee, a concept introduced about 
halfway through the book when the protagonist tells us that ‘“I think of my audience as a 
second person plural on the perennial verge of existence,” I wanted to say.’77 If, from the 
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narrator’s perspective (a perspective at once spoken and unspoken), the reader does not quite 
yet exist then, from the reader’s perspective, the narrator is always already existing, always 
just now emerging.  
The notion of replacement or substitution in 10:04 is introduced when the reader is told 
what the narrator ‘should have said.’ From what perspective (or temporality) is this preference 
being declared? And from where does this statement source its authority? This declaration 
introduces a backward-looking moment in which the narrator knows better than he once did, 
a new present, similar to the presents made explicit by Didion and Nelson. The reader 
recognises that the book about which the narrator should have made this claim is written, 
and it both is and is not the book in their hands. But it remains uncertain whether the narrator 
‘should’ have explained that he would project himself into several futures (the newly 
introduced moment from which this substitution is made could be one of these futures) 
because that is an accurate description of the text, or because it is what he wishes the text had 
become. The reader can make sense of these techniques because they are concurrent with the 
novel’s present, despite its being a distended, layered, and strange present. So the substitution 
here is a not-quite-substitution. We are not told what the narrator actually said, so the reader 
sees a regret but not specifically what is regretted. We are made comfortable with the 
ambiguity of the textual present, or it is clarified that the present is permanently unclear. 
As with this quasi-substitution, 10:04 frequently features propositions that are neither true 
nor false, and the truth or falsity generally has to do with how we interpret literature’s 
present. Let’s take the metafictional and temporally dizzying sentence that concludes ‘we 
were eating cephalopods in what would become the opening scene.’ This claim disrupts the 
novel’s fictionality—it prompts the reader to consider where Ben Lerner ends and the 
narrator begins. But it does not throw the novel into crisis: it does not constitute an obstacle 
or termination, because it is unlikely that it will cause the reader to, for example, freak out 
and throw the book out the window. This is because the reader, in order to render the text 
affectively coherent, is not required to decipher the novel as a reducible system of signs and 
signifieds. They are simply required to form an attachment to the text’s presence.  
10:04 is not an object about which a subject can be certain, or with which they will have a 
cleanly definable relation. It is a mutual relationship, an instance of Adam Phillips and Leo 
Bersani’s concept of impersonal intimacy: a loving investment in the potential of the self and 
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other.78 The opening of 10:04 is difficult to examine because it puts such emphasis on the 
joining of the future’s possibility with the past’s inflexibility. So the reader is required to 
account for the fact that they cannot know what will happen next, while being constantly on 
the verge of discovering what just happened. Rather than destabilising the reader, this 
positioning of the author as emerging based on a promise (that the reader is on the verge of 
appearing) means that the reader is completing a relationship by becoming present. There is 
a tension here: 10:04 treats the reader as if they were always on the verge of existence, but 
the reader is able to verify that they already exist by the fact that they are reading (among 
other apparent facts). And then the text, like all texts, like all social interactions, both requires 
and initiates their ongoing transformation. This is not surreal. This is what it feels like to be 
alive and to believe. Lerner is simply conjuring the fortune-telling of ordinary conversation.  
The opening of 10:04 approaches a substitution or exchange in which reader and author 
and narrator and paredros hold their ground. The reader does not quite take the narrator’s 
place. The author’s words are not quite the reader’s words. Both continue to exist and have 
existed and will continue to exist; both approach the occupation of one another’s perspective. 
Since the narrative and its author-figure, projected across multiple temporalities, are not 
bound by the strictures of time (in that the book’s present is interminable and can always be 
returned to), this all remains possible and sensible.  
The Essayistic Present 
This chapter is an essay (of sorts) in which essays are used to analyse essays. Character & 
Person and ‘The Avoidance of Love’ are distinctly essayistic, and their method and substance 
are inseparable. Although Character & Person is a book, Frow writes that its structure ‘as a 
whole is something like that of a prolonged essay’: 
a genre that is defined by a double movement: on the one hand towards the coherence 
of a systematic argument, but on the other towards a desire to dwell in the moment, 
giving it its full weight and letting the argument proceed by indirection.79  
As the world’s presentness to us does not rely on our knowledge of it, the essay’s dwelling in 
the moment and gaining momentum through indirection suggests that its aim is 
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acknowledgment, and closer in form to a conversation than an argument in that an argument 
can be settled and a conversation cannot.  
In its essayistic mode Character & Person has two beginnings, each offering a different 
degree of apparent authorial involvement. The preface, which comes before the 
acknowledgments or the contents page, is the first beginning; the second is the first chapter, 
‘Figure.’ The preface explains the book’s tasks and arguments, and clarifies its method and 
structure. And the book begins again with ‘Figure.’ These are rhetorical moves which 
acknowledge that claims are sometimes best made in a criss-crossing, a returning and 
rethinking, rather than by a linear working through. 
The most interesting ‘indirection’ in ‘The Avoidance of Love’—an aspect not 
foreshadowed when the essay’s aims are introduced—is that it develops into an expression of 
horror at the tragedy of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War. The war is not named, 
but America is, and Cavell recognises that his nation’s tragedy resembles Lear’s: 
So it is killing itself and killing another country in order not to admit its helplessness 
in the face of suffering, in order not to acknowledge its separateness. So it does not 
know what its true helplessness is. People say it is imperialist and colonialist, but it 
knows that it wants nothing more. It was told, as if in a prophecy, that no country is 
evil which is not imperialist or colonialist. So it turns toward tyranny, to prove its 
virtue. It is the anti-Marxist country, in which production and possession are unreal 
and consciousness of appreciation and of its promise is the only value.80 
This indictment is all the more powerful for its appearance in an essay on King Lear. Because, 
in the play’s continuous presentness, America is at war as Lear’s court is torn to shreds. In 
this way, tragedy is always present and unresolved. The world is relevant to us as it confronts 
us, whatever its stage.  
The notions advanced by Frow and Cavell are particularly suited to the essayistic, because 
they depend on moments of contradiction that facilitate rather than obstruct. In essays, 
contradiction moves us forward. A character is and is not a person. The actors on a stage are 
both present to us and distant from us. The author-figure behind, or in, an essay, knows us, 
and does not know us, and we know them, and do not know them. We are caught in moment-
to-moment, shifting acknowledgment. This does not mean the relationship is unstable, it 
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simply means that whether or not a reader can say that they know an author depends on their 
use of the verb, how it is meant.  
By looking at the sometimes confessional, sometimes evasive, sometimes generous styles 
of Didion, Nelson, Wallace, and Lerner, we can learn how the construction of an authorial 
figure in these essayistic texts is characterised by a shared sense of time, space, and social 
convention. And, as readers, we develop our picture of the author as we might develop a 
picture of a friend, a figure we acknowledge, trust, and believe. The recurrent theme of 
substitution emphasises the significance of possibility in equivocation, and the possibility is 
enlivened (or kept alive) by the reader’s complicity. As with any social relation, we enter into 
it by way of our accepting a set of conditions. That these conditions are amorphous and ever-
changing does not mean that they are indescribable, it simply means that they are ordinary, 
that they are governed by context and use. 
According to Cavell, 
The skeptic…forgoes the world for just the reason that the world is important, that 
it is the scene and stage of connection with the present: he finds that it vanishes exactly 
with the effort to make it present.81  
This is the supreme challenge. This is why ‘suspension of disbelief’ is a profound misnomer. 
We are frequently threatened with disbelief, but are accustomed to resisting it. It is more 
accurate to describe the pains we go to in insisting that an author is unknowable, or actors 
pretending, or a film imaginary, as suspension of belief. I fled The Three Little Pigs because belief 
came effortlessly. It still comes effortlessly. What we learn, with experience—for the sake of 
pleasure and getting on with things—is to manage the damage the wolf does us. 
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2 
Friendliness 
You must have a little patience. I have undertaken, you see, to write not only my life, but my opinions 
also; hoping and expecting that your knowledge of my character, and of what kind of a mortal I am, 
by the one, would give you a better relish for the other: As you proceed farther with me, the slight 
acquaintance, which is now beginning betwixt us, will grow into familiarity; and that unless one of 
us is in fault, will terminate in friendship. 
Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy 
 
Nothing shall I, while sane, compare with a dear friend. 
Horace via Montaigne, ‘On Friendship’ 
-- 
You are in conversation with a friend—let’s call him Ned—and you are recounting an 
especially funny passage from ‘A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again’. But rather than 
admitting that you encountered the passage in an essay by David Foster Wallace, you say, 
‘This happened to a friend of mine.’ What kind of lie are you telling? It seems to be an 
exaggeration, in that to characterise Wallace as a friend is to amplify certain aspects of your 
relationship with him. This is, for the most part, because friendship suggests reciprocity, or 
some mutual endorsement.  
And what if you are found out? Later, Ned comes across the essay, notices the story, and 
says that you lied to him about your relation with its narrator. He could claim ‘You lied to 
me,’ or ‘You were only imagining that David Foster Wallace is your friend.’ The first would 
mean I had been misleading him, the second would mean I had been delusional. Neither is 
desirable. How might I respond to Ned after being found out? I could double-down, insisting 
that Wallace was indeed my friend, proving myself delusional, or I could admit to lying. Or, 
third, maybe nearest the truth, I could say that I had been speaking metaphorically.  
There is no doubt that the pleasures we find in reading overlap with the pleasures of 
intimacy we find in friendship; because we recognise the author, we might believe that they 
recognise us. We find comfort in becoming part of a relation that expands our sense of 
emotional or intellectual possibility. One way to come to appreciate an author is by comparing 
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them to people we know. This chapter asks: What happens when we redescribe the author-
reader relationship as a friendship, specifically from the reader’s point of view? This line of 
thought has obvious limitations (the author and reader are plainly not friends, and it would 
be a disservice to the pleasure of reading to entirely reduce its description to the terms of a 
social relationship), and I want to find out where those limits are.  
Most of this chapter is dedicated to understanding how a contract between author and 
reader resembles a social relation. In order to ground my thinking, I apply it to two brief 
essays. Examining one 500-word piece (almost a fragment) by Janet Malcolm: ‘Thoughts on 
Autobiography from an Abandoned Autobiography,’ I ask some questions about the essay, 
and attempt to construct my account of authorial or textual friendship to describe how the 
process of Malcolm’s appearing to the reader as a character in her essay compares to the 
formation of a social relation. The chapter ends with an examination of Montaigne’s ‘On 
Liars’. While this essay is a historical outlier in this thesis, I use it as an example from the 
form’s originator to show how certain of the essay’s typical features, such as self-deprecation 
and confession, invite an evaluation of the author’s friendliness. Comparing Montaigne with 
the other authors included in this thesis suggests which characteristics are endemic to the 
form, and which are endemic to (or at least accentuated by) the contemporary moment.  
In order to think about friendship, I will examine how the friendliness of a text’s personal 
voice shapes the experience of reading. My interest in friendliness as an evaluable aesthetic 
and affect is prompted by recent challenges to the prevalence of suspicious critique and 
theorising. As outlined in the introduction, Rita Felski’s The Limits of Critique offers one such 
challenge, as does a recent collection co-edited by Felski, Critique and Postcritique. Toril Moi 
offers another in The Revolution of the Ordinary. This chapter attempts to resist critique by 
remaining grounded in the particular rather than looking to generalise. Felski calls this form 
of reading a ‘micro-aesthetics’, 1 while Moi calls it ‘thinking through examples’.2 Its success 
depends on the fullness of its description rather than the comprehensiveness of its 
disassembling. ‘We shortchange the significance of art,’ Felski writes, ‘by focusing on the “de” 
                                               
1 Rita Felski, Uses of Literature (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 133. 
2 Toril Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary Studies After Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2017), 88-110. 
 
  
 
50 
prefix (its power to demystify, destabilize, denaturalize) at the expense of the “re” prefix: its 
ability to recontextualize, reconfigure, or recharge perception.’3 
In the introduction to Critique and Postcritique, Felski and Elizabeth S. Anker write that 
‘attending to the diagnostic, allegorical, and self-reflexive facets of critique will allow us to 
better understand why it has proven such an enduring as well as gratifying approach.’4 The 
project of postcritique is not to abandon critical approaches, but to establish why critique has 
so long been taken for granted as a primary mode of inquiry. So, what I take from postcritique 
is not a rejection of critique, but a scepticism regarding the generalising and overwhelming 
force of a purely critical stance. In this thesis I am not seeking to totally dispense with critical 
(or even suspicious) methodologies, but rather I wish to consider the contexts in which it 
might be appropriate to deploy critique, and the contexts in which it might be appropriate to 
put those tools aside. To ensure I am not entirely uncritical—that I remain aware of the 
hazards of assuming some kind of social intimacy between author and reader—I engage with 
Sianne Ngai’s description of the aesthetic of the ‘interesting’, using it as a critical model for 
interrogating the aesthetic category of friendliness. Ngai is especially useful for 
understanding the ways in which this kind of aesthetic experience is commodified under late 
capitalism, and how close examination of such experience can reveal what conventions of 
judgment and evaluation elide.   
My conceptualisation of friendship derives from Alexander Nehamas’s book On Friendship, 
which traces the history of friendship as a philosophical and social concept while challenging 
the impulse to tie the quality of a friendship to its moral character. I am not offering anything 
like a total accounting for the western tradition of friendship as it applies to the reader-author 
relationship. Nor am I making a claim for friendship as the only or even best possible model 
for the reader-author relationship. Perhaps we could gain just as much insight by describing 
the affective relation between reader and author as professional, didactic, romantic, 
antagonistic, or familial. A different project could fruitfully describe the relationship as being 
between analyst and analysand (or two analysands). But I try out friendship for a number of 
reasons. The relation is especially difficult to generalise or describe exhaustively, so it offers 
a way to discuss a literary intersubjectivity grounded in particulars and not defined by (or 
constantly resisting) a friend’s apparent incapacity to wholly know or instrumentalise the 
                                               
3 Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 17. 
4 Elizabeth S. Anker and Rita Felski. eds, Critique and Postcritique (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University, 
2017), 3-4. 
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other. (We cannot be sure of an author’s intentions, or what was in their mind when they 
wrote what we are reading. Similarly, there are limits to what we can understand of our 
friends, as there are limits to what we want to understand.) Finally, this description permits 
the assumption that a text is not inevitably tricking or deceiving us (and nor is the 
enchantment or belief upon which reading is dependent necessarily inherently deceptive), 
diverting attention from seeking clues to uncover some presumed hidden truth. It encourages 
a reading that is grounded in the Wittgensteinian edict that ‘nothing is hidden’.  
 ‘When Wittgenstein insists that nothing is hidden,’ Moi writes, ‘he does not mean that 
everything is self evident. He means that we shouldn’t go around thinking that language 
itself—our sentences, our utterances—hides something just because it is language.’ Taking a 
Wittgensteinian attitude in order to do away with critical conceptions of textual surface and 
depth, Moi explains that ‘The suspicious reader is convinced that the text leads us astray. 
Wittgenstein thinks that we get lost in our own words, in our own unacknowledged or 
imperfectly understood assumptions.’5 Thinking about an author’s friendliness is one way of 
acknowledging the assumptions we make that govern interpretation, and of wondering why 
the natural path taken by criticism maintains the assumption that the reader is being deceived, 
a posture anathema (or, at least, not conducive) to friendship.  
Moi uses psychoanalysis, often thought exemplary of a certain kind of beneath-the-surface 
critical investigation, as an example of the opposite: ‘The psychoanalyst observes and listens. 
He looks and listens to his analysand’s expression, and thinks.’6 The evidence and findings 
are no deeper or less superficial than the words spoken by the analysand or the analyst, they 
are simply the result of attentive and studied reading. That is not to say that ordinary 
language philosophy doesn’t allow for deception, or presumes that a text should not be 
questioned. It maintains that philosophical or interpretive work should examine language in 
its particular context and not look to generalise its findings. This means treating texts as 
actions, which requires a spirit of inquiry that can account for a wide range of responses, so a 
text can still be judged to be deceptive, just as it can be taken to be trustworthy. Moi elegantly 
summarises this way of reading when describing it as a ‘practice of acknowledgment’: 
                                               
5 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 180-81. 
6 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 186. 
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To say that texts are actions and expressions is to remind us of the obvious: that 
sentences, utterances, texts don’t generate themselves; that they are spoken or written 
by someone at a particular time, in a particular place; that words reveal the speaker; 
that once words are uttered they can’t be undone; that utterances, like other actions, 
have consequences, ripple effects spreading far beyond the original moment of 
utterance.7 
Because there is no possibility of a functional general theory of language (and no obvious need 
for a general theory of language) the work of reading and literary studies is best characterised 
as beginning in a place of confusion and looking to dissolve the particular trouble being 
caused by that confusion. Writing about examining Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 
Cavell rejects the notion that he is establishing an ‘approach’ to the text:  
Approach suggests moving nearer, getting closer; hence it suggests that we are not 
already near or close enough; hence suggests we know some orderly direction to it 
not already taken within it; that we sense some distance between us and it which useful 
criticism could close.8 
Instead, Cavell begins with a ‘blur or block’: his understanding of Wittgenstein’s definition 
of ‘criterion’ and the fact that its use is ‘an everyday one’. This chapter is a stab at this kind of 
criticism; I begin with something I don’t understand by attempting to describe how feelings 
resembling an ordinary sense of friendship can be felt by the reader when reading an essay. 
The block described has to do with the definition of friendship. Why is it immediately obvious 
that the author and reader are not friends? And why would a reader’s claim that an author 
was their friend be a cause for embarrassment? How do we square this with the knowledge 
that the pleasure of a text seems so frequently to emerge alongside something like a 
friendship, or at least a social relation, with its author? What does it mean that reading can 
remind us of being in the presence of a person? This affective intersection is difficult to talk 
about without descending into sentimental platitudes or (worse?) crafting a theoretical 
system in an attempt to universalise the explanation. Yet it is precisely these risks, and the 
resistance against these impulses, that make the effort worthwhile.  
  
                                               
7 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 196. 
8 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), 6. 
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Friendliness, Affective and Aesthetic 
The first chapter examined the ease with which a reader can come to believe in a text and its 
author. Here, I want to speak more specifically to how, once the author is believed in, they 
take on a specific character in a reader’s mind, forming a connection comparable to a friendly 
social relation. While I don’t believe friendliness constitutes the defining element of a text’s 
personal voice, I take friendliness to contribute to the reader’s picture of the personal voice, a 
contribution that will in turn be shaped by the reader’s particular relation with the text. I will 
refer to instances where a reader might find an author to be friendly as entailing literary 
friendliness. To be precise, literary friendliness is a feeling of presence that gives the reader a 
nourishment resembling that given by social relations, a friendliness the reader feels towards 
the text’s personal voice. Another word for this is company.9  
In The Limits of Critique, Felski writes that recent work in literary studies, guided by what 
Ricoeur calls the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion,’ has largely been motivated by ‘a spirit of 
disenchantment’.10 To counter this tendency, she examines how and why suspicion can be 
such an overwhelming force, and considers some alternatives. The book is a sequel of sorts 
to Uses of Literature, published in 2008. In Uses, Felski takes seriously affective states 
associated with reading that might traditionally be considered trivial, where she aims to 
‘rough out, if you will, the shape of a positive aesthetics.’11 Following Felski’s methodological 
lead—particularly with respect to the experience of what she refers to as enchantment—I 
would describe literary friendliness as a positive aesthetic, emphasising that by positive I do 
not mean uncomplicatedly virtuous. To take a positive attitude when engaging with a text 
does not mean presuming that examining the text will yield a positive ethical outcome, just 
as taking a positive attitude towards a person who enters our lives does not guarantee any 
particular outcome. 
Felski refutes the critical assumption that to attend to affects such as enchantment is to 
surrender to a naïve feeling ‘imperiously dictating the terms of its reception.’12 She writes 
that 
                                               
9 Wayne Booth deploys this term in The Company We Keep. However, in that book he is primarily interested in 
the ethical implications of reading as a social experience. I am interested in the affective and perceptual 
implications, which may have ethical implications but they are not necessarily righteous.  
10 Felski, The Limits of Critique, 2. 
11 Felski, Uses of Literature, 22. 
12 Felski, Uses of Literature, 57. 
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Once we face up to the limits of demystification as a critical method and a theoretical 
ideal, once we relinquish the modern dogma that our lives should become thoroughly 
disenchanted, we can truly begin to engage the affective and absorptive, the sensuous 
and somatic qualities of aesthetic experience.13  
In criticism, enchantment is generally interpreted as a signal that there is more 
demystification to be done. ‘If critics leave any room for enchantment,’ Felski writes, ‘they 
are inclined to diagnose it as a displacement of real-world issues, a symptom of something 
else.’14 To be absorbed by a text, according to this critical spirit, is to be missing something.  
Imagine if our primary mode of evaluating friendship was one of political suspicion. If we 
were to approach friendship with the goal of uncovering what lies beneath, it would be 
difficult to engage in the generosity required to maintain and take both pleasure in and 
support from the relation. In my description of the personal voice as friendly, I am arguing 
for a generous rather than diagnostic evaluation. This does not mean forgoing scrutiny or 
reasonable scepticism; it is an attempt to manage the analysis paralysis or caustic paranoia 
that excessive critique can cause. Note that Felski is calling for a relinquishing of exhaustive 
disenchantment, not abandoning disenchantment altogether.  
In addition to enchantment, Uses establishes a vocabulary of recognition, knowledge, and 
shock. I would like to add friendliness to this taxonomy, which I take to be interpretable as 
both an affect, in that its presence can be felt or conveyed, and an evaluable aesthetic. Friendly 
is a term we use to refer to the possibility of finding some greater connection, or the absence 
of a block that would prevent us from discovering or being discovered by the described object. 
If I evaluate an object’s friendliness, I am wondering how it might appreciate me, and whether 
I will be permitted to appreciate it.  
In addition to taking my cue from Felski’s methodology, my examination of the aesthetic 
nature of friendliness is influenced by Sianne Ngai’s Our Aesthetic Categories. Here Ngai 
describes the zany, the cute, and the interesting as traditionally marginalised critical tools. 
Yet, she argues, they  
                                               
13 Felski, Uses of Literature, 76. 
14 Felski, Uses of Literature, 57. 
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are compelling reminders of the general fact of social difference and conflict 
underlying the entire system of aesthetic judgment or taste, making that underlying 
condition transparent in ways in which many other aesthetic categories do not.15 
I want to make a similar claim about friendliness: it is a preliminary criterion describing social 
potential. It would be absurd to claim that Janet Malcolm, for example, is my friend. However, 
we can call an author friendly (or unfriendly), and embedded in the term friendly is the 
intimation that its subject might become your friend, or, appears willing to become your friend. 
If used to refer to something other than a person it is a judgment suggesting an opportunity 
to experience some greater affect. In her chapter on recognition, Felski rejects the critical 
tendency to describe a reader’s recognising or misrecognising a feature of a text as their 
buying into a fallacy of constructed selfhood. This method reinforces the critical ‘conviction 
that our everyday intuitions about persons are mystified all the way down’ and encourages 
the critic to undertake a ‘slash-and-burn interrogation of the notion of identity’.16 Felski’s 
version of recognition is, instead, Cavellian: depending on acknowledgment rather than 
knowledge of the other.17 In other words, a reader who recognises in an essayist their own 
weakness or hope or self-doubt is not refusing the work’s alterity; instead, they are taking the 
first step in coming to terms with it.   
This social structure of literary friendliness can also be compared to the framework 
developed by Deidre Shauna Lynch in her 2015 book, Loving Literature, in which she examines 
the emergence of a division between intimate emotional investment in literature and the more 
staid academic approach that privileges objective evaluation. Lynch describes her subject as 
being 
the species of sociably minded animism that readers indulge when they designedly 
make a home with romantic poetry or keep company with their favorite authors—
whenever they conceive of literature as something more than an object that might 
instruct or move them or prompt their admiration.18 
                                               
15 Sianne Ngai, Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2012), 11. 
16 Felski, Uses of Literature, 28. 
17 Felski, Uses of Literature, 29-30. 
18 Deidre Shauna Lynch, Loving Literature: A Cultural History, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2015), 7. 
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Lynch traces this social aspect of reading to the early nineteenth century, when literature 
developed into something that did not necessarily need to be ‘used’. She proposes that  
We don’t treat literature as a thing but as a person: lovers of literature construct the 
aesthetic relation as though it put them in the presence of other people and with the 
understanding that the ethical relations so conjured must not be instrumentalized.19  
This invitation, resembling the social demand that we not instrumentalise other people, 
underpins the relation between reader and author. When the relation can be understood as 
social, this means that there is a horizon at which critique is no longer constructive. This is a 
matter at hand when I talk about trust in a text’s personal voice. As in friendship, the relation 
is at its best when we come to trust in it for the sake of its history and context, for what it has 
already shown us, what we hope it will show us in the future. Of course a reader may choose 
to instrumentalise literature (or simply find themselves doing so) or come to dislike an 
essayist. I am not arguing that in order to take something from a text we must find it friendly. 
Rather, I am tracing how literary friendliness can show us what it means to be a generous 
reader.  
As with Moi’s interpretation of psychoanalysis as a mode of attentive reading, Leo Bersani 
advocates for a style of reading that tracks a shift from suspicion to trust, by using a 
psychoanalytic model that is determinedly superficial (rather than one that seeks out hidden 
depths). Bersani proposes that some form of recognition of the other in a text is unavoidable, 
and, in fact, eventually makes interpretation or demystification impossible: 
[w]riting may begin to operate as the activity we call literature when, by a particular 
kind of replicative insistence which I shall try to define, it erodes its own statements 
and thereby blocks interpretation.20 
He argues that  
Art interprets the sexual by repeating it as perceivable forms; and what we call 
criticism interprets art by repeating its formalizing projects as ironic recognitions of 
their evanescent visibility. Critical interpretation would therefore be another exercise 
of self-conscious repetition, with, so to speak, an aggravated irony in the repetition. 21 
                                               
19 Lynch, Loving Literature, 8. 
20 Leo Bersani, Thoughts and Things (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 11. 
21 Bersani, Thoughts and Things,110. 
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To recognise a text’s friendliness (or unfriendliness) is to acknowledge a behaviour that 
intimates further affective possibilities, and to discuss a work’s friendliness is to be aware, 
ironically, of the ways in which the friendliness is irreducible, and cannot be isolated and 
pointed to as we might point to someone we know. 
So what exactly does it mean to say something or someone is friendly? A document’s 
wording, a room’s lighting, the design of a website: to refer to these things as friendly is to 
mean that they are welcoming. Or we could be told that a dog is friendly to assuage fears that 
he might bite. It is a superficial judgment with aesthetic and affective implications. It depends 
on limited information or invites further qualification: ‘He seems friendly’; ‘she’s pretty 
friendly’. It suggests that not all the data is available. Two countries that were once at war 
might now have ‘friendly relations’: their relationship may yet improve or deteriorate. ‘He’s 
friendly, although I’m not sure I want to be his friend.’ Here, the word implies that the subject 
is open to friendship and, in some sense, it always holds that the friendly person or thing is 
approachable, that they can be asked for more.  
The word is often dependent on its negative partner, ‘unfriendly.’ It seems that to describe 
someone as friendly is, at minimum, to confirm that they are not unfriendly (although to 
describe someone as ‘not unfriendly’ is to mean something entirely different), whereas to 
describe a person as ‘unfriendly’ is to describe a prickly, unwelcoming presence, rather than 
an absence of friendliness. If I wanted to emphasise not simply that my dog will not bite but 
that he will be affectionate, I would probably describe him as being so friendly.  
Friendliness usually signifies the opening of a possibility, akin to Ngai’s concept of the 
‘merely interesting’. Ngai describes the ‘merely interesting’ as falling ‘somewhere between an 
affect and a desire’.22 To proclaim that something is interesting is, for Ngai, is to open up an 
ongoing passage of inquiry; it is ‘a judgment that shoves us from judgment to justification, 
that hurries past the first moment in its eagerness to arrive at the next.’23 Similarly, the 
aesthetic of friendliness is an invitation to pay closer attention in order to establish whether 
we can move beyond it, perhaps to friendship. It is also the kind of judgment to which we 
could prepend a ‘mere’. In being the promise of something more, friendliness is also an 
inherent lack, an absence of what may or may not come next.  
                                               
22 Ngai, Our Aesthetic Categories, 116. 
23 Ngai, Our Aesthetic Categories, 169. 
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While the affect/aesthetic of literary friendliness is less ambiguously suggestive than 
Ngai’s ‘interesting’, its characteristic features are still difficult to pin down. This is further 
explored when I outline Nehamas’s definition of friendship but, for now, his most relevant 
claim is that, when supplying reasons for a friendship’s existence, ‘attempts at explanation 
can go only so far.’24 Each friendship is grounded in and generated from particulars.  
Ngai writes that ‘Difficult as it often is to recognise “interesting” as an aesthetic judgment 
(that is, as a subjective, feeling-based evaluation), the interesting seems even harder to 
understand, intuitively, as an objective style.’25 This is because to judge something as 
interesting is to slide between an affective response and a conceptual evaluation. Ngai argues 
that 
Whether invoked in the spirit of science, history, or art, the evaluation of ‘interesting’ 
is always affective (however minimally or equivocally so). ‘Interesting’ can thus be a 
way of linking feeling-based judgments to concept-based explanations under the 
radar—even making it appear as if aesthetic evaluations have a logical relation to facts. 
Indeed, the movement the interesting enables between aesthetic and nonaesthetic 
judgments mirrors a relay between pleasure and cognition internal to the experience 
of the interesting itself….26  
Ngai’s description offers a useful model for piecing out how aesthetic judgments encompass 
and relate to affective response. When it comes to friendliness, the judgment masks a slide 
into a future relation, describing not only a virtue of the object being referred to, but 
promising yet to be discovered virtues that will be revealed when it interacts with some other 
object that is compatible with its friendliness. From this aesthetic judgment we derive an 
affective relation. This claim is central to my argument, because this is a thesis about 
inference, and how we infer an author’s character or identity. Thinking about friendliness, or 
its lack, is a way of thinking about what a text makes possible while leaving room for 
productive critique.  
Ngai notes that ‘The experience of the interesting can quickly turn into one of obsession’, 
and the same is true of the experience of friendliness. 27 The reason we would find it unsettling 
to hear a reader referring to an author they’ve never met as their friend is that it suggests an 
                                               
24 Alexander Nehamas, On Friendship (New York: Basic Books), 109. 
25 Ngai, Our Aesthetic Categories, 112. 
26 Ngai, Our Aesthetic Categories, 128-29. 
27 Ngai, Our Aesthetic Categories, 27. 
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unhealthy delusion born of obsession. And friendliness itself is by no means straightforwardly 
virtuous or welcoming. Under capitalism, corporations evince friendliness in order to 
diminish any sense that the relationship might be exploitative. Under patriarchy, homosocial 
friendliness is used to sustain male privilege, a mechanism that excludes women from the 
groups in which power is located. It would be foolish to presume that the sense of friendliness 
conveyed by a text is not, in some sense, a potential disguise. That is not to say it is always 
covering a nefarious ulterior purpose, but rather that to embrace the sense can mean to be 
distracted from qualities that warrant critique. For example, in Wallace’s essays, his elaborate 
performance of empathy and self-awareness may make certain readers want to like him 
unqualifiedly and therefore forgive or gloss over instances of misogyny. In fact, much 
scholarly work on Wallace tends to function as a paean rather than a response. (One notable 
exception to this is Claire Hayes-Brady, who dedicates a chapter of her book, The Unspeakable 
Failures of David Foster Wallace, to Wallace’s vexed representations of women and 
relationships.28) This is where it is necessary, when evaluating friendliness, to leave room for 
critique.  
So how to embody a mode of study that can be at once generous and aware of the pitfalls 
of unquestioning generosity? As I have argued above, this mode finds its most convincing 
expression in ordinary language philosophy. In elaborating its application to literary studies, 
Moi is able to sustain the possibility of political critique while undoing traditional modes of 
universal suspicion because her strategy depends on what she refers to as a Wittgensteinian 
‘spirit of inquiry,’ which can be both critical and joyful, adapting to its context. (Moi, in 
describing this spirit, acknowledges Felski’s description of this approach as a ‘thought style’ 
or ‘mood’.29) In Revolution of the Ordinary, exemplifying the political value of ordinary 
language philosophy, Moi outlines how feminist political work can be done in a way that is 
necessarily dependent neither on ongoing critique nor on an uncritical stance: 
A feminist inspired by ordinary language philosophy would be unlikely to set out to 
theorize ‘intersectionality’ or ‘identity’ as such. Instead, she would focus on a specific 
problem that troubles and confuses her, maybe by looking at some examples. The 
work of theory would be an effort to reach clarity—to find a clear view—of that 
                                               
28 Clare Hayes-Brady, The Unspeakable Failures of David Foster Wallace: Language, Identity, and Resistance (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 167-192. 
29 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 2. 
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problem. We can think of this as laying bare the criteria governing a certain region of 
women’s oppression, or of intersectionality.30  
This recalls Cavell’s strategy of beginning a critical exploration with a blur or block, and it 
is in this vein, that I wish to look at a brief essay by Janet Malcolm, in order to get a sense of 
how literary friendliness can work to invite the reader in, or keep them out.  
Janet Malcolm and Autobiography 
Janet Malcolm’s ‘Thoughts on Autobiography from an Abandoned Autobiography’ first 
appeared in 2010 on the New York Review of Books’ website, on their NYR Daily blog,31 but 
its appearance as the final piece in Malcolm’s 2013 essay collection Forty-One False Starts: 
Essays on Artists and Writers is particularly suggestive. I examine this essay because it is at 
once intimate yet distant, unfinished yet final, prickly yet caring, friendly yet unfriendly. It is 
an essay about solitude that is difficult to get at. 
‘I have been aware,’ Malcolm begins, ‘as I write this autobiography, of a feeling of boredom 
with the project.’ She finds that she cannot make herself seem ‘interesting’. There is no subject 
about whom to write aside from herself, no muse for Malcolm to reflect on or think through. 
This boredom with the self seems sociopathic and, on its face, a deterrent. What are we to 
make of this figure who is unable to self-reflect? What is the use of continuing to read if the 
writer does not find her self and her subject worth her own attention? For substance she has 
only her memory and ‘Memory is not a journalist’s tool.’ Malcolm laments that her ‘powers 
of invention’ necessary for autobiography have atrophied due to years of her work being done 
‘by one brilliant self-inventive collaborator after another’. She feels she is not up to the 
required shift in the meaning of the first-person pronoun, which, in journalism, ‘resembles 
the relationship of a judge pronouncing sentence on a guilty defendant.’ Malcolm contrasts 
this with the sentimental ‘I’ of autobiography as telling the story of its subject ‘as a mother 
might.’ ‘Autobiography,’ she explains, ‘is an exercise in self-forgiveness,’ of which Malcolm 
has evidently deemed herself incapable.  
The essay ends: 
                                               
30 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 108-09. 
31 Janet Malcolm, ‘Thoughts on Autobiography from an Abandoned Autobiography,’ The New York Review of 
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I see that my journalist’s habits have inhibited my self-love. Not only have I failed to 
make my young self as interesting as the strangers I have written about, but I have 
withheld my affection. In what follows I will try to see myself less coldly, be less fearful 
of writing a puff piece. But it may be too late to change my spots.32 
The self-effacement belittles both her character and her ability. The reader of Forty-One False 
Starts, who has just spent a book with Malcolm, is abruptly introduced to the author’s failing 
self-esteem, and invited to reimagine the success of the previous essays as dependent on their 
subjects. The personal voice built up by the previous essays is suddenly dramatically 
refigured. But the premise of the collection, which is that Janet Malcolm wrote what is 
collected, means that the reader is probably already on her side, and at least believes that the 
author is worth their attention.  
What does it mean to separate the slightly hopeful Malcolm who wrote the piece, and the 
later Malcolm who chose to title it ‘Thoughts on Autobiography from an Abandoned 
Autobiography’? And then the Malcolm who decided to include the fragmentary introductory 
piece as the final essay in a collection? If we treat this essay as something like a conversation 
between author and reader, what shape does Malcolm take? Do these multiple authors, 
scattered across points in time, merge? How might the reader locate the origin of her voice(s) 
in this piece? What might the reader find interesting or friendly about the figure or character 
of Malcolm that is conveyed?  
The answers to these questions are embedded in a dialogue, the participants in which are 
the essay’s final sentence and its title. The hypothetical ‘may’ wonders at a possibility that the 
definitive ‘abandoned’ has preemptively closed off. The reader witnesses Malcolm’s loss of 
innocence, her transformation from hoping to write an autobiography to knowing she will 
not. There is a distinction between the writer the piece describes and the author the piece 
implies. Here, the gap is between the Malcolm who is cautiously optimistic about ‘what 
follows,’ and the Malcolm who titled the piece, who knows that nothing follows. So this essay 
is a record of failure. But the reader is not interviewing Malcolm for a job as an 
autobiographer (for which, presumably, this fragment would disqualify her). So how is 
Malcolm being valued? 
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A Pact 
In order to answer that question, let us consider what the reader might expect from Malcolm. 
What are the conditions of the contract that the reader accepts when they read this particular 
work? One term that refers to these conditions and their influence is genre. John Frow, in his 
book Genre, treats the concept as ‘a universal dimension of textuality,’ rather than a 
classificatory system. In other words, to talk about genre is to talk about the assumptions we 
hold, whatever they may be, as we begin to read. ‘The book’s central argument, then,’ Frow 
writes, 
is that far from being merely stylistic devices, genres create effects of reality, truth, 
authority and plausibility, which are central to the different ways the world is 
understood in the writing of history or of philosophy or of science, or in painting, or 
in everyday talk. These effects are not, however, fixed and stable, since texts—even 
the simplest and most formulaic—do not ‘belong’ to genres but are, rather, uses of 
them; they refer not to ‘a’ genre but to a field or economy of genres, and their 
complexity derives from the complexity of that relation.33 
So, in this sense, when referring to the essays I examine as autobiographical, I am not 
claiming that they are simply autobiography, but rather interrogating how and to what ends 
they make use of the conventions associated with autobiography. 
It is in this mode that Phillippe LeJeune approaches the genre of autobiography in his essay 
‘The Autobiographical Pact’. LeJeune, wondering whether it is possible to define 
autobiography, outlines how the contract between reader and author sustains an 
autobiographical mode of reading. Given how he begins, LeJeune’s conclusion regarding how 
one might describe autobiography is surprisingly compatible with Moi’s approach to literary 
studies and Frow’s elastic description of genre. Having set out to create a definition, LeJeune 
discovers that ‘To succeed in giving a clear and complete formula of autobiography would be, 
in reality, to fail.’ 34 Each instance of this contract is best examined in its particularity, rather 
than its universalisability and, while there are criteria, they are not fixed.  
The question of the autobiographical pact arises for LeJeune in his attempt to show how we 
distinguish between autobiography and the autobiographical novel.35 What is specific about 
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the reading mode of autobiography in terms of the reader’s expectations? The pact exists 
outside the body of text, in which the reader honours the author’s ‘signature’. Thus, the issue 
of the author’s name becomes vitally important, nearly always displayed on the book’s cover, 
and it is this named identity with whom the reader strikes an agreement. Even though 
Malcolm’s autobiography is abandoned, it remains autobiographical. However, it is not the 
Malcolm who is conveyed in the text’s body—the Malcolm of the text’s present—with whom 
the reader forms the pact, but rather the Malcolm of the text’s future, the Malcolm who 
consigns the autobiography as having been abandoned, the Malcolm of the byline.  
For LeJeune, the pact is central to how we interpret autobiography. I adopt two notions 
from his essay that I take to be as compatible with the personal essayistic texts examined 
throughout this thesis as they are with the genre of autobiography. The first is that there are 
multiple authorial levels that influence how the reader perceives the author. This is summed 
up by his claim that 
[F]or the reader, who does not know the real person, all the while believing in his 
existence, the author is defined as a person capable of producing this discourse, and so 
he imagines what he is like from what he produces. 36 
The second central notion I take from ‘The Autobiographical Pact’ has to do with the way in 
which the picture of the author is contingent on the authorial identity (or character), which 
in turn is influenced by the nature of the generic contract. According to Lejeune, confusion 
around the nature of autobiographical narration usually results from a conflation of the 
‘grammatical problems of person with the problems of identity.’37 In other words, the 
question of an autobiography’s generic legitimacy does not hang entirely on the 
representation’s resemblance to reality. Ambiguity regarding the accuracy of the 
representation does not necessarily destabilise the reader’s acceptance of the authorial 
identity, based on which they then evaluate the resemblance of the text to reality. 
Autobiographical fiction might be an exact representation (as far as such a thing is possible) 
of the author’s life, and an autobiography might be an inexact representation but, Lejeune 
argues, these questions of fact ‘have no bearing on questions of right, that is to say, on the 
type of contract entered into between reader and author.’38 
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In order to clarify how the autobiographical pact operates, Lejeune separates ‘identity’ 
from ‘resemblance’: 
Identity is a fact immediately grasped—accepted or refused, at the level of enunciation; 
resemblance is a relationship subject to infinite discussions and nuances, established 
from the utterance.39 
LeJeune speaks of resemblance in terms of the degree to which a narrative more or less 
resembles a reality external to the text. He proposes that there exists a ‘referential pact’ 
between reader and author:  
In biography, it is resemblance that must ground identity; in autobiography, it is 
identity that grounds resemblance. Identity is the real starting point of autobiography; 
resemblance is the impossible horizon of biography.40 
LeJeune’s analysis is useful beyond the autobiography and even when considering fictional 
works. The fact of the author and what they have done will inevitably shape our perception 
of the text. Regarding the way in which readers find (or at least seek) some sense of the 
author’s autobiography in their fiction, LeJeune proposes an additional pact, similar to the 
autobiographical pact: 
The reader is thus invited to read novels not only as fictions referring to a truth of 
‘human nature’ but as phantasms of the individual. I will call this indirect form of the 
autobiographical pact the phantasmic pact.41 
I am not especially interested in categorising the various pacts into which one enters 
according to the genre of the text being read. However, it is useful to recognise that most 
texts can be interpreted as inviting something that resembles an autobiographical pact, a way 
of thinking about the writer and their relation to their work. For example, Ben Lerner’s 10:04, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, seems to locate its contract with the reader somewhere 
between the phantasmic pact and the autobiographical pact. Maggie Nelson’s The Argonauts 
conveys a sense of authorial personhood through both its structure and its substance, 
appearing to expose the intimate. David Foster Wallace often elucidates the details of the 
pact explicitly, and in the next chapter I explore how this can be a tactic used to gain the 
reader’s confidence and trust in order to persuade them.  
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While each of these writers depends on a kind of seduction to draw the reader in, Malcolm, 
for the most part, forgoes such strategies. Instead, she hardens herself against the reader’s 
judgment. When she tells us that she is bored with herself, she is playing with the notion of 
the autobiographical pact. Notable here is LeJeune’s description of the reader as 
understanding that the author is a ‘person capable of producing this discourse, and so he 
imagines what he is like from what he produces.’ With that in mind, we see Malcolm as being 
a person who is capable of failure, capable of boredom with herself, capable of self-effacing 
confession. Yet she is also capable of taking these things and building from them a small work 
of literature. Even as a purported fragment, the essay remains whole and works on its own 
terms as a work about incapacity. And it is this incapacity that gives us some access to 
Malcolm as an identity, a character, a person. As discussed in the previous chapter, Frow 
argues that the nature of the presence of literary characters is not cleanly distinct from the 
presence of people. With this in mind, the literary character we understand Malcolm (or 
anyone in her position) to be is the sort of person from whom we want more.  
To wish for more in this context is to be in a position of uncertainty, unsure as to whether 
more can be given. And so we acknowledge the author and text in our uncertainty, taking the 
text to be an action from which we can usefully infer an agent. Moi, in Revolution of the 
Ordinary, takes Cavell’s notion of acknowledgment and considers how assuming such a 
posture can transform the practice of literary analysis:  
Acknowledgment does not begin in suspicion, although it may well conclude that 
suspicion is called for. It resists the positivistic model of knowledge from which 
skepticism is a recoil. If we picture our relationship to a work of literature as one of 
acknowledgment, then the category of ‘certainty’ is no longer the relevant dimension 
in which to assess the kind of knowledge a literary critic has of a literary work. 
Acknowledgment includes knowledge, but in its insistence on response, on action and 
self-revelation, it moves beyond epistemology to raise questions of ethics and 
morality.42 
If literary studies involve the elaboration of a response to a text, describing a response that 
begins in friendliness gives an opportunity to account for the fact that our responses to texts 
are frequently rooted in and learned through social practice. This is why Cavellian 
acknowledgment, as described in the first chapter of this thesis, and advocated for by Moi, 
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leads into imagining a social relation with the author. You do not keep a friend only because 
of what they say, but because of who they are. Similarly, a text matters not simply because it 
is written, but because somebody wrote it.  
A Promise of Friendship 
When I talk about the friendliness of an essayist, I am talking about the promise that primes 
or prepares the reader (or appeals to the reader) to appreciate the text’s personal voice. An 
author takes shape in the mind of a reader; something like a friendship is imagined. What 
features do these processes share? What distinguishes them from one another? In On 
Friendship, Alexander Nehamas proposes that the relationship has several characteristics. I 
want to focus on four: That we come to love a friend for themselves; that listing the 
characteristics of a friendship or a friend cannot satisfactorily encapsulate what is loved about 
that friend or friendship; that friendship is best evaluated under an aesthetic rather than a 
moral framework; and that the development of a friendship requires time.  
Descriptions of friendship are often characterised by a tendency to ignore the concept’s 
complexities. As Vanessa Smith writes in Intimate Strangers, ‘Friend is the word we think we 
can see behind.’43 But there is no one thing that characterises friendship. Nehamas insists that 
it ‘has no sure signs’.44 Perhaps the only criterion is that, tautologically, we know a person 
has become our friend when we are comfortable calling them a friend. One feature shared by 
the accepting of an author and a friend is that we allow ourselves to be led by them, trusting 
that the path they take us on will be worthwhile. So, for the relationship to function, for the 
relationship to permit generosity, we must make ourselves vulnerable in the other’s presence.  
Nehamas begins his book by explaining and building upon Aristotle’s definition of philia, 
a term he finds too capacious to describe modern friendship, but Nehamas uses the concept to 
develop his version of what the relationship entails. It requires several elements. First, philia 
requires philêsis, which is a type of care, but is not necessarily reciprocal as we can feel philêsis 
for inanimate objects. (Aristotle’s example is a man’s love for wine.) Second, philia must be 
reciprocal. Third, ‘I must care and wish good things to you for your sake and not, or not only, 
for my own—and you must feel the same way about me.’ 
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If, then, I care for you; if I wish you good things for your sake, not only for mine; and 
if, moreover, you feel the same way toward me, we are bound to each other by philia 
and are each other’s philos.45 
For Aristotle, there are three categories of philia: the first two are instrumental—for practical 
benefit, or for pleasure—and the third arises when neither friend expects anything from the 
other, and in which each loves the other purely for their virtues. Nehamas believes that only 
the last category (in which friends are ‘virtue-philoi’) accurately corresponds to our 
contemporary conception of friendship. However, he distinguishes between conventionally 
moral virtues and the virtues that endear us to a friend:  
…most of us are much less clear about the nature of moral virtue than about the facts 
of our friendship. Also, not only do we love our friends despite their shortcomings but, 
sometimes, we love them because of them…we are more likely to be friends not 
because we recognize in one another some independently acknowledged virtues but 
because we take the features we admire in one another, whatever they are, to be 
virtues, whether or not they are such in the abstract.46 
This is what it means to appreciate and love a person ‘for themselves’: once we love a friend, 
their behaviour comes to represent their virtue. Nehamas takes this feature to be typical of 
friendship. But is it possible to love an author in this way? Is it possible to love an author for 
themselves?  
We can see something like an appeal to this attachment in the essay collection genre, which 
gathers and arranges work by a particular author because of who they are. Both Flesh and Not 
is a posthumously published collection of essays by David Foster Wallace, and is mostly 
comprised of pieces not previously collected because they are fragments, slight, or of 
questionable quality. The appeal of such a publication is that it offers a Wallace fan more of 
the author. For a reader who reads the collection primarily for what it discloses about 
Wallace, the author’s shortcomings may reveal his humanity or character. For example, his 
downright weird essay, ‘Back in New Fire’—a piece of juvenilia arguing that the AIDS crisis 
raises the stakes of love and relationships—can be appreciated simply because it showcases a 
confused, precocious prodigy working through his insecurities.47 (Although, conversely, it 
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would be entirely reasonable for this essay to prompt a fan to reconsider their commitment; 
friendships, after all, can end.)  
It seems that if a reader selects a book because a particular author wrote it, or looks at a 
painting to see its artist, or listens to a sonata to hear its composer, the initial judgment—
that the creator is reason enough to attend to the work—has been made, and the appreciation 
of the work becomes (in part) an exercise in measuring it against the corpus (or context) with 
which the admirer is already familiar. Similarly, if you ask a friend how their day was, you 
aren’t interested in the nature of the day, you are interested in the wellbeing of the friend. 
And the intimacy comprised in acting on these points of interest is the foundation of an 
ongoing friendship. So our evaluation of an essay is influenced by our understanding of its 
author. Once the reader is familiar with an author—once, for example, they have a picture of 
Malcolm—the reader’s evaluation shifts (an adjustment of orbit rather than a polar shift) from 
a desire to judge, to a desire to justify the author’s behaviour.  
In ‘Thoughts on Autobiography’, Malcolm frames her writing process by announcing that 
she is bored with it; she then bemoans the inability of her imagination to moderate her mind’s 
‘passion for the tedious’. This brief examination of writer’s block is the most personal and 
vulnerable essay in Forty-One False Starts; little occurs aside from trifling, preparatory self-
reflection, along with the title, which points to a later moment of abandonment. If the reader 
wishes to discover and desire Malcolm and her writing for who she is, then they can take the 
path provided by this fragment and experience her quiet, cautious hope and ordinary 
despondence. This offers one kind of clarity.  
Beyond Description 
That is, of course, not to say that I am offering a methodology for uncovering or locating the 
author, or that this is the best piece of writing for helping us realise who Malcolm is. But is 
it ever reasonable to say that you know a friend exhaustively or that there is a best way in to 
understanding who they are? Is the resolution to or completion of a friendship something we 
would desire or seek out? What would such a thing look like? 
Nehamas believes Montaigne was the first philosopher to realise ‘that any effort to explain 
why we love particular people by citing their virtues, their accomplishments, or anything else 
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about them is bound to fail.’48 About his extraordinary friendship with La Boétie, Montaigne 
wrote: ‘If you press me to tell you why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed except 
by answering: Because it was he, because it was I.’49  
Arguing that friendship is characterised by its indescribability, Nehamas uses the example 
of first liking his barber based on the quality of the haircut provided. As the relationship 
progresses, he comes to like the barber for himself. If you ask why he likes the barber during 
the relationship’s first phase, Nehamas will respond by complimenting the ‘particular ability 
shared with others’: ‘I like the way he cuts my hair.’ Then then in the second phase, Nehamas 
becomes interested in aspects of his barber’s life: who the barber is particularly. And after the 
relationship with the barber ‘becomes personal,’ if someone were to ask Nehamas ‘why do you 
like him?’ ‘I no longer know how to answer it.’ ‘True, I could tell you that I like him because he 
is kind, entertaining, or interesting, and so on, but such attempts at explanation can go only 
so far.’50 
It is no coincidence that the first person to claim that friendship is beyond description was 
the progenitor of the essay. Indeed, Nehamas suggests that Montaigne’s essays were written 
in lieu of, or in reverence to, the friendship with La Boétie: 
The Essays represent the kind of communication Montaigne might have had with La 
Boétie, regaling him with the sort of stories, incidents, and thoughts that one would 
share with one’s close friends—stories, feelings, and thoughts that range from the 
most trivial and mundane to the most serious and profound and that, in the process, 
express their author’s personality. But La Boétie was dead; each of the Essays’ readers 
assumes his role as the friend to whom Montaigne reveals himself.51 
Nehamas is right to emphasise friendship’s mystification of desire and to compare it to the 
process of artistic expression and appreciation. However, to make inexpressibility a 
distinguishing feature is to argue on unsteady philosophical ground. This is because the 
quality of the preference and desire for anything is, in a sense (if we continue to interrogate 
it), unsayable. The barber illustration is not entirely persuasive, as explanations always ‘only 
go so far.’ And it is arguable that to believe language can only go so far is a misconception, 
and that to categorise feelings or knowledge as existing within or beyond words is to 
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misunderstand the relationship between language and the world, to think of the world as 
being built purely of things that can or cannot be labelled. But Nehamas steadies his argument 
by consulting Cavell’s discussion of metaphor in ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy’. 
To put Cavell’s case roughly: he clarifies the distinction between the describable and the 
indescribable (or the difference between exhaustible description and inexhaustible 
description) as the degree to which a description can be satisfactory.  
The point of Cavell’s argument that Nehamas finds most relevant is that any paraphrase 
of a metaphor has the phrase ‘and so on’ implicitly appended. This is because 
metaphors don’t create the expectation that they will be amplified, nor do they 
establish their meaning once and for all. They stand alone, and it is up to their audience 
to find what they can in them; as Cavell puts it, ‘The over-reading of metaphors, so 
often complained of, no doubt justly, is a hazard they must run for their high 
interest.’52 
‘Could our friends be irreplaceable,’ Nehamas asks, ‘because, just as with metaphors, we never 
fully know what their role in our life may be? Could our friends be, in the sense that metaphors 
are, inexhaustible?’ Perhaps a better way to put this is that all persons are inexhaustible, and 
to invest time in a friendship is one way to comprehend a specific person’s inexhaustibility. 
Nehamas describes a particular friend’s valiant act, which reinforced their friendship, as being 
‘both new and fitting, it made him both more complex and more coherent: it manifested his 
style.’53 And as it manifests the friend’s style, it manifests the friendship, reflecting on 
Nehamas, who points out that ‘to love our friends for themselves is also to hope that we will 
love what we ourselves will become because of our relationship with them.’ 54  
So we have an inexhaustible relation, comprised of actions that are more than the sum of 
their parts, and the friends’ evaluation of the friendship is inevitably self-reflexive. Do these 
features also apply when thinking about an author-reader relationship? In his 1981 article, 
‘The Postulated Author,’ Nehamas makes the comparison: 
In interpreting a text we must come to understand an action, and so we must 
understand an agent and therefore other actions and other agents as well and what 
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they took for granted, what they meant, believed, and what they wanted. For this 
reason, each text is inexhaustible: its context is the world.55  
At this chapter’s beginning, it was suggested that I could excuse my lying to Ned by claiming 
that when portraying an essayist as my friend, I had been speaking metaphorically. While 
Ned may not deem this a sufficient excuse, it can function as an excuse because the precise 
way in which the author is the reader’s friend is impossible to exhaustively account for—it is 
a claim that could not be established by a sufficiently comprehensive list of reasons. This is 
because essays, despite usually including some kind of argument or rhetoric, are not reducible 
to a list of functions, and nor is the author’s role.  
An essay may put forward an incoherent or flawed argument, but its nature as one person’s 
expressive action might allow the reader to recognise something in themselves and in its 
author. The reader might come to care for the author as a character with incoherent thoughts. 
This caring does not necessitate an exhaustive explanation; even its formation is difficult to 
trace. If we are engaged by an essay, the experience becomes more than the sum of its parts 
as it expands our perception of the author and ourselves.   
An Aesthetic of Friendship 
For the love of our friends we might do terrible things. Nehamas takes this to mean that the 
quality of friendship cannot be a moral quality. Several times, he favourably compares the 
appreciation of an artwork with the appreciation of a friend, usually to maintain that the 
values associated with friendship are primarily aesthetic. For Nehamas, love and friendship 
do make life worthwhile, but they exist in addition to, rather than as a component of, our 
moral drives and obligations: ‘That a good friendship can depend on immorality suggests 
very strongly that, whatever its value, friendship cannot be a moral virtue.’56 Rather than 
being a morally urgent obligation, he describes friendship as ‘a mechanism of individuality’ 
that encourages us to become ourselves.57 This is an aesthetic mechanism (although it is 
certainly not the sole aesthetic mechanism), a fact Nehamas demonstrates by discussing his 
love for the poetry of C. P. Cavafy:  
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And if what I find in him is something distinctly his own that others haven’t found, 
then, to that extent, I see his poetry in a way that is distinctly my own as well, and 
different, in some serious way, from the way all others see it.58  
To call someone a friend is both to have faith that they enjoy your presence, and to express 
(to yourself and to others) something about your own aesthetic judgment. Similarly, to say 
you like a particular author is to distinguish your own singular character. However, Nehamas 
is unnecessarily eager to separate the moral virtues of friendship. A social relation emerging 
from this kind of reciprocal, reflexive evaluation of individuality does not mean it is 
dissociated from moral judgment.  
While this is not a thesis about ethics, I do want to say that, in my view, the evaluation of 
a text or an author or a friendship is neither purely aesthetic nor purely moral, and the 
tendency of theory and criticism to set these categories in opposition is misguided. Along 
with Wittgenstein’s mystical observation that ‘Ethics and aesthetics are one,’ some of the best 
thinking about this perceived binary that I know comes from Leo Bersani. In The Freudian 
Body, he writes that 
psychoanalysis provides us with our best argument for resisting the fashionable 
academic distinction between formal or textual criticism and moral criticism. To map 
the moves of form is at once a (perhaps impossible but no less necessary) effort to fix 
a certain knowledge about the failures of knowledge, and an inescapable 
demonstration of the mapper’s own tolerance for such failure. The choice of a critical 
method is already an exercise in moral criticism.59 
So naturally, my description of the essayist as resembling a friend has moral weight, but the 
gratification or satisfaction we find in piecing their character together does not rely on that 
moral weight. Another way of putting this: the reader can of course become morally invested 
in what Malcolm’s essay implies about her character, but the construction of this character—
shared by Malcolm and her reader—is not an exercise in moralising or a map showing the 
reader a way to behave. Nor is the pleasure of a text dependent on the reader’s capacity to 
derive self-improvement from it. And if a reader evaluates or conceptualises an author 
aesthetically (or mostly aesthetically), this does not generate a sterile or lifeless version of a 
social relation, but something like a conventional one.  
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The aesthetic appeal of ‘Thoughts on Autobiography’ depends on Malcolm being 
humanised by her listing what she perceives to be her faults. This cataloguing goes beyond 
humility, towards self-loathing, which is self-reflexively recognised by Malcolm who 
remarks, ‘my journalist’s habits have inhibited my self-love.’ This self-deprecatory modesty 
topos is a common feature of the confessional-style essay and recurs in many of the texts 
examined in this thesis, but here I want to emphasise how Malcolm’s self-effacement evokes 
an intimate space in which she reveals her writerly weaknesses. The delicate authority 
claimed by an essay—the embedded assertion that it deserves your attention—is subverted 
by Malcolm’s disclosure of her professional and personal insecurities. However, by revealing 
more of the author to the reader, by undermining the assumption of authorial competence, 
this admission enriches her available humanity. It invites the reader to develop, or redescribe, 
a more complex picture of Malcolm the person, which inevitably inflects the text. Thus the 
personal voice is given texture or filled out.   
Approaching an essay as a social experience, in which the essayist appears to be a fictional 
character and a nonfictional person and something in between, means that it is possible to 
talk about how and why a text is worthwhile in the way we might talk about how and why 
friendship is worthwhile: for its startling particularity, and for how it can alter us both in a 
moment and over an extended period. Malcolm’s voice is developed by its joining together 
several perspectives from separate points in time, which is how we learn to interpret and 
rediscover (or recover) a friend’s voice; this is how a friendship might excite, disappoint, 
surprise, bore, or comfort us, how the experience of a friend is influenced by its presence in 
the timeline of the friendship. But what comprises the process of coming to recognise and 
distinguish a text’s particular virtue as being shaped by a specific voice coming from a specific 
place? In other words, how does a reader conceptualise the chronology of the author’s voice? 
Friendship Over Time 
The creation of a friendship typically requires extended interaction, and an accumulation of 
interactions. Nehamas quotes Aristotle, who declares: ‘For though the desire for friendship 
arises quickly, friendship itself does not.’60 This is a largely self-explanatory but profoundly 
important feature of friendship.  
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Imagine being told that ‘We met yesterday; we’re friends,’ or ‘She’s my friend, but I just 
can’t bear to spend time with her.’ These declarations may not be nonsensical (we know what 
is meant by them and can imagine situations in which they might make sense), but they do 
demand requests for clarification and contextualisation. To call someone a friend is to imply 
a certain level of tolerance for one another’s presence, which has been tested and proven. 
These statements lack clarity because they imply that the friends are either insufficiently 
tolerant of each other or have not spent the requisite time together in order to learn what 
they must tolerate and what they might appreciate.  
When Malcolm self-deprecates, she is listing the characteristics that must be tolerated 
(accepted or overcome) if a person is to appreciate her and her work. Malcolm’s self-
flagellation makes it simpler for the reader to see her as their double: because she is a person 
who hits limits, who feels her weaknesses, and ultimately fails. To come to appreciate 
Malcolm because of these failings is, in the words of Nehamas, to ‘take the features we admire 
in one another, whatever they are, to be virtues.’ It is to locate the possibility of friendliness, 
however remote. If, by the end of the collection, the reader has come to love Malcolm for 
herself, her confession can only amplify this sense of intimacy (and if the intimacy did not 
exist already, it could also initiate it). That the reader doesn’t witness the autobiography’s 
actual abandonment accentuates the piece as an invitation to empathise, as they must fill in 
the timeline by imagining the decision or act. But despite this vacant space between the 
essay—open to possibility—and the closed title, Malcolm is not concealing herself. Rather 
than having a sense of falsehood or misrepresentation, the reader is exposed to the sense of 
passing time that is necessary for the friendship to form. This fragment compels us to imagine 
the changes Malcolm underwent between beginning and abandoning the autobiography.  
While the value of a friendship may not be entirely articulable, it is discernible in the 
stories we tell about friendship. This is because the rhythm of stories depends on the 
emergence of a chronology; the structure of a compelling story is something like the making 
and fulfilling of a promise. A friend’s changing a tyre on Nehamas’s car in difficult 
circumstances was 
one way of fulfilling the promise that has kept our friendship alive for so many years. 
That promise was fulfilled in the new aspect of Tom that emerged through his 
action—novel, surprising, but also perfectly in character. It was a promise that existed 
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only for the two of us because it depended not just on what happened that morning 
but also on our whole history together.61 
It is not necessary to place ‘Thoughts on Autobiography’ in the context of the essay collection 
in order to locate it within a broader history of how the reader relates to Malcolm, although 
that is one possible history. There is also the history implied by the essay itself, and any of 
the myriad ways in which the reader might have previously encountered Malcolm. The 
promise shared between the author and each individual reader is distinct. And however the 
reader finds this essay and its author, this personal history establishes what the essay will 
affirm or subvert. It is the comfort or discomfort of this negotiation that makes it personal: 
friendly, unfriendly, or somewhere in between.  
What is friendly about ‘Thoughts on Autobiography’? What is unfriendly about it? For 
the most part, the unfriendliness has to do with Malcolm aggressively rebuking her ability, 
and the friendliness emerges from her willingness to admit to weakness and vulnerability. 
That the essay is a fragment from something abandoned implies both that a larger, planned 
work was left incomplete, and what the reader sees is still only part of the unfinished work 
that has been completed. The author’s curating is made more obvious, and we experience a 
feature of friendship: being shown an incomplete work, ready for a friend but not yet ready 
for the world. Mapping the aesthetics of friendliness and unfriendliness makes apparent the 
features of the text that reveal parts of Malcolm, as well as those that prevent us from seeing 
her in full view.  
In the same way that it is nonsensical to say an author is your friend, but sensible to say 
that they are friendly, you do not need to have a social relationship with an author for it to be 
perfectly reasonable to say: ‘I love Janet Malcolm.’ This is because of the way in which the 
author stands in for her work (or vice versa). And to claim you love Malcolm is not simply to 
mean that you love her writing, but that you appreciate an aspect of the character that can be 
inferred from the constellation of their work (it would be strange to claim you loved an author 
if you had only read one book or essay of their output) and what you know of them.  
What does it mean to engage with the possibility of an essay that depends on closing off 
possibility? The two distinct versions of Malcolm—the first is hopeful and the second has 
decided that hope was misplaced—may suggest a chronology that diminishes the value of 
desire in this context, but that doesn’t account for what the text gives the reader. Whether it 
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be Malcolm’s willingness to self-deprecate, or the certainty of the public declaration that her 
autobiography will never be returned to or finished, or her clarity, or the fact that the writing 
is simply beautiful (‘Memory glimmers and hints, but shows nothing sharply or clearly’), this 
essayistic fragment of an autobiography stands in for the now impossible autobiography and 
conveys information that is more emotionally and cathectically substantial than a 
straightforward autobiographical recount—for instance, a description of the influence of her 
parents or how she became a journalist—would likely be. The abandonment of the 
autobiography is not entirely a withdrawal of information or an obfuscation because the 
confession itself is meaningful and, when posted on a blog or included in a collection, the 
reader will interpret it under the conditions of its particular autobiographical pact.  
Montaigne and Trust 
Writing on the English renaissance essay, Kate Lilley describes the form as being ‘both a 
venue for, and a self-conscious representation of, experiments in thought as a means to self-
knowledge,’62 and argues that ‘Montaigne and Bacon belong together as the most influential 
architects of the essay as an experimental genre devoted to representing the movement of 
thought and, in turn, moving readers to think.’63 
This kind of reflexivity, as exhibited by Montaigne, Lilley writes, ‘is the exemplary mark 
of the essay’s attempt to (dis)place the relation between the general and the particular and to 
model the movement of persuasion and dissuasion.’64 This remark recalls Adorno’s 
description of the essay in ‘The Essay as Form’, in which he asserts that the virtue of the 
genre lies in its resemblance to the fragmentary and nonlinear nature of thought. Another 
way to formulate this: essays resemble conversations, structured similarly to questions and 
responses, in which a confusion or question can worked through by following an unsystematic 
path.  
Nehamas described Montaigne as writing his essays with La Boétie in mind, the actual 
reader thus adopting the role of the absent dear friend. This substitutive relation, along with 
the fact that Montaigne’s essays ‘model the movement of persuasion and dissuasion,’ 
demonstrates a point of connection between the structures of essays and structures of 
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63 Lilley, ‘Dedicated Thought,’ 100. 
64 Lilley, ‘Dedicated Thought,’ 98. 
  
 
77 
friendship. To clarify this connection, I want to end this chapter with a brief reading of 
Montaigne’s essay ‘Of Liars’. Montaigne is worth our attention because, as the progenitor of 
the genre, he performs the kinds of authorial character that is reiterated throughout the 
form’s history.  
‘Of Liars’ has a number of features that are present in many of the texts examined in this 
thesis, suggesting that these features are not exclusive to any particular era (nor are they 
necessarily exclusive to the essay form). If we are willing to accept that an essay can invoke 
a feeling of literary friendliness, and establish the author as a character, I want to note how 
this is not at all restricted to or defined by era. Rather, it is a way of looking that can be more 
or less fruitful depending on how accommodating the text happens to be to the particular 
spirit of inquiry.   
‘Of Liars’ begins by wending its way through an analysis of Montaigne’s own character. 
As with ‘Thoughts on Autobiography,’ the essay opens with self-deprecation: ‘There is no 
man whom it would so little become to boast of his memory as myself, for I can hardly show 
a trace of it, and I do not think that there is another in the world so marvellously defective as 
mine.’65 This is quite the statement from a writer so dependent on his obviously wide-ranging 
knowledge of the serious and the esoteric. But of course he goes on to defend against this 
obvious rebuttal: ‘when I complain of the defect of mine, they take me up and will not believe 
me, as though I were accusing myself of being a fool. They can see no alternative between 
memory and intelligence.’ Drawing this curious distinction, Montaigne then transitions from 
hyperbolic self-flagellation to trumpeting the deficiency as a virtue, arguing that ‘an excellent 
memory is, more often than not, coupled with an infirm judgment,’66 and that his lack of 
memory makes him both unambitious and a wonderful friend. Had his memory been faithful 
to him, he writes, he ‘should have deafened all my friends with my chatter,’ and its lack means 
that he has ‘a short memory for injuries I have received.’67 Ultimately, Montaigne concludes 
that due to this incapacity he is ‘by no means sure that I could tell a solemn and barefaced lie 
to save myself from an evident and extreme danger.’ 68 
As we read, a picture of the author develops: he is confident in his self-knowledge, and 
unreliable in his recall. And the reader will likely be struck by Montaigne’s willingness to be 
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so open in his admission of both weakness and strength. As LeJeune writes, ‘the author is 
defined as a person capable of producing this discourse, and so he imagines what he is like 
from what he produces.’ This means we become familiar with what Montaigne appreciates 
and what he despises. And, because his topic is so personal, the text invites self-reflection. 
The reader might ask of themselves: When have I lied? How dependable is my memory? 
What kind of a friend am I? What would Montaigne think of me? 
Having begun the essay by espousing his unreliability, then followed up with a case for 
trust and truth as the foundations of friendship, Montaigne then lays down this clear 
conviction: 
Lying is indeed an accursed vice. We are human beings, and hold together, only by 
speech. If we knew the horror of it, and the gravity, we should pursue it with fire, and 
more justly so than other crimes.69 
The severity of this rhetoric is notable. It is reasonable to draw the conclusion that Montaigne 
would find it impossible to maintain a friendship with someone untrustworthy. ‘How much 
less sociable,’ he writes, ‘is false speaking than silence!’70 Montaigne seems to demand the 
reader’s agreement, the implication being that those who disagree lack moral character.    
It is appropriate, then, that Montaigne begins this essay on lying, friendship, and trust by 
discussing his own character, because in order to be at all convincing as a moral authority on 
lying, he must convince the reader that he is trustworthy. Because the genre encourages it, 
Montaigne can move seamlessly from self-reflection to polemic, the structure reinforcing the 
argument. His description of himself as mentally incapable of lying (not due to some principle 
or other, but because of his poor memory) makes the argument more believable. And reading 
the essay, the reader is forced to reflect on their own character. The reader is not simply being 
given the information with which to evaluate the author, but they are shown how Montaigne 
would judge them. The argument has little abstract metaphysical content; it is grounded in 
relationships and character, specifically Montaigne’s relationships and Montaigne’s 
character.  
I would not characterise ‘On Liars’ as being an especially friendly essay; it would make 
more sense to call it adversarial. But that does not mean its friendliness (or lack thereof) does 
not contribute to the impression it makes. Montaigne wants to persuade the reader that lying 
                                               
69 Montaigne, Essays, 30. 
70 Montaigne, Essays, 31. 
  
 
79 
is ‘an accursed vice,’ so the reader is called upon to evaluate the strength of his argument and, 
therefore, the strength of the arguer. The reader is being shown the conditions upon which a 
friendship with Montaigne would depend, along with the moral substance of those conditions. 
When he begins to accuse those who lie of undermining the social fabric on which civilisation 
depends, the reader must take seriously the question of whether they are among the accused. 
At stake is Montaigne’s judgment of the reader, and the reader’s willingness to share his 
moral universe, their willingness to go on reading him in the appropriate spirit. That is to 
say, the Montaigne portrayed by ‘Of Liars’ is most fruitfully read in the spirit of generosity 
we might afford a friend.  
In this chapter’s opening hypothetical, Ned’s disappointment at my lying about my 
relationship with the essayist could be twofold: First, it revealed me to be untrustworthy, 
second it revealed that I thought I needed to lie in order to impress my friend. The 
connotation here is that I feared for the stability of the friendship and that in order to maintain 
it, I could not be myself. One of the traits, or perhaps ambitions, of a good friendship is that 
it relieves the friends of having to impress one another. This does not necessarily mean that 
friends abandon any artifice, but rather that they come to learn how the artifice operates, how 
one person’s artifice manifests their character. This is not all we desire of literature, but it is 
surely one desire: to find what it means to be someone else, and to see if they know what it 
means to be us. In reading Malcolm or Montaigne, the reader is called upon to trust that the 
author is, in some way, conveying who they are, revealing something of themselves. This 
belief is grounded in the author’s expressing their character, building a picture of themselves 
that looks something like a person, the sort of person who could become the reader’s friend.  
This picture does not necessarily have anything to do with the author’s moral quality. 
Friendship does not map cleanly to morality. A good friendship can be cruel. But all this 
means is that reading a book is not always in your and society’s best moral interest. And, as 
Nehamas argues, friendship is certainly not always in society’s best moral interest. To make 
the positive case—that the pleasure of reading is always a moral pleasure—would be to argue 
for something so general that it would be meaningless and unmanageable. To evaluate an 
essay is to consider an unquantifiable array of judgments, emotions, and reactions, of which a 
sense of friendship is undoubtedly one. These senses develop not as the result of critical 
analysis but as part of an imaginative exchange. Anyone who has loved a writer knows that 
literature can be generous to us, and that it can elicit generosity. And what is friendship if not 
the formalising of a desire to read, and to be read, generously?
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3 
Persuasion 
At the end of reasons comes persuasion. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty 
 
…behavior is expressive of mind; and this is not something we know, but a way we treat ‘behavior’. 
Stanley Cavell, ‘Knowing and Acknowledging’ 
-- 
Overidentification 
David Foster Wallace was among the most intellectually distinctive and influential authors 
of his era. His death in 2008 was quickly followed by an enormous quantity of writing that 
described, critiqued, advocated for, and attempted to decode his work. As of writing, there are 
more than ten books dedicated to the man, many dozens of journal articles on Wallace and 
his work, a biography, a Journal for David Foster Wallace Studies, reams of non-academic 
literature discussing his influence and significance, an annual David Foster Wallace 
conference in Bloomington, Illinois, and a film that fictionalises a portion of his Infinite Jest 
book tour. His essays have been collected, republished by theme, and issued as individual 
editions. His second novel, Infinite Jest was reissued for its 10th and 20th anniversaries. A 
recording of the commencement speech he gave at Kenyon College (which was also published 
as a small book) was posted on YouTube and currently has over 2.6 million views.1 He is a 
writer with whom, to put it crudely, many people have connected. Notably, with Wallace, the 
readerly connection is often of the kind that inspires further writing, as if the connection 
demanded some kind of response or acknowledgment. It is also the type of writing that 
appears to motivate a certain masculine evangelism. In 2017, 21 years after Wallace’s 
magnum opus had been published, the satirical website Reductress published an article 
headlined, ‘Why I’m waiting for the right man to tell me I should read Infinite Jest’.  
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While Wallace is undoubtedly a significant and accomplished author who is worth much 
attention, I would hazard that too much has been written on him. So why contribute, here, to 
the teetering pile? This chapter is dedicated to Wallace because one of his distinguishing 
traits, if not his foremost, is the sense of social intimacy he appears to generate with many 
readers. In Wallace’s New York Times obituary, A. O. Scott wrote that ‘He may not have been 
the most famous novelist of his time, but more than anyone else, he exemplified and 
articulated the defining anxieties and attitudes of his generation.’ Wallace’s voice, Scott 
writes, ‘was — is — the voice in your own head.’2 It is this trait of seeming to at once speak 
for, with, and to his readers that prompts the especially strong feelings for which his audience 
is known. These feelings, Kathleen Fitzpatrick argues, mean that a reader of Wallace is at 
risk of overidentification: 
many of his readers experience a sense of intimate connection with his writing, a 
connection that can very easily bleed over into a relationship, however imagined, with 
the man himself.3 
This was a risk that Wallace himself seemed to be aware of. In a letter to a friend, he worried 
about becoming a ‘literary statue,…a Mask, a Public Self, False Self, or Object-Cathect’ that 
people would mistake for his authentic self.4 Fitzpatrick proposes that the reason for 
Wallace’s capacity to rouse such fervour can be credited to his 
wedding, in a way that no other writer has managed quite so well, high-modern and 
postmodern experimental pyrotechnics with an incisive cultural critique and a deep 
concern for quotidian human suffering.5 
In addition to his stylistic skill and charisma and insight into the travails of human experience, 
I would argue that the dedication of Wallace’s readers is frequently intensified, and often 
initiated, by the popularity of his nonfiction and its habitually confessional mode. Wallace the 
author is relentlessly present, and his nonfiction writing adds texture and depth to the 
personal voice readers perceive when they read his other writing. The style of his fiction is 
conspicuous and frequently performative, bringing the reader’s attention to his authorial 
acrobatics. In his nonfiction, Wallace constantly reminds the reader of his humanness, while 
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exhorting them to trust him. Describing the personal voice generated by this text means 
accounting for the fact that his essays show readers a clear and intricately drawn authorial 
figure with whom they can connect. The presence and clarity of this figure is fundamental to 
the sense of intimacy evoked by his writing. 
Fitzpatrick lays out the risks and rewards of this kind of powerful transferential 
relationship. The possible reward is drawn from Wallace’s oft-quoted interview with Larry 
McCaffery, in which Wallace declaims that ‘if a piece of fiction can allow us imaginatively to 
identify with characters’ pain, we might then also more easily conceive of others identifying 
with our own.’6 The counterpoint is provided by the intellectual historian Dominick LaCapra, 
whom Fitzpatrick quotes as writing that uncritical identification can result in ‘the derivation 
of one’s identity from others in ways that deny their otherness.’7 It is of course valid for 
Fitzpatrick to raise these possibilities, but the experience of identification is not reducible to 
such a binary, nor is there a clean measurable line by which we can judge whether a reader is 
identifying enough, or too much.  
The previous two chapters have discussed how essayists come to be humanised; this 
chapter is interested in how this humanising of the author relates to the essay as a genre of 
persuasion. I am interested in what good and bad identification look like, and where they 
overlap. In order to understand how Wallace’s rhetoric encourages a reader to imagine him, 
I examine of one of his longer essays, ‘Up, Simba’. I focus particularly on Wallace’s humour, 
which is essential to both his persuasiveness, and his becoming someone a reader might like 
to know. Fundamental to this is Wallace’s conception of empathy, which he frequently treats 
as an impossible aspiration that would require some kind of exhaustive knowledge of the other 
in order to be successful. Later in the chapter, I argue that Wallace’s strategy presumes a 
degree of solipsism on the part of the reader and author that undermines the arguments he, 
the author, wishes to make. The personal voice in ‘Up, Simba’ seems sceptical of its own 
existence, and sceptical of the prospect of the reader coming to trust in it without undertaking 
a radical leap of faith, the kind that most ordinary relationships simply do not call for.  
The term overidentification perhaps implies that a correct amount of identification is 
attainable, while warning that it is possible to exceed it. In Pursuits of Happiness, Cavell raises 
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philosophy’s fear of ‘overreading’, arguing that it is an anxiety related to how we might know 
to set reading’s boundaries. ‘In my experience,’ he writes,  
people worried about reading in, or overinterpretation, or going too far, are, or were, 
typically afraid of getting started, of reading as such, as if afraid that texts—like 
people, like times and places—mean things and moreover mean more than you 
know…Still, my experience is that most texts, like most lives, are underread, not 
overread.8 
To fear overidentification is to fear missing something due to the loss of a sense of difference 
between your perspective and that of the object. Overreading seems to emerge from a fear of 
overidentification, manifesting as a kind of paranoia that a reader must totally map a text out 
to avoid getting lost in it.  
By examining ‘Up, Simba’, and Wallace’s invitations to be persuaded by his argument, I 
wish to think through why we conceptualise overidentification as a risk. And, if 
overidentification does place a reader at risk of erasing difference, or failing to engage in 
critique where critique is warranted, or being persuaded of something they shouldn’t be 
persuaded of, how does a reading of Wallace, for example, balance the pleasures and rewards 
of identification with a wariness that avoids the pitfalls of overidentification? To reframe this 
question in the vocabulary of this thesis: how do we ensure that a social relation entails the 
appropriate amount of identification, and what does this tell us about reading? This is a 
challenging question to which I do not expect to provide a definitive answer, and it will recur 
throughout the following chapters. For now, I will examine how this particular essay invites 
the reader to both trust in and to identify with its author. I wish to find what assumptions 
underpin Wallace’s picture of the reader, and his relationship with them. I will identify the 
stakes of that relationship, as described by the essay. And, finally, I will argue that Wallace’s 
fear of intersubjective misunderstanding causes him to assume, in ‘Up, Simba’, that the reader-
author relationship is fundamentally fragile, forever vulnerable to a reader’s scepticism, and 
that I think he is wrong.  
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Political Engagement 
In 1999 Wallace was approached by Rolling Stone to cover Senator John McCain’s ascendant 
(and, by the time the piece was published, erstwhile) presidential primary. Wallace writes 
that, in taking the assignment, he was not so much interested in the politics as he was drawn 
to the campaign’s being representative of a shift in the American character, an expression of 
an America conditioned to respond to political campaigns by adopting the same cynicism with 
which it responded to advertising campaigns. He wanted, he tells us, to describe what the 
bright and transient mania associated with a political campaign ‘actually makes us US voters 
feel, inside.’9 The piece—called ‘The Weasel, Twelve Monkeys and the Shrub’ in Rolling Stone, 
and later ‘Up, Simba!: Seven Days on the Trail of an Anticandidate’ when expanded to roughly 
three times the length of the original and published as an e-book—describes Wallace’s week 
travelling on the bus trailing McCain’s bus, accompanied by media techs (sound and camera 
operators) and journalists. This chapter focuses on the expanded piece included in Wallace’s 
2005 essay collection Consider the Lobster. This version has the same title as the digital edition, 
sans exclamation point. 
In this essay, as in much of his work, Wallace has a political agenda, and is not coy about 
it. Marshall Boswell, one of the first critics to write seriously on Wallace, traces the origin of 
Wallace’s interest in the possibilities of political and civic engagement—the question with 
which his final, unfinished novel, The Pale King, grapples—to covering McCain.10 
Thematically, ‘Up, Simba’ is about voter disengagement and the media’s inexorable distortion 
of politics but, due to its subject, it is inevitably epideictic, evaluative of McCain as a person 
and candidate. For my purposes, the most remarkable achievement of this essay is how 
Wallace invites the reader to evaluate McCain all the while constructing the framework 
through which he, as both author and character, is to be evaluated, modelling belief in 
another’s sincerity even when such belief is inevitably fraught.  
Over 78 pages, ‘Up, Simba’, attempts to persuade the reader to take an interest in civic 
engagement and, ultimately, to believe in politics. The success of this project is dependent on 
its being instructive without being didactic, so, the essay also needs to get the reader to 
believe in Wallace. Wallace’s analysis of McCain attempts to show that political engagement 
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requires a kind of faith despite the fact that certain factors, such as what the candidate truly 
believes or what they will do once in office, remain unknowable. The essay works to make its 
reader attend to what will remain unknowable and what can be known, in both the rhetoric 
of the essay and the rhetoric of its subject. The essay also presumes that the reader’s attitude 
is an impediment to its persuasion, that it must convert them. Wallace explicitly states this 
about a third of the way in: 
It’s hard to get good answers to why Young Voters are so uninterested in politics. 
This is probably because it’s next to impossible to get someone to think hard about 
why he’s not interested in something. The boredom itself preempts inquiry; the fact 
of the feeling’s enough.11 
Fundamental to the sense of this essay and its claims is that Wallace not only exists as a 
character within the text, he also exists in the negative space enclosing the argument. That 
is to say, when he describes his experience of the McCain political machine, the media filtering 
and delivering McCain’s message, and the audience receiving and parsing the message, he 
implicitly describes himself. As he calls for a renewed mode of civic engagement, he is 
attempting to both describe and model that engagement. And, when he describes the 
challenge of believing a politician, he understands that the reader may face the same 
challenges in believing the author of the essay. (This is the kind of belief I described in the 
first chapter of this thesis.) So when he writes about the obstacles that make it difficult to 
believe McCain, he must ensure that these obstacles do not come between him and his reader. 
Wallace’s charismatic prose negotiates this challenge, conflating the appeal of politics with 
his authorial appeal. Once the reader finds Wallace compelling, interest (and belief) in the 
substance can more naturally follow.  
Rhetorically, Wallace (as the reader perceives him) is inseparable from his writing, and his 
essay implies that McCain is inseparable from his campaign rhetoric. ‘Up, Simba’ does not 
make the case that the campaign (or Wallace) must be wholly believed, but rather that politics 
deserves to be scrutinised critically yet with careful optimism. This case is premised on the 
inseparability of style and substance, and qualified by the knowledge that in order to win a 
presidential primary, the candidate will be driven by an apparatus that compromises his 
integrity. The compromises a presidential candidate makes in order to win votes are not the 
same as those the author of a polemical essay makes to persuade readers, yet they aren’t 
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entirely different. Neither candidate nor author can appear as patronising; both must establish 
shared ground with their audience. The sort of ethical work that can be done in and by any 
of Wallace’s essays, especially that to do with the reader-author relationship, is contingent 
on this requirement.  
‘I don’t personally see how my own politics are anybody’s business’ 
A range of problems arise for Wallace qua journalist as he examines the value and prospects 
of a citizen being effectively involved in the inscrutable US political process. Two particular 
obstacles, both emphasised by Wallace, are the focus here: first, he presumes that he is 
speaking to the uninterested and cynical young cohort of voters who comprise the 
demographic that (in 1999) reads Rolling Stone. It seems unlikely that such a reader would 
want to consume a lengthy article about a Republican veteran’s primary campaign. The 
second problem over which Wallace agonises is that the sincere elements of a presidential 
campaign are often indistinguishable from acts of manipulative self-interest, and it best serves 
the candidate to appear totally sincere. In order to navigate these obstacles, Wallace adopts 
a tone that mixes unadorned sincerity, self-deprecation, and wry humour.  
Though Wallace does depict the likely reader as young and cynical, it is difficult to say 
exactly who Rolling Stone is targeting. The magazine appears to have been undergoing an 
identity crisis as it entered the new millennium. This crisis was displayed on the cover of the 
April 13, 2000 issue (the issue in which Wallace’s article appeared), which features the rapper 
DMX mugging, arms crossed, the two largest headlines: ‘DMX: Hip-Hop’s Top Dog Barks 
Back’ and ‘Crosby Stills Nash & Young: The Long & Winding Road,’ the latter brushing 
DMX’s left bicep. ‘Julia Roberts Talks Trash’ is also prominent, pointed to by DMX’s chin. 
While Wallace may have settled on a hypothetical audience profile, Rolling Stone seems to be 
casting about. It might well be that Wallace characterises his readers as being hip, young, 
and cynical to flatter those who don’t fit the description.  
Wallace describes this tactic of audience flattery—in his essay on ‘Authority and American 
Usage’—as being perfected by Reagan:  
The tactic is crafty because (1) it flatters the audience, (2) disguises the fact that the 
rhetor’s purpose is actually to persuade and rally support, not to inform or celebrate, 
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and (3) preempts charges from the loyal opposition that the actual policy proposed is 
in any way contrary to the interests of the audience.12 
Explicitly defining who the reader is (American, young, hip, politically ambivalent), doesn’t 
necessarily restrict who the reader can be, it simply sets the expectations of whoever the 
reader happens to be. It is easy to imagine a reader who, rather than feeling that Wallace’s 
polemic is directed at them, feels as if they are delivering it with him, taking pleasure in 
sharing a position with Wallace and having it so forcefully and intelligently articulated. To 
use the vocabulary established in the previous chapter, Wallace’s friendliness in this essay 
could present as either instructive or companionable.  
As the author’s relationship with the reader is clarified, so is his relationship with the 
editor. Direct address or reference to the editor recurs in Wallace’s essays; often a section is 
deviously prefaced by a claim that it will likely be cut, which makes the reader both feel they 
are being granted access to exclusive information and wonder what the editor may have 
actually cut. These metatextual nods place the text at the centre of a triangulated relationship 
between reader, editor, and writer. In the ‘Optional Foreword,’ which initially served as an 
‘Introduction to the Electronic Edition’ of ‘Up, Simba,’ the writer-editor relationship is 
foregrounded as moderately frictional. For the creation of the digital edition, Wallace 
explains that he was obligated to bow to editorial pressure: 
The Electronic Editor (actual title, like on his office letterhead and everything) says I 
should insert here that I, the author, am not a Republican and that actually I ended up 
voting for Sen. Bill Bradley (D-NJ) in the Illinois primary. I don’t personally see how 
my own politics are anybody’s business, but I’m guessing the point of the insertion is 
to make clear that there are no partisan motives or conservative agenda behind the 
article even though parts of it (i.e., of the upcoming article) might appear to be pro-
McCain.13 
That the editor ultimately allowed for the disclosure to be embedded in a passive-aggressive 
shot at the editor goes unmentioned.  
                                               
12 David Foster Wallace, ‘Authority and American Usage,’ in Consider the Lobster and Other Essays. (New York: 
Little, Brown and Company, 2005), 76. 
13 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 157. 
 
  
 
88 
Wallace viewed himself primarily as a fiction writer,14 but turned to nonfiction when 
commissioned, often due to some combination of financial necessity, genuine interest, and the 
need for a break from fiction. In an interview that took place during the Infinite Jest book tour, 
he describes the Wallace character (author and protagonist) in the essays written for Harper’s 
(the two most famous being minutely observant, sharply funny travelogues: one on a 
Caribbean cruise, the other on the Illinois State Fair) as a ‘certain persona that’s a little 
stupider and schmuckier than I am.’15 In a television interview with Charlie Rose, speaking 
about his reportage in the essay collection, A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again, 
Wallace characterises his mode of journalism as ‘an enormous eyeball floating around 
something, reporting what it sees.’16 (This metaphor is reminiscent of Emerson portraying 
his own role as a ‘transparent eye-ball’, described in his essay ‘Nature’, to which Wallace may 
be alluding.) However, the journalism is not made compelling by observation alone. There is 
the incisive analytical eye that allows Wallace to point out, for instance, that when McCain 
delivers his stump speech closing line: ‘I will always. Tell you. The Truth,’ the wild cheers 
aren’t for McCain, but ‘for how good it feels to believe him.’17 Because of the sense, described 
above, that Wallace writes as his reader’s equal, his nonfiction flatters the reader by 
presuming a shared, intellectually elevated experience. For example, when lamenting the fact 
that terms such as ‘service’ and ‘duty’ and ‘moral authority’ have become clichés, emptied of 
meaning, Wallace blames this on their being ‘invoked by men in nice suits who want 
something from us.’18 Here, the reader is assumed to agree, and the pronoun, suggesting 
consensus, might either ingratiate a sympathetic reader or antagonise an unsympathetic one. 
It is noteworthy that many of Wallace’s techniques presume an intimacy with his reader that 
will likely amplify their appreciation or distaste, depending on their predisposition. So 
Wallace’s strategy depends on reciprocal congeniality.  
                                               
14 In a letter to Don DeLillo, describing the McCain essay (which he ‘felt pretty happy with’), Wallace writes 
that ‘I do not know why the comparative ease and pleasure of writing nonfiction always confirms my intuition 
that fiction is really What I’m Supposed to Do, but it does.’ Wallace. Letter to Don DeLillo (21 March, 2000). 
David Foster Wallace Papers, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin.  
15 David Lipsky, Although of Course You End Up Becoming Yourself: A Road Trip With David Foster Wallace (New 
York: Broadway Books, 2010), 41. 
16 David Foster Wallace, Interview by Charlie Rose, Charlie Rose Show, March 27, 1997, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=91ytSdSM-Kk. 
17 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 188. 
18 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 166. 
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Wallace from the Outside 
The vast majority of critical attention on Wallace has focused on his fiction. This is despite 
the fact that, at least anecdotally, his nonfiction is better known. In the Rolling Stone eulogy 
for Wallace, David Lipsky wrote that ‘When people tell you they’re fans of David Foster 
Wallace, what they’re often telling you is they’ve read the cruise ship piece.’19 (Today, that 
would likely be replaced with his Kenyon College commencement speech, This is Water.) One 
of the few academics who has written on Wallace’s nonfiction is Josh Roiland, who argues 
that it is best understood as existing in the tradition of literary journalism. Wallace described 
Hunter S. Thompson’s gonzo approach as ‘naïve and narcissistic’ and was not a fan of Wolfe 
or Mailer,20 but, Roiland argues that Wallace’s style is most similar to that of Thompson and 
Joan Didion, who present themselves as outsiders, dissociated from the journalism pack in 
terms of ability and perception. 21 Wallace’s position as a ‘new journalist’ is significant here, 
because this genre gains much of its power from that outsider status.  
 ‘Up, Simba’ is compelling because it so enthusiastically pursues the conventions of literary 
journalism, showing up the limitations enforced by traditional journalism’s boundaries. That 
is to say, in reporting on McCain, Wallace considers the implications of how the American 
public perceives political theatre, while self-reflexively understanding himself to be part of its 
portrayal and implicated in the manner of its perception. By reinforcing his status as an 
interloper, alienated by insider jargon and shibboleths, Wallace is able to push back against 
the traditional suspicions or criticisms a reader might have for a journalist operating within 
the restrictive conventions of political journalism.  
By portraying himself as negotiating behind the scenes access, Wallace showcases his 
outsider status, revealing the machinations that are traditionally cloaked by political theatre. 
‘Up, Simba’ depends on the reader being familiar with the surface of the political industry 
because its drama is dependent on its tearing back the surface and exposing the mechanisms 
that package and deliver messages to the audience. Wallace repeatedly obtains inside 
information from the amorphous pack of ‘techs’: cameramen and sound technicians. The techs 
                                               
19 Ed. Stephen J. Burn, Conversations with David Foster Wallace (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2012), 
173. 
20 Burn, Conversations, 155. 
21 Josh Roiland, ‘Getting Away from it all: The Literary Journalism of David Foster Wallace and Nietzsche's 
Concept of Oblivion,’ in The Legacy of David Foster Wallace, eds. Samuel Cohen and Lee Konstantinou (Iowa 
City: University of Iowa Press, 2012), 40. 
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stand in for the reality of the campaign trail, possessing secret insight developed through 
their experience of observing from the shadows: pointing the spotlight, so always outside it: 
This is because network news techs—who have all worked countless campaigns, and 
who have neither the raging egos of journalists nor the political self-interest of the 
McCain2000 staff to muddy their perspective—turn out to be more astute and sensible 
political analysts than anybody you’ll read or see on TV, and their assessment of 
today’s Negativity developments is so extraordinarily nuanced and sophisticated that 
only a small portion of it can be ripped off and summarized here.22  
Not only is Wallace behind the scenes. He acquires his information from those who exist 
behind the scenes professionally. This positioning carries considerable persuasive weight, and 
the dissonance of his unprofessionalism fuels much of the piece’s comedy. The jokes frequently 
take the form of Wallace revealing surprising and/or strange behind the scenes information, 
and the essay’s argument relies on these revelations persuading the reader even as they laugh.  
By making himself part of the story he tells, Wallace asks the reader to trust that he is 
being truthful. So is Wallace telling the truth, and does it even matter? Roiland has written 
on Wallace’s factual accuracy, which has frequently been questioned and occasionally 
discredited. The only biography of Wallace to date—Every Love Story is a Ghost Story by D. 
T. Max—identifies a range of fabrications and embellishments in Wallace’s nonfiction. 
Regarding mendacity in ‘Up, Simba’, Max targets Wallace’s designation of the major 
newspaper reporters as the ‘Twelve Monkeys’ (a label Wallace credits to the journalists from 
smaller outlets.):23 
He painted [them] as haughtier and more alike one another than they even were and 
pretended the McCain campaign strategist was so afraid of him he would duck around 
the corner to avoid encounters (in fact they got along well; the gesture was playful, 
the campaign strategist told a reporter for Salon in 2010).24 
                                               
22 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 204.  
23 In the notebook Wallace took on the campaign trail, the note ‘It’s fun to watch the 5 Clones sit uncomfortably 
in this auditorium’ is appended with a boxed note in the margin: ‘No – call them the 12 Monkeys’. This does not 
prove the term was Wallace’s invention, but it is not credited here. Wallace, Notebook related to ‘Up, Simba’. 
Container 30.12. Papers, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin, 50. 
24 Max, Every Love Story is a Ghost Story, 259. 
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Max also doubts Wallace’s report that he was twice mistaken for a bellboy, and suspects that 
the pair of campaign buses were christened Bullshit 1 and Bullshit 2 by Wallace rather than, 
as he claims, by the ‘cool and laid-back NBC News cameraman Jim C.’25  
Roiland, however, counters Max’s insistence on doubting Wallace’s accuracy, arguing that 
Max fails to acknowledge the evidence that Wallace was ‘committed to capturing the truth.’ 
‘The wariness is warranted,’ Roiland writes, ‘but suspicion alone is insufficient. Max fails to 
back up much of his speculation with concrete evidence of wrongdoing.’ Roiland quotes 
Wallace admitting that, as a fiction writer hired to write nonfiction: ‘there’s going to be the 
occasional bit of embellishment,’ but also that the only difference between fiction and 
journalism is that ‘In nonfiction, everything has to be true and it also has to be documented, 
because magazines have fact checkers and lawyers who are very thorough.’26  
The text’s capacity to convince is only weakened if the reader knows (or, at least, is given 
reason to suspect) it to be false, and Rolling Stone presented the piece as journalism (albeit 
literary). For the purposes of this thesis, I am only concerned with Wallace’s relationship 
with truth in terms of how the possible inventions serve his style and the force of his 
argument. The fabrications, or potential fabrications, raised by Max all serve a comic purpose. 
Any suspicions a reader might have about Wallace’s reportage being a little too absurd will 
be simultaneously undercut by his hyperbole’s friendliness. So, is the reader being fooled for 
the sake of narrative brilliance or a solid joke? If the reader is being deceived but does not 
realise it, does it matter? When does an embellishment become an unforgivable lie?  
There are no universal answers to these questions; each can only be resolved in the context 
of a particular reading, and with respect to the reader’s expectations and experience. What is 
important, in this case, is how a reader takes up or rejects the text’s invitation to believe in 
its personal voice. And this will no doubt be influenced by the essay’s clear message about 
who it expects the readers to be, and what it wants them to learn.  
‘Sort of fun and unfun’ 
Humour is indispensable to the rhetorical strategy of ‘Up, Simba’. The essay is, among other 
things, an admonition of its readership, attempting to rouse them to political engagement. 
                                               
25 Max, Every Love Story is a Ghost Story, 171. However, in Wallace’s notebook, a circled aside on page 69 declares: 
‘Crew calls #2 bus ‘Bullshit 1’’, implying that Max’s suspicion is incorrect. 
26 Josh Roiland, ‘The Fine Print: Uncovering the True Story of David Foster Wallace and the “Reality 
Boundary”,’ in Literary Journalism Studies. 55 no.2 2013, 155. 
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Vitally, humour alleviates the awkward didacticism that can accompany polemical writing. 
The essay’s moral questions focus on the possibility of resuscitating dead clichés about 
complex issues like authenticity and leadership, presenting political engagement as a 
potentially productive enterprise. Without jokes, the clichés would remain dead and ‘Up, 
Simba’ would be near-unbearable to read. Wallace’s steady rhythm of mockery, 
overstatement, and self-deprecation both alleviates the intensity of the neuroses which 
permeate his prose, and prevents the piece from becoming overly patronising, or appearing 
to be an endorsement of conservative political structures, and blinkered patriotism. (The 
purpose of this chapter is not to decide whether it is actually such an endorsement, although 
it may well be.)   
In their introduction to a recent special issue of Critical Inquiry, ‘Comedy, An Issue,’ Sianne 
Ngai and Lauren Berlant write that ‘Comedy helps us test or figure out what it means to say 
“us”’.27 So, in finding humour, Wallace tests his own arguments against the reader, setting 
their expectations as they build their picture of him as an author. The comedy in ‘Up, Simba’ 
functions to bring Wallace and the reader under the umbrella of an ‘us,’ a plural pronoun. 
Ngai and Berlant take the reception and evaluation of comedy to constitute an aesthetic 
judgment, and describe the judgement as delighting in a freedom of mixed affect while 
experiencing the discomfort of transgressing societal boundaries: ‘There’s a relation between 
the grin and chagrin; there’s the fatigue from feeling vulnerable because pleasure’s bad objects 
are not always in one’s control.’28  
It is precisely in this way that Wallace uses humour, locating moral ambiguities and 
emphasising moments and concepts that evade our control; it attempts to shake loose his 
readers’ judgments about politics and its coverage. Through tone, he can circumnavigate the 
strangeness of advocating for a conservative Senator by, for most of the essay (that is, until 
its final section), asking not be taken too seriously. It functions as an affective and political 
escape clause.  
Wry wit emerges throughout ‘Up, Simba’: jokes that aren’t necessarily hilarious on their 
own, but contribute to a skewed, jovially mocking/self-mocking perspective. Some examples 
(note that the tone of slight hyperbole in these incidental observations establishes the sense 
                                               
27 Lauren Berlant and Sianne Ngai, ‘Comedy Has Issues,’ in Critical Inquiry, 43 (Winter 2017): 235. 
28 Berlant and Ngai, ‘Comedy Has Issues,’ 248. 
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that what we’re reading is probably not the keenly reported truth but is, rather, 
impressionistic): 
• From the foreword, on the difficulty of scheduling the trip: ‘because I happen to 
have dogs with professionally diagnosed emotional problems who require special 
care, and it always takes me several days to recruit, interview, select, instruct, 
and field-test a dogsitter.’29 
• On boredom on the campaign bus: ‘Pulse rates are about 40…the CBS and CNN 
techs, who like cards, today are not even bothering to play cards but are instead 
recounting memorable card games they’ve been in in the past.’30 
• On the eerily similar chain hotels that serve as accommodation at each stop: ‘RS 
asks whether it’s any wonder that over half of all US suicides take place in chain 
hotels. Jim and Frank say they get the idea.’31  
• On the campaign going negative: ‘…comparing a Republican candidate to Bill 
Clinton is roughly equivalent to claiming that he worships Satan.’32  
• On a negative campaign ad: ‘…and then shows a nighttime shot of 1600 
Pennsylvania Ave.’s famous façade with its palisade and blatantly ejaculatory 
fountains in the foreground and says “Can America afford another politician in 
the White House that we can’t trust?” about which nobody mentions the 
grammatical problems.’33  
With Wallace perched behind the scenes, performing bafflement, the essay is structured 
to highlight the campaign trail’s relentless weirdness. Wallace acts as a kind of anthropologist 
who is able to gain authority by dismantling the media apparatus, which then allows him to 
both distance himself from the manipulative and obscuring conventions of political coverage 
and demonstrate a thorough understanding of them. ‘Up, Simba’ is divided into sections with 
whimsical names like ‘Who Cares’, ‘Who Even Cares Who Cares’ (note the lack of question 
marks), and ‘Substantially Farther Behind the Scenes Than You’re Apt to Want to Be’. Early 
                                               
29 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 157. 
30 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 157. 
31 In a draft available in the archive, this joke is different: ‘Is it any wonder that over half of all indoor suicides 
take place in hotels? Jim and Frank say they get the idea.’ The final version suggests that Wallace has altered 
the facts of the conversation in service of a better joke. Wallace, Edited proofs of ‘Up, Simba’. Container 5.3. 
David Foster Wallace Papers, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin, 196.  
32 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 202. 
33 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 211-212. 
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in the piece, there is a section entitled ‘Glossary of Relevant Campaign Trail Vocab, Mostly 
Courtesy of Jim C. And The Network News Techs’ that comprises a nearly four-page list of 
jargon definitions, meaning that Wallace need not explain a new term each time one is used. 
The reader gets an approximate sketch of aspects peculiar to life on the campaign trail and 
the disposition of those on it in the space of a few short pages, without needing to endure 
lengthy exposition. Acronyms like ‘OTC = Opportunity to Crash, meaning a chance to grab 
a nap on the bus (placement and posture variable),’ and expressions like ‘22.5 – The press 
corps’ shorthand for McCain’s opening remarks at THMs (see THM [Town Hall Meeting]), 
which remarks are always the same and always take exactly 22½ minutes,’ give a sense of the 
particular brand of insularity portrayed.34 This concise, playful structure minimises the need 
for a reader to come to the table already politically engaged. There is plenty of cross-
referencing, emphasising the environment’s alluringly tangled strangeness, and a mixture of 
pseudo-formal and colloquial language (typical of Wallace) that reminds the reader that the 
guy writing this is pretty cool and funny and more akin to you, the cool reader who gets it, 
than to those he is writing about. And the sense of insider intimacy, accessing weirdness, is 
both part of and compounded by the essay’s targeted humour. Rather than the author telling 
the reader what to think, the author and reader are companions on the path to the same 
conclusion. The personal style reinforces this individuality while aspiring to dispense with 
any sense of moralising while, paradoxically, contributing to the text’s moral authority.  
On Wallace and Authority 
At its core, ‘Up, Simba’ is about authority, and what it means to believe in or to question 
authority, whether the authority be McCain, the media, or Wallace. On its own terms, if ‘Up, 
Simba’ is successful as a polemic, its reader will finish the essay feeling a productive interest 
in civic engagement, rejecting political apathy. If the essay is unsuccessful, the reader will 
remain sufficiently sceptical of politics (and sufficiently sceptical of Wallace’s point of view) 
to feel that their engagement could make no positive difference. So, if the polemic is to 
succeed, Wallace must persuade the reader to accept his authority. He attempts to do so by 
both explicitly and implicitly writing about himself.  
                                               
34 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 167-170. 
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Wallace the non-journalist is a character in the story, exposing his own preferences and 
proclivities, which also happen to explain the motivation behind the words on the page (or 
screen) pushing the reader in a particular direction. In the ‘Optional Foreword’ Wallace 
claims that the report is bipartisan, in that it is not pro-McCain ‘even though parts of it might 
appear to be … Nor is it anti-; it’s just meant to be the truth as one person saw it.’35 (As if it 
could be anything else.) That ‘one person’ describes himself as ‘the least professional pencil 
[Rolling Stone] can find,’36 and makes all sorts of jokey efforts to ensure the reader knows he 
is not a very good journalist, and is performing a role or on an adventure, rather than acting 
professionally: 
I will confess that I even borrowed a friend’s battered old black leather jacket to wear 
on the Trail so I’d better project the kind of edgy, vaguely dangerous vibe I imagined 
an RS reporter ought to give off. (You have to understand that I hadn’t read Rolling 
Stone in quite some time.)37 
As Roiland makes clear, Wallace knowingly and repeatedly uses this outsider status to his 
advantage. Wallace the non-journalist is, semi-ironically, referred to in the third person as 
Rolling Stone or RS throughout. Constant reminders of Wallace’s journalistic inadequacy 
constitute self-deprecatory joking around, but the joking is intended to lure the reader, who 
is not interested in the honed and polished news report they would get from CNN or The 
Washington Post, to accompany the putatively naïve author on a quest in which they are, 
together, able to discover what is actually going on. For the reader to buy the essay’s 
argument, it requires that they identify with the author as an outsider looking in on politics. 
As two outsiders together, Wallace gives the impression of a kind of equality between reader 
and author. The impression is, of course, misleading.   
In Terrors and Experts, Adam Phillips describes the psychoanalyst Sàndor Ferenczi’s 
experiments with mutual psychoanalysis. Whereas an analyst traditionally reveals very little 
of themselves, Ferenczi allowed his analysands to analyse him, motivated by a recognition 
‘that he was frightened of his patients’: 
                                               
35 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 157. 
36 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 161. 
37 Wallace, ‘Up, Simba,’ 158. 
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Ferenczi exposed the defensive function of professionalism in psychoanalysis, and, by 
implication, the posturings of any professional identity unable to acknowledge (or 
enjoy) what it is organised to exclude.38 
In the jokes and self-deprecation described above, Wallace appears to open himself up for 
analysis. However, he can only ever give the impression of symmetry, as the reader-author 
relation is always asymmetrical. Rather, he is having it both ways, acknowledging what 
political journalism is organised to exclude, yet maintaining a position of authority. In the 
words of A. O. Scott, Wallace is writing as ‘the voice in your own head,’ so the self-analysis 
the piece encourages seems to double as an analysis of Wallace. Whereas, of course, true 
mutual analysis should undo any notion of authority.  
‘Analysing a transference,’ Phillips writes, ‘should spell the death of critical fantasies of 
expertise.’39 The analysis of the transferential relation between Wallace and his reader must 
therefore be conducted on Wallace’s terms if he is to remain persuasive as an expert. The 
figure of the expert, no matter its strength, only holds up to so much scrutiny (Phillips 
suggests that ‘It is not common enough knowledge that everyone was originally a baby.’40). 
Wallace’s humour allows him to preserve this sense of opening himself up while keeping 
himself guarded and maintaining his authority.  
In On Humour, the philosopher Simon Critchley writes on ‘incongruity theory’ (alongside 
‘relief theory’ and ‘superiority theory’). Incongruity theory describes the recognition of 
something funny as being the recognition of some incongruity in the world.41 While simply 
categorising Wallace’s humour is not particularly productive, using Critchley’s descriptions 
of these types of humour offers insight into how Wallace’s jokes serve his rhetorical purpose. 
(Ngai and Berlant rightly point out that ‘Scholars of comedy from many disciplines regularly 
fall down rabbit holes of taxonomy.’42 I attempt to avoid that here.) 
Critchley argues that for a joke about incongruity to be successfully shared there must be 
a local consensus regarding the pattern of the world, so there can be consensus on the pattern 
being broken. This is important in Wallace’s writing because humour is used persuasively to 
                                               
38 Adam Phillips, Terrors and Experts (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1996), 32. 
39 Phillips, Terrors and Experts, 31. 
40 Phillips, Terrors and Experts, 11. 
41 Simon Critchley, On Humour (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 4. 
42 Berlant and Ngai, ‘Comedy Has Issues,’ 235. 
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remind the reader that the author shares their perspective. These jokes are distinguished by 
looseness with language, structure and convention, subverting journalistic norms. As an 
outsider, behind the scenes, Wallace is reflecting the status of the reader; when he emphasises 
some incongruity as astonishing, he is performing as he wants the reader to perform, 
constructing a reader-author resemblance. Critchley sees the felicitous fulfillment of jokes 
premised on incongruity as reliant on the dissolution of tension;43 in ‘Up, Simba’, these 
moments of dissolving tension gather and dissipate to ensure that the reader becomes 
amenable to the author’s argument. For example, the tension created by Wallace relating 
McCain’s horrific experiences as a POW in Vietnam is relieved (though not trivialised), by 
Wallace’s idiomatic, conversational portrayal. However, because Wallace is always the one 
making the joke, offering the insight, he inevitably remains in charge.  
Given that the explicit project of ‘Up, Simba’ is to show the reader a path to taking up civic 
responsibility, much of the humour can be of the kind that Critchley classes as ‘superiority 
theory’ (the form of humour that is contingent on feeling superior). By providing privileged 
access to political and media backrooms and elegantly dismantling the conventions of the 
campaign trail, Wallace offers the reader an opportunity for smugness, as they now by 
definition exist outside the audience being targeted by politicians and the mainstream media. 
(It could be said, here, that Wallace is adopting a demeanour of knowingness—the aesthetic 
to which the next chapter is dedicated—inviting the reader to share in his sense of 
superiority.) The reader of ‘Up, Simba’ is shown that those who blindly believe what they see 
of politics on cable news are being tricked. And the reader who is being influenced by and 
adopting Wallace’s charismatic and disarmingly intellectual perspective, is asked to rise 
above the tricked. Any feeling of superiority that the reader has developed, however, is 
deliberately complicated by the essay’s final section, in which Wallace argues for increased 
alertness and openness along with less cynicism when engaging in the political process.  
Complementing Wallace’s tone, his tendency to spend time on lengthy diversions is a 
powerful rhetorical and comic tool. While there are no footnotes in the article (presumably 
this is due to a Rolling Stone editorial decision rather than a stylistic choice on Wallace’s part 
as there are two in the four-page appended introduction), Wallace spends an extended passage 
describing the difficulties of using the lavatory on the campaign bus (a slapstick, hilarious 
description contained in a 26 line long single sentence with a breathlessness that reflects the 
perilous risk of the sensitively primed door whooshing open on a moving bus), another on the 
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unacknowledged weirdness of the ubiquitous flag backdrops (‘Where do they get these giant 
flags? What happens to them when there’s no campaign?’). Wallace’s humour attends to these 
inessential but peculiar details and this is gently, subversively instructive. ‘Up, Simba’ 
maintains a delicate tension between relaying the value of political engagement and being 
sufficiently entertaining to keep the politically unengaged hooked and receptive. When it 
comes to McCain’s history as a POW, the substance becomes darker and, while Wallace is no 
longer joking, his rhetoric remains in the shape of jokes, clarifying the dissonance.  
Wallace spends considerable time recounting McCain’s experience as a POW in Vietnam. 
The fundamental question of the piece is a moral one and is predicated on what Wallace takes 
to be McCain’s astonishing act of valour in turning down an opportunity to return to America, 
instead choosing to continue enduring a horrific imprisonment. Wallace declares this section 
of McCain’s biography ‘underneath politics…riveting, unspinnable and true.’ ‘The US 
military’s Code of Conduct for Prisoners of War,’ he writes, ‘apparently said that POWs had 
to be released in the order they were captured, and there were others who’d been in Hoa Lo 
a much longer time, and McCain refused to violate the code.’44 As Wallace examines and 
relates the logistics of riding around the country on a campaign bus, watching stump speech 
after stump speech, and refining his understanding of the relationships between and roles of 
the various media and political players—journalists, spokespeople, advisers, TV audiences, 
town hall audiences, campaign competitors, and the candidate—he attempts to reconcile 
McCain’s singular act of bravery with the cynical marketing-style manipulation that radiates 
from a presidential primary campaign. 
In the passage describing McCain’s capture and detention as a POW, the humour that has 
led up to this moment is exchanged for horror. ‘Think,’ Wallace writes, ‘about how 
diametrically opposed to your own self-interest getting knifed in the nuts and having fractures 
set without a general would be, and then getting thrown in a cell to just lie there and hurt, 
which is what happened.’45 The heightened style, a mix of casual conversation and intellectual 
precision, mimics the comic mode present in other parts of the essay, but here there are no 
punch-lines. Unexpected shifts in tone and rhythm invite the reader to sit up and pay 
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attention and, whereas before such shifts would have invited laughter, they now invite shock. 
According to Ngai and Berlant,  
there’s no continuum between the unintended pleasure and the sudden appearance of 
an uncomfortable joke that seems to write itself, thanks to the autonomy of mind, the 
conventions of culture, or plain old aggression. Maybe the fantasy of a spectrum 
alleviates the anxiety at the boundary where comedy enmeshes with all its others.46  
Wallace’s discomfiting description of McCain’s torture is disturbing precisely because it takes 
the same form as his trivial cracks about, for example, hiring a dogsitter, but now the reader 
is shocked into empathising with the traditionally dehumanised figure of the politician. The 
persuasive power of this passage relies on the prose’s comic incongruities, which expect the 
reader to recognise McCain’s ordeal and seriously consider its implications for the 
authenticity of his campaign trail persona. 
McCain was offered release because his father ‘had just been made head of all naval forces 
in the Pacific, meaning also Vietnam, and the North Vietnamese wanted the PR coup of 
mercifully releasing his son.’ When McCain refused the offer, ‘The prison commandant, not 
at all pleased, right there in his office, had guards break McCain’s ribs, rebreak his arm, knock 
his teeth out.’47 Wallace wants the reader to ‘try to imagine it at the time, yourself in his place, 
because it’s important.’ He implores the reader to ‘do some creative visualization’. A 
readership (at least the Rolling Stone readership Wallace appears to envision) that has been 
conditioned never to empathise with politicians is being coaxed into doing an immensely 
square thing: empathise with a politician. Why ‘PR coup’? Why is the commandant, 
understatedly, ‘not at all pleased’? Torture rarely needs to be explained as being ‘diametrically 
opposed to your own self-interest’; that characteristic goes without saying. But because these 
stories are repeated endlessly by media that fails to question the nature of the presentation, 
presented politically and received cynically, they have no meaning if not freshly staged. 
Wallace’s language is jarring. It could be described as black humour, but it isn’t very funny: 
the colloquialisms are subversive, wrestling with the weighty but staid tone that this sort of 
narrative (a personalised, traumatic war experience) would naturally form and, in doing so, 
reminding the reader of the lived reality. The description of McCain’s capture and 
imprisonment is, not unexpectedly, the essay’s darkest passage. But its rhetorical purpose, to 
snap the reader out of viewing politics as grey and uncomplicated and not worthwhile, is 
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consistent with the rest of the piece, and consistent with the voice of Wallace’s authorial 
persona. In this passage, the various persuasive tools operating through the essay, linked 
together by Wallace’s personal voice, interact with one another to engineer a shift in their 
perspective. 
The final drama of Wallace’s week on the campaign trail involves a distressed woman at a 
town hall meeting asking McCain about her son receiving a call, allegedly from a Bush 
campaign push poller who inquired as to whether the son ‘knew that John McCain was a liar 
and a cheater,’48 among other awful things, reputedly contributing to the son’s general 
disillusionment and compounding the trauma caused by the scandals of the Clinton years. 
McCain ‘seems upset in a way that’s a little too…well, almost dramatic,’49 and the immediate 
fallout caused by the incident—McCain pulling negative advertising and claiming to be 
genuinely dismayed by the news—turns the narrative of the campaign in his favour, however 
briefly. This causes Wallace to ask a great many questions—apparently ignored by the media 
pack, who reportedly read the drama as entirely genuine—about the scenario’s overall 
authenticity. And asking these questions of McCain forms part of his self-reflexive persuasive 
strategy, which entails signalling to the reader that he knows that whether or not they are 
ultimately persuaded by his argument depends on more than the evidence that he has 
mustered. It ultimately depends on whether or not Wallace has shown himself to be the kind 
of person that the reader can believe. 
‘There are limits’ 
Wallace puts these questions to the reader, purportedly sincerely, in the essay’s final section: 
‘Suck it Up’. This continues the colloquial titling trend and this title is worth a closer look. 
The phrase suggests that the audience—presumed young, apathetic, and distrustful of 
mainstream political coverage—has had its appetite for appreciating politics as a productive 
enterprise so thoroughly benumbed that exposure to the presidential primary is something 
to be suffered: a hardship. It signals a pivotal shift in tone and substance. Here, Wallace 
maintains the jocularity but, having wrapped up his recounting of the week on the campaign 
trail, abandons the supplemental playful comedy, and knuckles down to explain why politics 
should not be treated cynically. The phrase implies that an obstacle has been presented that 
must be dealt with, and demands the interlocutor confront it. In this case, the obstacle is the 
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absence of a rhetorical mediator: tonal irony. While the title is perhaps playful, resembling a 
joke, the section itself suggests that Wallace means it as a serious request. It is without 
humour.  
So is that what ‘It’ refers to? Discarding the idiomatic meaning of ‘Suck It Up’, which 
previous titles suggest is an option (for instance, ‘Substantially Farther Behind The Scenes 
Than You’re Apt To Want To Be’ plays on the deadened cliché of being ‘behind the scenes’, 
both enforcing and subverting its meaning), being told to ‘Suck It Up’ acquires another layer 
of implication. It indicates that the reader should totally embrace the clichés Wallace is about 
to deploy, forget that they have been rendered hollow by meaningless self-serving political 
rhetoric, and relish the genuineness. The final lines of ‘Suck It Up’—also the final lines of ‘Up, 
Simba’—are the essay’s most important. They offer a plea. Wallace presents some sort of 
verdict about McCain, pointing away from McCain: that ‘whether he’s truly “for real” now 
depends less on what is in his heart than on what might be in yours. Try to stay awake.’50  
The reader is being presented with a question of rhetoric, a question the essay attempts to 
resolve. It takes the form of what the literary critic Richard Lanham calls ‘The Q Question’, 
the Q standing for Quintilian, the Roman rhetorician, who first raised it. The Q Question asks 
whether there is any relation between the quality of a person’s rhetoric and their moral 
character. Is a morally sound argument a necessity for good rhetoric? Quintilian decided in 
the affirmative; Lanham, by extensively qualifying and developing Quintilian’s position, 
argues the same. In his essay, named for the question, Lanham frames his argument in the 
context of the humanities curriculum. Tracing the association and separation of rhetoric and 
virtue from Quintilian to the modern university, the thesis is framed with two arguments that 
have defined the history of the debate, what he terms the Weak and Strong Defences.  
The Weak Defence argues that there are two kinds of rhetoric, good and bad. The good 
kind is used in good causes, the bad kind in bad causes. Our kind is the good kind; the bad 
kind is used by our opponents.51 The Strong Defence assumes that truth is determined by 
social dramas, some more formal than others but all man-made. Rhetoric in such a world is 
not ornamental but determinative, essentially creative. Truth, once created in this way 
becomes referential, as in legal precedent.52 
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Wallace’s own argument depends on Lanham’s Strong Defence in two ways. The first is 
that McCain’s rhetoric cannot be dissociated from his politics; what matters is how and to 
what degree the rhetoric is interpreted as an inextricable component of his character and 
cause. The second is that Wallace, in criticising political rhetoric, bemoaning the difficulty of 
identifying exactly what political rhetoric represents, and seeking a way to be less cynical 
about political rhetoric, is ironically backed into a corner where he must deploy rhetorical 
devices similar to those he has been criticising. In order to avoid this trap he has set for 
himself, Wallace must acknowledge the irony.  
I should emphasise, briefly, that while I believe that the resolution of this rhetorical 
quandary is the challenge Wallace sets himself, it seems to me an unnecessary challenge, a 
philosophical problem that begins in a metaphysical suspicion rather than attending to 
ordinary experience. The final section of this chapter examines why Wallace is so concerned 
with whether we can really know the contents of another person’s character or mind and 
suggest that his views on this are misguided. For now, I want to note that Stanley Cavell, 
discussing the nature of the kind of scepticism that causes Wallace’s dilemma about McCain’s 
character, writes that 
behavior is expressive of mind; and this is not something we know, but a way we treat 
‘behavior.’ The skeptic in effect goes on to say that we have no reason to treat behavior 
in this way. And is that false? —But what he turns out to mean is that behavior is one 
thing, the experience which ‘causes’ or is ‘associated’ with it is something else.53 
So, what ordinary language philosophy shows us is that while Wallace’s concern is 
intelligible, such anxiety about whether behaviour can truly count as evidence for the quality 
of another’s mind depends on a denial of how, in our lives, we come to understand character, 
how we come to know other people. It is a denial that we can know come to know others 
through what they say and do.  
 ‘The really important stuff’ 
In developing his understanding of humour, Critchley draws on Henri Bergson’s seminal Le 
Rire, a 1900 collection of three essays outlining a theory of laughter. Bergson’s central thesis 
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is that laughter is induced when we are persuaded to see the human being as a machine, 
something mechanical, a ‘thing’.54 Bergson’s inclusion of absentmindedness, which paves the 
way for people appearing mechanical,55 reveals Wallace’s humour as, fundamentally, a prompt 
to the reader to question their assumptions about what they ignore when, in the case of 
McCain, it comes to politics and the media. We find absentmindedness (‘as though the soul 
had allowed itself to be fascinated and hypnotised by the materiality of a simple action,’ 
Bergson writes) funny and, in finding our own absentmindedness funny, our attention is 
drawn, encouraging re-examination and, perhaps, change. For Bergson, laughter ‘makes us 
at once endeavour to appear what we ought to be, what some day we shall perhaps end in 
being.’56  
Critchley expands on Bergson’s idea of laughter as revealing the mechanical to propose 
that ‘there is something essentially ridiculous about a human being behaving like a human 
being.’57 This is why Wallace’s self-deprecatory jokes can be funny: we are reminded of his 
and his characters’ humanness. The characterisation of the Vietnamese commandant as ‘not 
at all pleased’ might be darkly funny because that is an especially mundane and human thing 
to be. Critchley believes that this sort of comic recognition requires one to coolly detach from 
immediate experience in order to inhabit a ‘contemplative standpoint.’ 
The shifts in Wallace’s own rhetoric—the careful blend of incisive humour and powerful 
sentiment—implicitly confront the dilemma about McCain’s genuineness. Riffing on the 
emptiness of cliché and the murkiness of purported authenticity, Wallace, goading the reader 
to question their assumptions, inescapably calls his own authenticity into question. The final 
section, ‘Suck It Up’, begins like this: 
Another paradox: it is all but impossible to talk about the really important stuff 
without using terms that have become such awful clichés they make your eyes glaze 
over and are difficult to even hear.58 
This section makes the essay’s final and most vital argument, in which Wallace, in his effort 
to persuade, dispenses with humour. One more detail of the campaign is revealed: The 
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afternoon following the push polling revelation, McCain personally called the distraught 
woman’s son. The media is allowed to film the call but, in the name of privacy, permitted to 
record only 10 seconds of sound. And the media’s explanation to their audience for the lack 
of sound, McCain’s concern for privacy, ‘will then of course make McCain look doubly good, 
both caring and non-political.’59  
The absence of humour here is significant; it both signals that the humour used up to this 
point has done its job, and draws attention to the argument as something that’s not to be at 
all obscured. The substance is left to stand alone, unornamented. Since the substance posits 
that these ‘awful clichés’, beneath all the spin and dead repetition, actually have some value, 
an arch approach would totally undermine the premise. Bergson writes that ‘The 
comic…appeals to the intelligence, pure and simple; laughter is incompatible with emotion.’ 
He argues that the distinction between action and gesture underlies this division between the 
humorous and the dramatic. An action is the conscious manifestation of a mental state that 
aims towards a goal, dramatising the mental state. A gesture, for Bergson, is the unintentional 
expression: ‘the attitudes, the movements and even the language by which a mental state 
expresses itself outwardly without any aim or profit, from no other cause than a kind of inner 
itching.’60 In ‘Up, Simba’ Wallace navigates the reader through the comic gestures of the 
campaign trail, before reminding them of the actions on which these gestures depend.  
The most compact summary of the essay’s primary thesis is a question, which Wallace 
formulates as follows: 
Is it hypocritical that one of McCain’s ads’ lines in South Carolina is ‘Telling the truth 
even when it hurts him politically,’ which of course since it’s an ad means that McCain 
is trying to get political benefit out of his indifference to political benefit? What’s the 
difference between hypocrisy and paradox?61 
The essay is uncomfortable with the assumption that the natural reaction to this dilemma is 
blasé cynicism (the assumed natural reaction of the Rolling Stone readership). Wallace 
identifies ‘The science of sales and marketing’ as responsible for causing the term ‘leader’ to 
become an impenetrable cliché.62 The difference, Wallace explains, between a salesman and a 
leader, is that a salesman, no matter how good a person or salesman, has self-interest at heart, 
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a good leader does not. The essay accepts that the reader can never be certain whether they 
are dealing with a good salesman or a good leader, but that does not mean that they should 
retreat in despair. The reader has witnessed Wallace be cynically self-deprecating and pierce 
the manufactured exterior of the political campaign. However, Wallace does not denounce 
the entire process as wasteful, meaningless or inaccessible. He returns, unequivocally, to 
McCain in his cell in Vietnam: ‘There were no techs’ cameras in that box, no aides or 
consultants, no paradoxes or gray areas; nothing to sell. There was just one guy and whatever 
in his character sustained him. This is a huge deal.’63  
The fundamental obstacle (as in all of Wallace’s work; this tendency is discussed in more 
detail further on) is solipsism: while we have access to a large portion of McCain’s history and 
views and personality, the inside of the subject’s head is, for Wallace, unavailable (whatever 
that means), so in his view we cannot truly know McCain’s motives, thinking and internal 
conflicts. Because Wallace settles on the problem of other minds’ inaccessibility as the 
fundamental challenge, the impossibility of wholly knowing another becomes, for him, 
exhausting. This is amplified by Wallace’s rhetorical questions and long, detail-packed, self-
reflexive sentences. The question of whether McCain is exploiting the media, or is genuine in 
what he says, or is, most likely, a complex mixture of both, cannot be answered. So the essay 
turns to the reader, the American citizens who at least think they know something about 
themselves.  
Wallace illustrates the manipulation and deceit inherent in political campaigning, while 
attempting to preserve the possibility of endowing politics with some civic value, and this is 
tricky. The political/media machine Wallace describes incorporates elements of the Weak 
and Strong Defences into its rhetoric. The media adopts the Weak, the politicians adopt the 
Strong, both accounting for the others’ rhetorical assumptions in the blurry, symbiotic 
relationship. A political campaign desires that its audience receive its rhetoric as indicating 
virtue, yet the media, simultaneously disseminating and analysing a political campaign’s 
output, measures the success of message management as representative of a requisite 
managerial competence, rather than being inseparable from a candidate’s personal morality. 
If a politician is able to effectively demonstrate their morality rhetorically, this is spun as a 
success story predicated on the demonstration of effectiveness rather than morality. A media-
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savvy audience privy to the constructedness of a campaign can congratulate themselves on 
observing what the media unpacks.64 
The argument of ‘Up, Simba’ is that this nightmarishly obfuscatory feedback loop should 
not stop the reader from politically engaging and that they should think hard about the 
meaning and shape of productive political engagement. The essay relies on the implausibility 
of separating style and substance, coupled with the impossibility of knowing the extent to 
which oratory represents character, posed as an exhortation that we not give up on politics. 
What can McCain’s politicised rhetoric tell us about his character? What does it indicate 
about his presidential capability? The most fruitful answers to questions of character are not 
explicit in the essay—Wallace leaves them hanging on that final page, explicitly passing the 
burden of decision to the reader. This approach is typical of Wallace, and indicates that his 
broader project involves an appeal for the reader to take responsibility.  
Writing in 2004 for Gourmet magazine on the Maine Lobster Festival, Wallace concludes 
the article with a series of questions (including ‘what ethical convictions have you worked out 
that permit you not just to eat but to savor and enjoy flesh-based viands’), before admitting 
that  
These last few queries, though, while sincere, obviously involve much larger and more 
abstract questions about the connections (if any) between aesthetics and 
morality…and these questions lead straightaway into such deep and treacherous 
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waters that it’s probably best to stop the public discussion right here. There are limits 
to what even interested persons can ask of each other.65  
In his 1996 essay on David Lynch, Wallace, while praising Lynch ecstatically, states that he 
may be ‘either ingenious or psychopathic’ and declares that it is ‘hard to say’ whether his films 
constitute ‘good art.’ The essay’s last words are, simply, ‘you might want to keep all this in 
mind.’66  
The final lines of ‘Up, Simba’ are not very different from the kind of immediate unqualified 
entreaties of a political campaign ad: ‘whether he’s truly ‘for real’ now depends less on what 
is in his heart than on what might be in yours. Try to stay awake.’ (The difference is that 
campaign ads are not preceded by 78 pages of amusing, agitated equivocating about the 
possibility of genuineness in politics.)  
How to characterise the effects of this repeated strategy of closing on equivocation? In 
recent years, a number of critics have concluded that there is a privileged, blind conservatism 
inherent in Wallace’s philosophy, indicated by his lack of trust in the writing to actually reach 
the reader. Iain Williams contends that: 
His long-winded, maximalist syntax echoes the meandering ruminations of 
individuals with the luxuries of leisure time and education to invest in these all-
consuming and yet ultimately petty concerns.67  
And James Santel writes that: 
The source of Wallace’s conservatism was his insurmountable belief that we’re all 
ultimately alone. Critics might be correct in writing that Wallace was moving toward 
a more communal emphasis after Infinite Jest, but it seems to me more accurate to say 
that Wallace was always searching for, and failing to find, access to this path.  
For Santel, the end of ‘Up, Simba’ (‘Try to stay awake.’) ‘becomes a cramped account of 
isolation and indifference.’ ‘As a conclusion,’ he writes ‘it feels too much like an abdication’ 
and pronounces this tendency to be ‘the tragedy of Wallace’s conservatism.’68 While 
Wallace’s work certainly shows conservative tendencies, it is hyperbole to describe ‘Up, 
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Simba’ as ending with a tragic abdication. Rather, Wallace’s leaving space for the audience 
seems to reflect an understanding that Wallace cannot, beyond the force of his rhetoric, coerce 
the reader to do anything. They could always simply stop reading the essay. However, Santel 
is right to draw attention to Wallace’s anxiety about our ultimate solipsism.  
This habit of giving the reader space to make their own decisions resonates with ordinary 
language philosophy; Wittgenstein had a tremendous influence on Wallace (although, as I 
am about to argue, Wallace’s version of Wittgenstein is different from the Wittgenstein with 
whom this thesis is in conversation), especially his contention that ‘private language’ is 
impossible. Wallace called Philosophical Investigations, in which Wittgenstein makes this 
argument, ‘the single most comprehensive and beautiful argument against solipsism that’s 
ever been made.’69 Because we owe the development of our communication, and thus our 
ethics, to our interlocutors, Wittgenstein’s work leads us away from solipsism. The method 
of persuasion Wallace employs in his attempt to convince the reader to have faith in him and 
his argument demonstrates this belief. This is the form in which the attempted resolution to 
the dilemma of McCain’s authenticity presents itself. However, the desperation of his calls for 
the reader to trust him seem to emerge from a belief that he could never do quite enough to 
convince a reader to do so, and that there would always be some scepticism with respect to 
his sincerity.  
On Wallace and Solipsism 
Claire Hayes-Brady writes that ‘The recurrent encounters with the incomplete throughout 
Wallace’s work unify his writing at structural, formal, and narrative levels.’ For Hayes-Brady, 
the concept of the unfinished is the underlying ideological project of Wallace’s writing career. 
Wallace is especially concerned with the way in which our understanding of others can be 
conceptualised as forever incomplete, and that we cannot get inside another person’s head. 
This fact is central to his commencement address, This is Water. It is the motivating force for 
many of his essays, including ‘A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again’, ‘David Lynch 
Keeps His Head,’ and ‘E Unibus Pluram’ (the essay about the ubiquity of irony in late 
twentieth-century US literature, often taken to be his manifesto). It is obsessed over in his 
story collection Brief Interviews With Hideous Men. In the short story, ‘Octet’, Wallace 
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addresses the reader as if they were the author writing the story they are reading. In doing 
so, he describes how you, the author of this story, want to avoid being seen as 
the type of real-world person who tries to manipulate you into liking him by making 
a big deal of how open and honest and unmanipulative he’s being all the time, a type 
who’s even more irritating than the sort of person who tries to manipulate you by just 
flat-out lying to you, since at least the latter isn’t constantly congratulating himself 
for not doing precisely what the self-congratulation itself ends up doing, viz. not 
interrogating you or have any sort of interchange or even really talking to you but 
rather just performing in some highly self-conscious and manipulative way.70  
Wallace felt that, after the postmodernist American wave of writers such as Barth, Pynchon, 
and DeLillo, writing sincere literary fiction was, if not impossible, near-unattainable.71 This 
stance can be linked to the philosophy that underpins much of his work, which was shaped by 
Wittgenstein, yet not the Wittgenstein of Cavell. Rather, Wallace’s version of Wittgenstein 
is inherited from Norman Malcolm, which means that the philosophy underpinning Wallace’s 
writing was compatible with his sentiment that ‘True empathy’s impossible,’72 a thought 
incompatible with the ordinary language philosophy of Cavell and Toril Moi.  
In an early-career interview, Wallace is described as having 
a habit of lightly striking the back of his head with an open palm, a habit which, 
Wallace noted, descends in a direct line from his father, a philosopher at the University 
of Illinois Champagne/Urbana; through his father’s teacher, Norman Malcolm, 
Wittgenstein’s last student; back to Wittgenstein himself.73 
While the claim of gestural heritage seems dubious, the claim of influence is valid. In his essay 
on language, ‘Authority and American Usage,’ Wallace describes Wittgenstein by drawing 
on Malcolm’s version.74 He remained caught in Malcolm’s viewpoint which, in questions of 
solipsism, is opposed to that of Cavell. In fact, Cavell established his concept of 
‘acknowledgment,’ in his essay ‘Knowing and Acknowledging,’ in response to Malcolm’s ‘The 
Privacy of Experience’. Cavell takes Malcolm to have too hastily assumed that ordinary 
language philosophy constitutes a direct repudiation of the figure of the sceptic. He refutes 
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Malcolm’s claim that, since we can have the same pain as another person (for instance, we 
both feel pain in the same place), that means that we share one pain. This is significant, 
because Wallace’s fixation on solipsism is contingent on a Malcolm-style reading of 
Wittgenstein in which the concept of ‘acknowledgment’ is an insufficient empathetic tool. 
Wallace maintains that we can never really know McCain, which seems to presume it 
conceivable that we could really know another person’s depths. For Cavell, ‘To know you are 
in pain is to acknowledge it, or to withhold the acknowledgment. —I know your pain the way 
you do.’75 Wallace’s vision is incompatible with the vision of my thesis, in which we can talk 
about knowing an author and mean it. For Wallace, that kind of knowing remains elusive. 
I spend time on this in order to challenge Wallace’s assumption that telling whether 
McCain is ‘for real’ is an irresolvable crisis that requires a leap of faith, and the consequent 
assumption that deciding whether Wallace, the author of the essay, is for real requires a 
similar leap. Rather, McCain, on the campaign trail, is a mixture of authenticity and 
salesmanship, and the voter will judge him using the tools they have developed during their 
18 years minimum of evaluating and engaging with others. To imagine that anything more 
is possible, that some true empathetic understanding lies beyond our natural abilities, is to 
misconceive of how we live with one another, and thus misconceive how readers and authors 
relate to each other.  
To presume, as Wallace does, that ‘true empathy’ is impossible is to remove the word 
‘empathy’ from its everyday use. Referring to Section 124 of Philosophical Investigations, in 
which Wittgenstein argues that philosophical systems ‘set out to “interfere with” the actual 
use of language,’ Moi writes: 
Cavell explains, rightly, that the idea of ‘interfering’ with language refers to 
Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy’s tendency to distort perfectly ordinary words, 
such as ‘see,’ ‘believe,’ ‘doubt’ and so on, to use them in ways that conflict with their 
ordinary use, yet all the while trading on that use for philosophical effect.76 
Wallace writes as if genuine understanding of another was unfathomable, as if trusting a 
writer required the reader to take on tremendous risk. However, that assertion rests on the 
assumption that we do not ordinarily and successfully empathise with and trust others all the 
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time in our everyday lives. In fact, living together makes us experts in such things. This is 
why belief in a text’s personal voice can come to a reader so naturally.  
In Why Do We Care About Literary Characters? Blakey Vermeule writes that ‘Mind reading 
is the most important cognitive mechanism of human sociability, and literature obsessively 
reflects that mechanism.’77 In Terrors and Experts, Phillips writes that 
There has always been a resistance, at least among psychoanalysts themselves, to 
thinking of their work as mind-reading or fortune-telling. Despite the fact that most 
ordinary conversation is exactly this, or perhaps because it is, psychoanalysts have 
wanted to describe what they do as different, as rational, even—dealing with the 
irrational but not dealing in it.78  
In asking us to identify with both himself and McCain, Wallace is operating under the 
assumption that the reader-author relation is forever incomplete, and is similarly resisting 
the idea that writing might offer a form of mind-reading, a form as valid in its penetration of 
the mind as ordinary conversation or psychoanalysis. Wallace’s persuasive strategy entails 
describing a certain kind of reader, imagining what they might think, what he thinks they 
should be convinced of, and attempting to communicate. The reader, then, reads and 
evaluates. That this strategy permits manipulation is notable, but no more notable than the 
prospect of such transgressions in any social interaction.  
The dangers of overidentification with an essayist such as Wallace emerge when he is 
idolised, taken to be something more than ordinary. Misguided (or, perhaps, irresponsible) 
reading can occur when the reader is seduced by the naturally hortatory nature of writing, 
alongside the near-magical aura of celebrity that can accompany the endorsement given by 
publication and critical acclaim, interpreting these features as sources of authority. These 
metaphysical assumptions about the effects of authorial presence are risky because, to 
paraphrase Moi, they trade on their use for philosophical effect. The alternative, for which I 
would advocate, is to understand the relationship a person might have with Wallace or 
McCain as the kind of relationship I described in the previous chapter: an aesthetic or literary 
connection that reminds us of our social connections. The ‘friendliness’ of a politician is likely 
to seem performed, thus inviting a degree of suspicion (which, I would argue, is healthy). To 
read Wallace as friendly is to simultaneously acknowledge his humanity and lower the 
                                               
77 Blakey Vermeule, Why Do We Care About Literary Characters? (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
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expectations for what it might mean to truly empathise with him. We know what it means to 
empathise with another person; we have all done it.
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4 
 Knowingness 
For years in the movies he had played the good guy and been proud of it. If he didn’t get the girl, it 
was because he was too good a guy to be overwhelmingly attractive. That was all right. He would 
grit his teeth and get the girl next time out. Since this was conceivably the inner sex drama of half of 
respectable America, he was wildly popular with Republicans. 
Norman Mailer on Ronald Reagan, Miami and the Siege of Chicago 
 
Knowing what one wants is an incitement to violence. 
Adam Phillips, Intimacies 
-- 
Social relations tend to involve a degree of fantasy. What do we picture when imagining a 
successful conversation? The interlocutors are managing their responses based on one 
another’s character and feedback, they are taking up invitations to engage, responding to 
warnings that certain areas are off-limits. According to this fantasy, we adjust our behaviour 
to adapt to whomever we are speaking with. We may even model ourselves on our 
conversation partner. Or, if we choose not to engage, we are being disruptive. Reading offers 
another opportunity to indulge in this kind of fantasy, as we reflect the attitude of the author 
we are reading. I am not suggesting that readers automatically ape an author’s approach but 
that, in evaluating an author, they are influenced by the way the author is evaluating or 
interpreting their subject. For example, across two epideictic essays in The White Album, Joan 
Didion describes Georgia O’Keeffe as ‘simply hard, a straight shooter, a woman clean of 
received wisdom’ and Doris Lessing as ‘a writer undergoing a profound and continuing 
cultural trauma, a woman of determinedly utopian and distinctly teleological bent assaulted 
at every turn by fresh evidence that the world is not exactly improving as promised.’1 These 
pronouncements, made with such conviction, ask the reader to judge Didion by similar 
standards. As with my discussion of Montaigne in the second chapter, and David Foster 
                                               
1 Joan Didion, The White Album in We Tell Ourselves Stories in Order to Live: Collected Nonfiction (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2006), 272, 268. 
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Wallace in the third, an essay that undertakes any kind of moral evaluation usually implicitly 
maps out a set of standards by which it, and its author, can be judged. 
So how might we take seriously an essay that offers a suspicious reading of its material 
without automatically applying such suspicion to the author? Is it reasonable to engage in 
the kind of generous reader-author relationship this thesis has so far described while taking 
an author’s scepticism seriously? In order to describe how the reader might strike such a 
balance, this chapter looks at several pieces of writing that deal with American politics and 
disappointment. I argue that these essayists use the posture of knowingness to establish what 
appears to be a mutually respectful relationship with their readers while thoroughly 
critiquing their material. I then look at how this sentiment prompts the reader to imagine 
themselves as part of the political collective that these writers articulate. In what follows, I 
want to show that while knowingness is a tragic place for a conversation to end, it can be a 
fruitful place for a conversation to begin.   
Because an author is usually someone who knows (an authority), one motivation for 
reading is to discover what they know (this can mean taking them at their word, or presuming 
to see through the text to deduce what has been withheld). And one reason for critiquing a 
reader’s (over)identification with an author is to prevent the reader from excessively exalting 
the other’s knowledge. As discussed in the previous chapter, the presumption of critique is 
that when a reader identifies with an author, they become vulnerable to manipulation (or 
blindness). So, is the author tricking them into agreement, dazzling them with charismatic 
prose and quick-witted argument? In coming (or deciding) to believe in an author, to take 
them seriously, is the gullible reader overexposed, too willing to be charmed by knowingness? 
And what is at risk if the reader is too ready to agree, too ready to accept the author on their 
own terms? Whatever the risks, it is difficult to speak about them without acknowledging 
that the author is addressing the reader both as an individual and as part of a collective. In 
recognising knowingness, a reader defines themselves both against and with particular 
crowds, able to understand themselves as both distinctive and conforming. So tracing 
authorial knowingness provides a way to reconcile how readers might find themselves 
addressed as both an individual and an audience member, implicated in and distinguished 
from the collective. It is also the case that if the reader-author relationship is redescribed as a 
social relation, the risk of manipulation or error as a result of falling prey to knowingness no 
longer seems so great. This is because, in this picture, the reader has some agency.   
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On Knowingness 
Here is what I mean by knowingness: A demeanour or sentiment that implies a shrewd 
possession of special knowledge, a knowledge to which the knower controls access. I think 
that knowingness entails at least part of the appeal of many (perhaps all) of the writers 
described so far in this thesis. And knowingness, I will argue, has the potential to locate a 
mutual understanding while threatening exclusion and paranoia. It is a sentiment that 
contains the risks and possibilities that arise when a reader believes, appreciates, or enjoys an 
author. It describes a point at which critical and postcritical styles of reading are in play. An 
author’s knowingness is an affective stance functioning as both an invitation and an 
instruction, a claim to see through a subject, and an invitation to the reader to join them in 
their insight. For Joan Didion, knowingness means she can maintain a critical distance from 
her subject, yet still establish a shared perspective, and perhaps intimacy, with the reader. 
Even Wallace, in his attempt to prevent his readers’ cynical knowingness keeping them from 
paying attention to politics (discussed in chapter three), uses the sentiment to engage the 
Rolling Stone readership’s distrust of being marketed to. Knowingness is a form of evaluation 
that conceals the reasoning that motivates it. Knowingness, by definition, goes unexplained.  
It is true of both literary studies and literature that when they try to demystify their 
subjects, they can wind up replacing their subjects, becoming the new mystifying regime. 
Every successful effort to demythologise is at risk of becoming the new mythology. 
Knowingness is especially vulnerable to this because it encourages attachment to the knower; 
everyone wants to be ‘in the know’. To identify knowingness is to share in its glory. In this 
way, knowingness seems to desire (perhaps even demand) a knowing response. And often, 
but not always, the currency of knowingness depends on the exclusion of the purportedly 
credulous or naïve.  
The posture of knowingness is significant to my thesis because it is the siren song of the 
charismatic essayist, an invitation to understand and be understood, to experience the 
sensation of power that knowingness transmits. Yet to believe too firmly in the authenticity 
of knowingness can mean a failure to pay attention to the value or validity of the knowledge. 
According to Adam Phillips, ‘When psychoanalysis makes too much sense, or makes sense of 
too much, it turns into exactly the symptom it is trying to cure: defensive knowingness.’ In 
this context, the danger is that settling on the supposition that knowledge will solve our 
problems gives us permission to detach from those problems. In Missing Out, Phillips writes 
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that ‘All tyrannies involve the supposedly perfect understanding of someone else’s needs.’2 
The tyranny of knowingness is its presumption and fetishisation of understanding.  
Rita Felski describes graduate students engaged in interrogating texts as feeling 
compelled to choose between ‘knowingness and naïveté’ and, for obvious reasons, picking the 
former. Felski goes on, ‘knowing is far from synonymous with knowingness, understood as a 
stance of permanent skepticism and sharply honed suspicion.’3 Knowingness is liable to make 
a reader certain of their convictions when equivocation or further interrogation might be 
called for; it is a way of prematurely halting inquiry. This certainty can lead to the dangerous 
presumption that the pleasure of art is to be found in sharing its sense of superiority when it 
endorses the audience’s worldview.  
Describing the distanced affect of Jean-Luc Godard’s films, Stanley Cavell writes that 
Evidently, Godard’s admirers read his withdrawal of feeling as a combination of 
knowingness and objectivity toward the corruption of the world. But objectivity is a 
spiritual achievement, and apart from it knowingness is only a sentiment. In that case, 
accepting Godard’s work is simply sharing that sentiment.4 
Here, Cavell sees the pleasure of the text as deriving from the director and audience’s mutual 
knowingness, which depends on a critique of those who are not knowing as guileless.  
When Toril Moi advocates for reading as a practice of acknowledgment, she describes the 
alternative as rushing in ‘with concepts taken from theorists and philosophers. Or with the 
unbearable knowingness of skepticism.’ For Moi, conceptualising reading as acknowledgment 
requires us 
to understand our own position in relation to the work’s concerns. To articulate a just 
response, we must do justice to both the work and ourselves. Just as I try not to impose 
my own theories on the work, I need to acknowledge my own investments, interests, 
and reactions. After all, if they drive me toward this particular work, I need to account 
                                               
2 Adam Phillips, Missing Out (London: Penguin, 2013), 56.  
3 Rita Felski, Uses of Literature (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 4. 
4 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1979), 98. 
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for them, too. Understood as a practice of acknowledgment, reading becomes a 
conversation between the work and the reader.5 
I accept absolutely that a posture of knowingness can encourage the reader to read selfishly, 
without accounting for important differences. In The Epistemology of the Closet, Eve Sedgwick, 
laying out the book’s goals, writes that ‘In particular, the book aims to resist in every way it 
can the deadening pretended knowingness by which the chisel of modern homo/heterosexual 
definitional crisis tends, in public discourse, to be hammered most fatally home.’6 This is 
where knowingness is at its most dangerous, where it cloaks complexity in superior dismissal, 
and ends up reinforcing the oppressive structures it aimed to undo. This is why Cavell, Moi, 
Phillips, and Felski, among others, also speak of it so warily. If it comes to govern our way of 
reading, it is simply an expression and affirmation of power. I want to suggest, however, that 
an essayist’s knowingness can also provide a departure point, a way to prompt the 
conversation. 
Knowingness is, essentially, a style of critique, and this thesis is aligned, for the most part, 
with scholars who resist methods of interpretation that depend on critique. Those I cite above 
are describing the dangers of knowingness, and indeed knowingness is often ungenerous and 
self-aggrandising. But what about its promises? Knowingness can, I believe, function as an 
invitation to become enthralled. Part of the pleasure of reading has to do with the exaltation 
of the author, the kind of enchantment Felski describes in Uses of Literature. To presume that 
a reader can’t simultaneously indulge in the pleasure of finding themselves uplifted by an 
author’s superficially elevated stature yet remain wary of that author’s inherent unreliability 
and inevitable human foibles is to diminish the irreducible complexity of the act of reading. 
So is there a place for a knowing author? 
Knowingness, like critique, is not inevitably negative, counterproductive, or exclusionary. 
It can allow the reader to discover how they share the author’s form of life. Knowingness can 
be a facilitator of intimacy that strengthens and adds nuance to relations. While a 
presumption of understanding or knowledge can be tyrannical, it can also be a gift. Moi 
rightly argues that a rush to theorise a text is too often undertaken with ‘the unbearable 
knowingness of scepticism.’ However, I am not arguing for the benefits of ‘knowing critique’ 
                                               
5 Toril Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary Studies After Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press), 217. 
6 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 2nd ed. (Berkley: University of California Press, 2008), 12. 
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as a style of reading. Rather, I want to understand how authorial knowingness, the 
knowingness of an essayist, can provoke a reader to find a point of mutual recognition.  
I want to insist that knowingness is a place where we can begin to understand an author 
as a person, but if it turns out the relationship consists of nothing but knowingness, the reader 
can fall prey to ‘the unbearable knowingness of skepticism’ rather than experiencing reading 
as they might experience a conversation. In this case, the reader’s pleasure depends on their 
maintaining a picture of themselves as distinct from and superior to the collective, rather than 
simply being a participant in the collective, or a particular example of it. So part of what 
manages the sentiment is how the reader conceives of themselves in relation to the rest of the 
audience, whether their pleasure in reading, in being recognised, is dependent on disdain for 
others.  
By examining knowing political writing, I will imagine how a reader, in viewing their own 
relation with the author as a social relation, might avoid the pitfalls of knowingness. I want 
to describe what it can look like for a reader to use the sentiment productively and generously, 
and thus prevent the suspicion the sentiment encourages from defining the attachment it 
initiates. Because conversations about politics so frequently take the shape of arguments (even 
when, for example, two interlocutors loudly agree about politics, both usually still argue their 
point) in which each party presumes access to special information, they almost always involve 
a degree of knowingness. 
I want to pose an alternative to what can be an endless cycle of knowing scepticism as the 
eager reader reads the knowing author. Reading a text predicated on a level of knowingness 
does not mean we are required to respond entirely in kind. Drawing from the thinking on 
literary friendliness and authorial characters I have articulated in previous chapters, I will 
model a style of reading that is more nuanced: a reader might take pleasure in the author’s 
knowingness while being capable of the generosity that a social relationship encourages. 
Seeing an author as a person (taking the time to form a picture of who they might be) means 
we can read warily and generously.  
My central argument focuses on Joan Didion and Ben Lerner, who each possess distinct 
attitudes towards politics, thus providing different ways of describing the author (or essayist) 
as a knowing figure. I am especially interested in the way these writers speak knowingly 
about political collectivity: recognising the uses and limits of this sort of generalisation in 
which the reader is implicated. Conspicuously, while performing knowingness, Didion and 
Lerner spend significant time on what they do not know. Their work frequently gains its 
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energy from the tension between the author’s authoritative presence and the instability of 
their knowledge. The knowingness accounts for the limits of knowledge, the inexplicable in 
both their personal and political spheres. This stance is essential to their avoiding becoming 
purely superficial or exclusionary. However, Lerner and Didion still employ knowingness to 
signal their rarified social and intellectual positions. In order to think about writing where 
this is not the case, I first examine an essay by Kevin Young, who uses knowingness (or 
something that resembles it) as an invitation to have the reader join him in a rewriting of 
American history. The goal of this chapter is not to conclusively justify or condemn the 
knowingness it finds (although it contains some justification and some condemnation). 
Whether the knowingness of Didion, Lerner, and Young is an obstacle to accessing their 
work, a misleadingly seductive tone, or, in fact, a pleasure, is for each reader to decide. What 
I want to argue is that describing the effect of knowingness provides a clearer picture of how 
an author appears to a reader, and shows that this appearance resembles a social experience. 
Both what I am describing and what I am arguing involve an appeal to the reader, an inquiry 
as to whether we share a common sense of what it means to both recognise an author and feel 
recognised by an author.  
When Moi is explaining her use of the pronoun ‘we’ in her writing, she justifies it thus: 
The usual rejoinder is to reject the ‘we’ as normative, as an attempt to tell others what 
they must say. But this ‘we’ is neither an order nor an empirical claim. It is, rather, an 
invitation to the reader to test something for herself, to see if she can see what I see. If 
she can’t, we can try to figure out why. The claims of ordinary language philosophy 
are invitations to a conversation, invitations to do philosophy together.7 
Moi describes this invitation as ‘an appeal to the other’s freedom,’8 and it is best to think of 
this chapter as such an appeal. I cannot say whether the knowingness I describe is definitively 
excessive or insufficient or well-balanced—knowingness is a sentiment particular to each 
reader and each reading—but I can relay what I see.  
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Kevin Young 
Kevin Young’s essay collection, The Grey Album (a book that takes its name from a mashup 
album that mixes Jay-Z’s The Black Album and songs from The Beatles aka The White Album, 
and is doubtless an allusion to Didion’s second essay collection) is, he explains, about black 
creativity, a polemic that demands the reader recognise the overwhelming quantity and 
quality of the contributions by black Americans to the nation’s culture and self-image. In the 
collection’s opening essay, ‘The Shadow Book’—which serves as a kind of preface—Young 
contemplates lost and destroyed texts, incomplete texts, or texts that were never written as 
a way of talking about the place of blackness in art, and black artists. 
‘The Shadow Book’ begins with Young telling his reader that he has lately been ‘thinking 
about the idea of a shadow book—a book that we don’t have, but know of, a book that may 
haunt the very book we have in our hands.’ He proposes to provide a brief taxonomy, and 
transitions to his argument with the line ‘Like to hear it, here it go—’.9 This is the catch phrase 
from the television series In Living Color, a sketch comedy show that exploded the 
conventions of the portrayal of black culture on American network TV. The inclusion here, 
italicised but unreferenced, sets the tone for a collection that samples widely from American 
art, literature, music, and media, African American and otherwise.  
‘The Shadow Book’, more than any text examined in this thesis, is a knowing polemic that 
does not require a knowing nod from its reader. Young’s knowingness develops the authority 
and appeal of his writerly voice without risking self-congratulatory scepticism. This has to 
do with the fact that he is telling a story that has been largely excluded from the American 
narrative. When Lerner and Didion, as will be shown, tell stories they tend to refine dominant 
narratives, still operating within their discourse; even as they unravel the myths of The 
Challenger disaster and Reagan’s presidency, they are retelling them. Young’s knowingness 
does not contain common knowledge insofar as common knowledge perpetuates the narratives 
of whiteness through which the vast majority of American art tends to be understood. Rather, 
Young’s knowingness reveals an overlooked America. Where Didion and Lerner speak 
knowingly of the prevailing narratives of American life, Young speaks knowingly of the 
shadows, acknowledging a different kind of collectivity. As a black writer, Young is part of a 
racial collective in a way that white authors are not.  Didion and Lerner speak to the difficulty 
of conceptualising lives that are, on the surface, more or less compatible with the American 
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national fantasy, whereas Young depicts a marginalised collective, the presence of which the 
national fantasy is dependent on marginalising.  
When Young lists W. E. B. Du Bois, Jean Toomer, Ralph Ellison, and Anatole Broyard—
writers who left potentially great books unwritten—Young is calling for fresh recognition of 
black writers and artists who have been pushed to the historical and cultural fringes, but is 
also mourning art that was stolen by oppressors. ‘One of my main convictions throughout 
this book,’ he writes, ‘is the centrality of black people to American experience, to the dream 
of America.’10 Writing on books that never came to be, Young tells the reader that 
This unwritten shadow book haunts not just the reader—what could have been—it 
haunts every writer each time she or he sits down to write. It is part of the vast 
unwritten that threatens us all, and that in the case of the African American writer, 
seems too much like the life denied him or her, the black literature denied existence. 
It is, in some way, the price of the ticket.11 
His knowingness is bound up with irretrievable loss, and every member of this collective is 
implicated in that loss.  
So, what are the promises of knowingness? Young’s style is nowhere near as knowing as 
Didion’s, for instance, yet it asks similar things of the reader: a respect for the knowledge 
being imparted and the author who knows it, a thrilled recognition of its allusivity, to see 
through structures of power, to be struck by Young’s capability and conviction. So I do not 
think it disingenuous to describe his writing as, to some degree, knowing. But rather than 
offering admission to an exclusive club, it demands the reader’s acknowledgment of a 
collective that was largely shaped by the hardships inflicted upon it. The insight it models 
and demands is premised on the call for a recognition of the importance of difference rather 
than similarity. The knowingness signals the overshadowed collective’s existence, its 
enduring power, and if a reader takes the essay seriously, they will join Young in his insight 
that they too are implicated in ‘the vast unwritten that threatens us all’. To attend to Young’s 
knowingness is to acknowledge the pain of which he writes, whereas, to attend to the 
knowingness of Lerner and Didion is to acknowledge something closer to a disinvestment or 
a distancing from the political scenes in which they find themselves implicated.   
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122 
Knowing Detachment 
Lauren Berlant might as well have been describing Joan Didion when she wrote that 
The political depressive might be cool, cynical, shut off, searingly rational, or averse, 
and yet, having adopted a mode that might be called detachment, may not really be 
detached at all, but navigating an ongoing and sustaining relation to the scene and 
circuit of optimism and disappointment.12 
Another way of formulating this is to say that the political depressive protects themselves 
from failure and disappointment by adopting a posture of knowingness. A figure defined by 
their knowingness becomes immune to surprise; they second-guess criticism and are 
reconciled to a world that deserves their cynicism.  
This is the attitude Didion adopts throughout her essay collection Political Fictions. 
‘Washington,’ she tells us in an essay shredding the faithful journalism of Bob Woodward, ‘as 
rendered by Mr. Woodward, is by definition basically solid, a diorama of decent intentions in 
which wise if misunderstood and occasionally misled stewards will reliably prevail.’13 In 
pieces spanning from 1988 to 2000, Didion tries to make political narratives coherent while 
marvelling at their incoherence. In the foreword (curiously titled ‘A Foreword’, the indefinite 
article suggesting the possibility of other forewords) Didion raises what she perceived to be 
the ‘puzzling frequency’ with which she was interrogated about her own political views, as 
she continued to write about politics. They are not ‘eccentric, opaque or unreadable,’ she 
insists: 
They are the logical product of a childhood largely spent among conservative 
California Republicans (this was before the meaning of ‘conservative’ changed) in a 
postwar boom economy. The people with whom I grew up were interested in low 
taxes, a balanced budget, and a limited government. They believed above all that a 
limited government had no business tinkering with the private or cultural life of its 
citizens. In 1964, in accord with these interests and beliefs, I voted, ardently, for Barry 
Goldwater. Had Goldwater remained the same age and continued running, I would 
have voted for him in every election thereafter.14 
                                               
12 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 27. 
13 Didion, We Tell Ourselves Stories in Order to Live, 867. 
14 Didion, We Tell Ourselves Stories in Order to Live, 735. 
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It is pleasurable to imagine Joan Didion enthusiastically casting a ballot for an immortal 
Barry Goldwater at the turn of the twenty-first century (when this foreword was written), 
but difficult to gauge the seriousness of the claim. She goes on to explain that the party’s 
abandoning of Goldwater (‘an authentic conservative’) and embracing of Reagan led her to 
register as a Democrat:15 
That this did not involve taking a markedly different view on any issue was a novel 
discovery, and one that led me to view ‘America’s two-party system’ with—and this 
was my real introduction to American politics—a somewhat doubtful eye.16 
The author portrayed here no longer appears to believe in the positive potential of political 
action. The reader is presented, instead, with scepticism. The loss of what Didion sees as this 
original meaning of ‘conservative’ leads to a kind of universal disdain for the subjects of 
Political Fictions, and her analyses show no quarter for anyone invested in the process. 
However, the text is not void of affective attachment. The knowing, deliberate detachment 
becomes a cathexis connecting reader and writer, each investing in the other’s disinvestment.  
While most of the essays include less of Didion’s personal experience than those in 
Slouching Towards Bethlehem, The White Album, and After Henry (her first three collections), 
the combination of occasionally confessed personal details with Didion’s frequent claims and 
evaluations—all presented from a consistent, carefully honed perspective—creates a clear 
sense of the author and sets expectations for how the reader might interpret the text. These 
essays frequently end with a hanging fact or quote (a pattern, as shown in the previous 
chapter, also present in Wallace’s essays), undoing itself to expose the ludicrousness of its 
source. For instance, the closing line of ‘Clinton Agonistes’: ‘“Who cares what every adult 
thinks?” a Republican strategist asked The Washington Post to this point [that the electoral 
process was becoming impenetrable to ordinary Americans] in early September 1998. “It’s 
totally not germane to this election.”’17 Didion shows this attitude to be general among the 
political elite, despite the elite’s repeated public declarations that the entire system is premised 
                                               
15 The George Packer article ‘Turned Around,’ which appeared in the Feb 22, 2016 issue of The New Yorker, 
mentions Didion as one of the few public figures who has journeyed from right to left (the article is primarily 
about those who have done the opposite). However, Didion’s sentiment around the shift is not unusual; Packer 
identifies the trend of converts claiming that the political movements left them, rather than the other way 
around: ‘It’s like blaming your spouse for your own unfaithfulness. Political conversions are painful affairs, as 
hard to face up to as falling out of love or losing your religion.’ 
16 Didion, We Tell Ourselves Stories in Order to Live, 736. 
17 Didion, We Tell Ourselves Stories in Order to Live, 890. 
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on the opposite, and it is on the emphasis of these sorts of ironies that Didion’s knowing tone 
depends.  
Unlike Wallace, discussed in the previous chapter, Didion never exhorts the reader to take 
an interest in or become involved with politics. Rather, her work is cautionary. Here, 
knowingness at once operates as a defensive measure and a kind of careful optimism. 
Registering political crises and farces, as she does, is valuable as an end in itself. If a reader 
uses Didion’s style of interpretation as a model for the reading of her own work, it becomes 
clear that her writing is about showing rather than explaining or resolving. The moral of 
Didion’s stories cannot be distilled; if they were evident or recoverable in some purer form, 
Didion implies that she would simply write them that way. Perhaps the best example of 
Didion coming up against the inexplicable and responding with knowingness is her writing 
on Ronald Reagan. 
Reagan is the subject of, or on the fringes of, several essays in Political Fictions. He typifies 
Didion’s favoured exemplary conflict: the clash of insider and outsider narratives. Didion is 
especially fascinated by how these narratives have a tendency to replace facts in political 
discourse. Reagan is a fruitful focal point here, because Didion’s criticism of him leads the 
reader to adopt a particular attitude that can then be applied to her essays, a scepticism that 
will persuade the reader to admire Didion’s thinking. Notably, Reagan also appears as a kind 
of cipher in Ben Lerner’s 10:04, standing in as a representative of grand American narratives, 
a sort of impostor whose strength as a convincing simulacrum elides the reality that the 
nation he recalls never existed.  
I will offer some examples of Didion and Lerner’s personalisation of the political sphere, 
then describe how Didion shows the gap between administrative rhetoric and political action 
with a close reading of her essay ‘“Something Horrible” in El Salvador’. Then I will draw 
together Lerner and Didion’s descriptions of what Reagan might represent, and describe how 
their evaluation dismantles the clichéd narratives of American exceptionalism and 
Presidential grandeur, yet permits the reader to find value in the reader-author connection 
that is forged through what is shared.  
The personal voices constructed by Lerner and Didion to process politics invite an affective 
detachment from the material that allows the reader to avoid disappointment. However, it 
also contains the possibility of a positive connection, in inviting the reader to the kind of 
mercifully untidy concept of recognition that Felski illustrates in Uses of Literature:  
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Recognition comes without guarantees; it takes place in the messy and mundane world 
of human action, not divine revelation. Yet it remains, in its many guises—including 
the rueful recognition of the limits of recognition—an indispensable means of making 
sense of texts and of the world.18  
In the writing of Didion and Lerner, the personal voice invites the reader to share a stance 
with the author: be interested in America, but don’t get your hopes up. Even the authors don’t 
have the answers. This strategy requires the reader to maintain a knowing attitude towards 
politics, yet that does not necessarily require total scepticism. If the reader understands the 
author to be a person, and reads them generously, political scepticism can be accompanied by 
genuine emotional investment, and it can become an acknowledgment, a conversation.  
The Collective Political 
One reason authorial knowingness is compelling is that it mimics the allure of the orator who 
convinces an audience member that they are being directly addressed, their relation 
transcending the audience around them: the reader can reconcile the facts that they are being 
addressed as an individual and as a member of a collective readership. The reader is both made 
to feel simultaneously singled out from and welcomed into a crowd, becoming someone who 
deserves to be addressed. An author’s knowingness can prompt an interaction that might look 
something like the beginning of a friendship, and when reciprocated it reflects a conceptual 
shift between reading as a collective experience and reading as an individual experience.  
Didion and Lerner both struggle with how collective life and collective address might be 
reconciled with individual experience. This has to do both with how one might speak about 
politics or a nation as a single entity, when it is only ever a collection of overlapping yet 
distinct individual experiences, and how an author can write as if they were speaking to both 
a single person and a crowd. (As I discussed in the first chapter, Lerner’s protagonist in 10:04 
speaks of his audience ‘as a second person plural on the perennial verge of existence.’19) They 
experiment with how one might speak of politics and feelings at once, without becoming 
incoherent. Knowingness is one strategy with which to reconcile collective political 
challenges and personal disappointment. (Although the irony of deploying knowingness to 
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shield against disappointment is that the sentiment requires some preemptive 
disappointment.) 
Whereas knowingness is typically understood as a cynicism that precludes optimism, it 
can also be deployed to mitigate genuinely false hope. In Feeling Backward, Heather Love 
maps out a style of literary criticism that resists rewriting history in order to redeem the 
experiences of those who suffered in the past. The book wrestles with the trauma of queer 
history and the tradition of reading queer writers as participating in a revolutionary historical 
arc. Love argues that negative affects of the past—which, traditionally, have been reviewed 
positively or resuscitated, in order to locate martyrdom and value in the pain of those who 
suffered—should be registered, rather than erased. Love examines Walter Benjamin’s reading 
of the Paul Klee painting Angelus Novus. In his essay ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’ 
Benjamin terms the painting’s subject ‘the angel of history’. The angel’s perspective reveals 
history to be 
one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. 
The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with 
such a violence that the angel can no longer close them.20 
According to Love, Benjamin uses Klee’s angel to show ‘that while most people are content 
to forget the horrors of the past and move on toward a better future, the angel resists the 
storm of progress.’21 
Didion’s writing allows the reader to register past crises, without declaring that this 
registering might prevent their recurrence. Here, knowingness functions to avoid sanitising 
cliché. Whether the disdain is directed towards the singular naïvety of Bob Woodward, the 
egregiously mishandled prosecution of the Central Park Five, or a massacre in El Salvador 
being ignored by the Reagan administration because of its failure to match the preferred 
political narrative, Didion’s strategy demonstrates the value in recording and conveying what 
happened, but never presumes that the value relies on explicating lessons to be learnt. The 
figure of Reagan is especially salient to this thinking, given that Didion and Lerner both make 
literature of him without enacting a political or moral recovery. Taking a cue from Feeling 
Backward, I argue that the analyses of this president, who is apparently made wholly of 
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surfaces, his depths non-existent, exemplifies the sort of literature that does not depend on 
undoing political tragedy and transgression, or demanding that the reader find something to 
redeem or some kind of redemption.  
Love claims that 
At the heart of the ambivalence about the angel of history is a key paradox of political 
life. Although historical losses instil in us a desire for change, they also can unfit us 
for the activity of making change. If we look back, we may not be able to pull ourselves 
away from the spectacle of Sodom in flames.22 
Defensive knowingness is one way for both reader and author to avoid being engulfed in these 
flames, and it also allows for the creation of art. The pain of this paradox and the suspicion of 
this relentlessly eager, bound-to-be-disappointed march into the future energises Didion’s 
essays and prompts Lerner’s fiction, essays, and poetry. Both authors try to achieve a balance 
between registering the past without being overwhelmed by recurrent cultural catastrophes, 
while remaining healthily sceptical of the future. The writing itself is doubtful of its subject 
(and the writers prove doubtful about themselves) but gives weight to the practice of locating 
hope in social connection. Lerner’s fixation on the perception of the author, the nature of the 
author in the text, and the nature of the audience being addressed makes usefully explicit 
what is implicit as a line of prevaricating anxiety running through the work of Didion. Most 
importantly, Lerner is interested in what happens—what becomes nonsensical and what 
becomes sensible—when individual experience is facilitated by the language of what I take to 
be ‘national fantasy,’ the concept Berlant coins to describe how American culture is localised 
‘through the images, narratives, monuments, and sites that circulate through 
personal/collective consciousness.’23  
The presence of the ‘knowing author’ in 10:04 is made evident in Lerner’s attempts to 
break down this concept of national fantasy. By doing so, the novel exposes the threats that 
the concept conceals, yet also defends against the disappointment that such beliefs can bring 
about. His examination of national fantasy is focused on the dissonance between the general 
and the particular, or the political and personal. How, Lerner asks, is the maintenance of 
national fantasy compatible or incompatible with the everyday?  
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In terms of 10:04’s authorial voice, this question is explored through conflation of the fictional 
narrator and the author. As discussed in the first chapter, 10:04 blends fiction and reality, the 
narrator sharing many features of Lerner’s life: he is a writer, he writes about art, he spends 
time in New York and is granted a residency in Marfa, Texas. A short story of Lerner’s, ‘The 
Golden Vanity,’ that appeared in The New Yorker comprises the second section of 10:04 and, 
in the novel, is written by the narrator. However, the book is not memoir. 
‘The Golden Vanity’ includes a moment of narrative confusion, in which a character’s 
absence is noted, someone who hasn’t been previously mentioned.  
Then his brother asked, ‘Where’s Ari? Did she go to bed already or is she coming?’ 
They heard what could have been the slamming of a screen door in the distance, and 
his brother said, ‘That must be her.’ 
But the author said, ‘She isn’t in this story.’24 
Ari is Lerner’s wife. She is not mentioned again in the story or the novel.  
During an interview on the radio program Bookworm, Michael Silverblatt asked Lerner 
about Ari’s presence in the book. Lerner responds:  
This book is about the interpenetration of different worlds, meaning the way that your 
fictions can become facts in your life and the way the facts of your life reenter your 
own fictional composition.25  
The fact that Lerner’s wife appears in the text, alongside so many other facts of the author’s 
life, suggests even to the moderately engaged reader that, in reading the novel, their 
understanding of the author is being enriched beyond the inference that he is the sort of 
person who would write such a novel. So it becomes difficult to evaluate the work without, to 
some extent, presuming to evaluate the character of its author. This is amplified by the nature 
of knowingness as a sentiment, the success of which depends on the author initiating the 
reader into their group, a kind of endorsement that resembles social acceptance.  
The narrator of 10:04 attempts to reconcile his personal experience with threats to the 
collective of which he is a part, such as global warming, which is manifested by two storms 
that bookend the novel. On page 25 of 10:04, Klee’s Angelus Novus appears, the artwork used 
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by Benjamin and referred to by Love. Underneath the image—rendered in black and white, 
the angel appearing decayed, composed of flat surfaces, its wide eyes avoiding the viewer’s—
is the Benjamin quote: ‘The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is 
turned.’ In ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’ Benjamin announces that ‘This storm is 
what we call progress.’26 This artwork appears at the end of a section in which the protagonist, 
the Ben Lerner surrogate, has spent a chaste night in bed with his friend Alex. They are holed 
up in Alex’s apartment, ready to weather an impending cyclone (Irene). Back to the Future 
plays silently as Alex falls asleep. While Alex sleeps, the narrator brushes his hand over her 
breasts and stomach. She responds by grabbing his hand and pressing it against her chest, 
maybe conscious, maybe not, maybe in-between: ‘whether to stop or encourage me or neither, 
I couldn’t tell. In that position we lay and waited for the hurricane.’27 The hurricane does not 
arrive. Originally billed by the media and New York state as an imminent disaster for which 
the city must prepare, the storm is downgraded before making landfall and ‘whatever physical 
intimacy had opened up between us had dissolved with the storm.’28  
Lerner is concerned with the clashing of personal, fictive, and historic narratives. A 
moment of potential intimacy that, for him, is ultimately dissatisfying (Alex’s perspective is 
sidelined), is facilitated by an event with a sense of impending grand history, invoking an 
anticipation that goes unfulfilled. How is one self-obsessed poet to reconcile himself with the 
scale of Hurricane Irene, (a real storm that hit New York and New Jersey on August 28, 
2011), billed as world-altering and revealed to be impotent? The personal significance of his 
interaction with Alex is inseparable from the storm’s significance to the community. The 
variation in scales cannot be properly distinguished, and the force of the author as character, 
the ambiguity of how Ben Lerner is drawing on his actual experience, emphasises the strange 
muddle of the personal (or solipsistic) and political.  
Political Fictions, Feeling Backward, 10:04 and Angelus Novus respond to and negotiate the 
notion that political history—the broad narrative strokes of the public sphere—is both 
unavoidable and inaccessible. Love asks how feelings of shame and apathy that would usually 
disqualify the person feeling them from fruitful activity could be made productive.29 Didion 
and Lerner make something of this, and by exploring how politics can be depicted by 
literature, they show that politics and personal affective context are inextricable, and that 
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neither can entirely frame the other. The knowingness they adopt is not a simple facilitator 
of authentic intimacy, nor can it be reduced to a sceptical defence against clichéd feeling. 
Rather, it is a tone that asks the reader to pay attention to emotional and political complexity. 
It is a way of showing the profound flaws in a concept such as the American national fantasy, 
while acknowledging a desire for connection and understanding.  
However, no general theory of knowingness could capture the precise implications of every 
instance of the sentiment, and authorial knowingness can still risk becoming mean-spirited 
or emotionally distant. Didion is possibly at her closest to perpetuating what Moi refers to as 
the ‘unbearable knowingness of skepticism’ when writing sceptically of political activism. 
This has nothing to do with the accuracy or otherwise of Didion’s assessments; rather, I am 
interested in the way her knowingness begins to slip from preempting disappointment to 
rejecting hope. In ‘On the Morning After the Sixties’ Didion seems to sigh: ‘If I could believe 
that going to the barricade would affect man’s fate in the slightest I would go to the 
barricade.’30 In the 1966 essay, ‘Where the Kissing Never Stops’, Didion half-scornfully, half-
sympathetically describes Joan Baez’s commune-type school as a ‘place where the sun shines 
and ambiguities can be set aside a little while longer,’ and repeatedly remarks on Baez 
navigating politics instinctively rather than rationally, following her ‘feelings’.31 
Standing out as assured pronouncements that pierce through her reportage, these occur at 
the threshold where knowingness begins to encourage the kind of critique that is self-
congratulatory rather than curious; they are remarks that take their literary refinement as 
reason enough to exclude those insufficiently refined to comprehend their significance. These 
are the type of indulgences that, in part, give knowingness a bad name. 
Political Feelings 
In her introduction to Feeling Backward, Love quotes Berlant as wondering how ‘the struggle 
that shapes collective life’ is influenced by the fact that feeling—‘the most subjective thing’—
governs our thinking. Love confirms the difficulty of reconciling affect and political 
transformation: 
Politics and feelings are very different kinds of things: the public sphere is big, feelings 
are small; social life happens out there, psychic life somewhere inside; public time is 
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collective time, measured by the clock, whereas in psychic life the trains hardly ever 
run on time. Such problems of scale, location and temporality simply serve to remind 
us that the public sphere and affect are different kinds of objects; as such, they have 
different histories and critical frameworks, and they call for different kinds of 
responses.32 
It is impossible to disentangle politics and feelings completely, but Love clarifies that to talk 
about them with the same vocabulary is deceptive and leads to the sort of self-deception 
described by Berlant. Rather than focusing on how the everyday is organised by capitalism, 
Berlant declares herself to be compelled by the 
overwhelming ordinary that is disorganized by [capitalism], and by many other forces 
besides…The ordinary is an intersecting space where many forces and histories 
circulate and become ‘ready to hand’ in the ordinary, as Stanley Cavell would put it, 
for inventing new rhythms for living, rhythms that could, at any time, congeal into 
norms, forms and institutions.33 
The balance between scepticism and nourishment that Didion and Lerner perform can 
alternately enact and resist Berlant’s cruel optimism. This concept is the subject of Berlant’s 
book, Cruel Optimism, the thesis of which is encapsulated in its first sentence: ‘A relation of 
cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing.’34 
Coming up against this blockage, knowingness is a way to acknowledge the intersubjectivity 
that can make reading so pleasurable, while attempting to avoid (though not always 
succeeding) indulgence in the superiority that such dismantling of systems and conventions 
can prompt. Didion’s repeated descriptions of past mistakes and tragedies take the form of 
cautions against repetition. But the cautions remain implicit, because repetition seems 
inevitable. If Didion were to urge her reader to act against repetition, she would incite them 
to form an optimistic political attachment that would inevitably disappoint.  
In Cruel Optimism, Berlant 
thinks about the ordinary as a zone of convergence of many histories, where people 
manage the incoherence of lives that proceed in the face of threats to the good life they 
imagine.35 
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Didion makes no call to action because it is reasonable to expect that her reader is living an 
ordinary life. The essays in Political Fictions make the American political scene coherent, or 
clarify its incoherence, rather than pointing to some good life, within reach beyond the 
ordinary, where the described contradictions might finally be overcome, a path Didion 
repeatedly implies would lead to inevitable disappointment. The general function of her 
defensive knowingness is to convey the argument that There is no such thing as a coherent 
‘America,’ yet we behave as if there was. It could be said that Didion’s writing is an exercise in 
knowingly describing and managing cruel optimism, and nowhere is this more apparent than 
in her writing about how the brutalities wrought by the US government are typically buried 
in the bureaucratic language of American exceptionalism.  
Included in Political Fictions, originally published in the July 14, 1994 issue of the New 
York Review of Books (NYRB), is the essay ‘“Something Horrible” in El Salvador’. Ostensibly 
a review of Mark Danner’s The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War, the essay—
broken into several sections, each with a gut-punch climax—is about the Reagan 
administration’s response to the murder of approximately 900 civilians in El Mozote, El 
Salvador. The political reaction is motivated by the administration’s attempt to save face with 
respect to its intervention in the country. The essay’s first section lays out the massacre’s 
American context, explaining the government’s careful refusal to acknowledge the facts. In 
typical NYRB style, the review both summarises and extends the book’s argument. I examine 
this essay closely because it is an excellent example of how Didion’s characteristic 
knowingness is deployed as a finely balanced emotional defence mechanism, yet guides the 
reader to recognise the political stakes. 
Despite the eyewitness accounts and photographs, Didion explains, the events of El 
Mozote  
came to be discounted by large numbers of Americans for no other reason than that 
the government, presenting no evidence, referred to the accounts (the photographs 
seemed rather eerily not to exist in anyone’s argument) as describing an event that 
was intrinsically unconfirmable, rendering the accounts by definition untrue.36 
In the first paragraph, the reader is told—with Didion’s clinically ironic rephrasing emulating 
the managerial language in which the government discusses the massacre—that ‘certain 
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events occurred in certain remote villages north of the Torola River in Morazán province.’37 
Didion reveals that the phrase ‘certain events’ stands in for the slaughter of hundreds by the 
Salvadoran army, the details officially confirmed eleven years after the fact in a report to the 
United Nations. At the time of the report, no charges had been laid.  
Didion finishes the first section of the essay with the horrifying evidence that the 
managerial language concealed: ‘Of the 767 victims cited on the Tutela Legal list, 358 were 
infants and children under the age of thirteen.’ She ends the second section by making explicit 
the complicity of the United States, not just in concealing the massacre, but in laying its 
groundwork: 
Mark Danner’s true subject in The Massacre at El Mozote, then, wasn’t the massacre 
itself but the way in which the story of the massacre, which was carried out by troops 
trained by the U.S. Special Forces and equipped with U.S.-manufactured M-16s and 
with ammunition manufactured for the U.S. government at Salt Lake City Missouri, 
came to be known and discounted in the United States, the way in which the story of 
El Mozote ‘was exposed to the light and then allowed to fall back into the dark.’38 
Didion gradually introduces us to the scenario’s horror and amplifies it by exposing the 
programmatic and circular logic employed by government and media in refusing to 
acknowledge a story unsuited to the desired narrative ‘that El Salvador, with the inspiration 
of the Reagan administration, was at last “turning the corner” toward democracy.’39 It was, 
Didion explains,   
a case that presented as its most urgent imperative the need to craft a report that 
would ‘have credibility among people who were far away and whose priorities 
were…definitely not necessarily about getting at exactly what happened.’40 
Didion’s essay is about how a massacre is politically refigured as the news makes its way from 
Morazán to the ‘thin air of Washington.’ Much of the work is done by the careful ordering of 
facts, accompanied by occasional claims made regarding the government’s astonishing ability 
to repeatedly refuse these facts. 
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In one flagrant instance of refusal, the American embassy in El Salvador cabled the State 
Department a report citing lack of evidence for a government-approved massacre. A 
statement made by the House Subcommittee on the topic two days later was written in a tone 
suggesting ‘an extreme version of a kind of exaggerated hauteur commonly translated as 
entitlement in the northeastern United States.’41 This statement strategically omitted details 
from the original report and was adopted as the official narrative. Didion recognises the 
internal contradictions of this narrative, papered over, and uses them to demonstrate the 
nature of self-serving administrative rhetoric. Despite a corrective cable from the U.S. 
ambassador to El Salvador insisting that ‘it is quite possible Salvadoran military did commit 
excesses,’ the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliot 
Abrams continued to wonder ‘why a massacre that had occurred in mid-December, if indeed 
it had occurred at all, had not been “publicized” until late January.’ 42 Ten years later, in an 
interview, he repeated the point: 
Abrams, in other words, was still trying to negotiate what had become, with the 
exhumation of the sacristy, unnegotiable, still trying to return discussion to the 
familiar question of whether or not a massacre had occurred… it had been necessary 
to deny the massacre because had there been a massacre the ‘effort’ would have 
become, again in [Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas] 
Enders’s word, ‘unfundable.’ 43  
Rather than becoming unfundable, the effort became ‘the most expensive effort to support a 
foreign government threatened by insurgency since Vietnam’: 
The El Mozote case was, Abrams said, ‘a very interesting one in a sense.’ (‘Interesting’ 
was at the time a word much in use, as were ‘strange’ and ‘unusual.’ Enders for 
example had noted that Socorro Jurídico ‘strangely lists no victims of guerrilla and 
terrorist violence.’ I recall watching Jeane Kirkpatrick during this period whip an 
audience to a frenzy with little silken whips of innuendo as she described how 
‘interested,’ even ‘bemused,’ she was by the ‘unusual standards,’ the ‘extraordinarily, 
even uniquely demanding standards’ imposed by the certification requirement.) 44 
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Didion draws attention to this seemingly mundane language because it is used as a kind of 
dismissive hyperbole, structured to invalidate and mock those who questioned the 
government’s account. To show how this strategy inflects and shapes the author’s voice, I 
will return to Sianne Ngai’s conception of ‘interesting’ as both judgment and aesthetic. When 
Ngai writes about the ‘interesting,’ she nods to Mikhail Epstein’s argument that ‘the 
judgment of “interesting” is thus an effort to “bridge the gap between reason and surprise, at 
once rationalising the improbable and extending the limits of rationality.”’ Ngai regards the 
zany, the cute, and the interesting as ‘compelling reminders of the general fact of social 
difference and conflict underlying the entire system of aesthetic judgment or taste, making 
that underlying condition transparent in ways in which many other aesthetic categories do 
not.’45 The ‘interesting,’ Ngai shows, lacks definitive aesthetic content. To claim that a subject 
is ‘interesting’ is to noiselessly shift between aesthetic and nonaesthetic criteria.46 In this way, 
the ‘interesting’ possesses its own self-fulfilling rationality, presuming external empirical 
verification. When the El Mozote case is described as ‘interesting,’ an essentially aesthetic 
judgment about the case is slyly enveloped in the language of administrative reason. 
Kirkpatrick and Abrams, ‘regular defenders of administration policy in Central America,’47 
are using terms such as ‘interested’ and ‘unusual’ to shape the rationality of the situation in 
and on their terms. Didion, drawing attention to this language and occasionally sliding into 
the style herself, inverts its original softening of the massacre’s drama and instead amplifies 
the administration’s attempts to dissociate itself from the violence.  
The carefully controlled tone allows Didion to lead the reader to accept her polemic 
without being instructed to do so. This is her version of the knowing nod or the raised 
eyebrow. Allowing the reader to recognise that this dull, administrative rhetoric had its 
intended effect implies that its audience, America, cannot escape some complicity in its 
government’s insidious politics. Didion’s treatment of the El Mozote massacre appears to be 
a total condemnation of naïvely interventionist American foreign policy under Reagan, but 
the essay’s final, long sentence condemns, in the first-person plural, the American people, who 
are repeating past mistakes: 
Just six years after Vietnam and in the face of what was beginning to seem a markedly 
similar American engagement, Mozote, by which we have come to mean not exactly 
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the massacre itself but this systematic obfuscation and prevarication that followed the 
disclosure of the massacre, was the first evidence that we had emerged a people again 
so yearning to accept the government version as to buy into a revision of history in 
which those Americans who differed, those Americans who for reasons of their 
‘political orientation’ would ‘fabricate’ reports of a massacre carried out by a unit noted 
for its ‘humane treatment of the people,’ were once again our true, and only truly 
sinister, enemy.48 
But does this work as a condemnation? This view neither eliminates nor stimulates the 
possibility of overcoming such horror. The style is contingent on the obvious fact that Didion 
(and the reader) can neither undo the massacre, nor ensure that such violence or government 
manipulation never recurs. To treat these facts knowingly, as Didion does, is to imply that 
while we may be horrified, it would be misguided to be shocked. The final implication of the 
American reader and Didion herself in both the massacre and the failure to recognise the 
massacre, however, suggests that an alternative is possible, and indicates that the reader has 
a responsibility to, at least, consider their complicity. As with Feeling Backward, this essay 
registers past traumas rather than refiguring them. Those complicit in the El Mozote 
massacre cannot be redeemed, nor can its victims be saved, even if it were to be made into a 
learning experience; it is simply a horror requiring acknowledgment. The question of what it 
means to acknowledge the horror, or what comes next, is not available.  
The organising principle of American life, as depicted by Didion, resembles what Berlant 
calls cruel optimism. Yet Didion’s knowing detachment is a way of attempting to avoid the 
feeling’s worst consequences. Rebecca Mead writes about this authorial detachment in The 
New Yorker, responding to a 2017 documentary about Didion that was made by the author’s 
nephew, Griffin Dunne. During an interview, Dunne asks Didion how she felt witnessing a 
neglected child dosed by her parents with LSD, a scene she recounted in one of her best 
known essays. After a pause, Didion smiles. ‘Let me tell you,’ she says, ‘it was gold.’ ‘This too 
is gold,’ Mead writes: 
The exchange shows Didion offering a distillation of her art, and shows her mastery 
of the journalist’s necessary mental and emotional bifurcation. To be a reporter 
requires a perpetual straddle between empathy and detachment, and Didion’s 
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refinement of that capacity is part of what has long made her a role model—to use 
that unfortunate but necessary phrase—especially to female writers of slight build, 
neurasthenic temperament, and literary aspiration.49  
This is an example of how Didion’s knowingness functions as a tool for survival while 
simultaneously constituting a vital element of her appeal, not just as a writer, but as a role 
model, a character that transcends and shapes the text and its reception.  
However, this demeanour does not exclusively encourage detachment, it can also warn 
against it. In Political Fictions, Didion seems to confirm that the yearning for an exceptionalist 
American utopia can only be sustained if massacres in which the American people are 
complicit are ignored. And the mundanity of commodified administrative language is the tool 
used to maintain this ignorance. The American people’s shared acceptance of a politely revised 
history in which their government is endeavouring to virtuously democratise a nation rather 
than training battalions that slaughter civilians is a particularly knotty instance of collective 
cruel optimism. In refusing this belief, Didion undertakes the suspicious reading that the 
situation demands. Moi writes that ‘In literary criticism, both politics and aesthetics are 
matters of response, judgment, and responsibility.’50 Didion invites the reader to respond to 
the story of El Salvador by acknowledging their own, and the author’s, responsibility. This 
movement from accepting a knowing critique conducted by an author, to recognising the role 
of personal responsibility is the sort of shift that knowingness can initiate, beginning with 
scepticism of the material that can then be incorporated into a generous reading of the author. 
Whether Didion is too knowing for her own good (whether the knowingness overwhelms the 
subject matter and its stakes) is for each reader to decide; it is a matter of response, judgment, 
and responsibility, dependent on the nature of their particular reading.  
On Reagan 
Throughout her career, Didion returns to Ronald Reagan as a kind of totem for the opacity 
of American politics, a one-man parable in which the ‘absence at the center’ is paradoxically 
not the central point of the narrative. Rather, the peculiarity of the Reagan White House 
comes down to ‘the amount of centrifugal energy this absence left spinning free at the edges.’51 
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Thus Reagan functions as a symbol of the simultaneous strength and vapidity of the imagined 
American collective. Published in 1997 in the NYRB as ‘The Lion King’ and republished in 
Political Fictions, the review is used to methodically excoriate the incorrigible Dinesh 
D’Souza’s Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader. It echoes the 
themes of her 1989 NYRB article on Reagan, originally published as ‘Life at Court,’ and 
republished in After Henry as ‘In the Realm of the Fisher King’.  
Didion (who had some experience in Hollywood) frequently describes the Reagan White 
House as resembling a movie set, an observation also made by Reagan’s Chief of Staff, who 
compared the daily schedule to a ‘shooting script’.52 Didion compares Nancy Reagan’s 
clothing to ‘a production expense, like the housing and the catering and the first-class travel 
and the furniture and paintings and cars that get taken home after the set is struck.’53 This 
sense of on-set magic, Didion shows, is fundamental to the Reagan administration’s mode of 
operation: 
He had ‘feelings’ about things, for example about the Vietnam War. ‘I have a feeling 
that we are doing better in the war than the people have been told,’ he was quoted as 
having said in the Los Angeles Times on October 16, 1967. With the transforming 
power of the presidency, this special information that no one else understood—these 
big pictures, these high concepts—took on a magical quality, and some people in the 
White House came to believe that they had in their possession, sharpening his own 
pencils in the Oval Office, the Fisher King himself, the keeper of the grail, the source 
of that ineffable contact with the electorate that was in turn the source of the power.54 
In this same vein, ‘The Lion King’ begins: ‘The aides gave us the details, retold now like 
runes.’55 The details comprise Reagan’s schedule, beginning at precisely 9am and including 
meetings lasting precisely one hour, regardless of substance (either padded with jokes or 
ended abruptly). Didion is interested in how Reagan the individual, ‘the absence at the center,’ 
differs from the Reagan perceived by those who worked with him, and the Reagan imagined 
by the American people, an imago Reagan, a simulacrum, the Reagan arrived at by community 
consensus. 
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In Lerner’s 10:04, this perceived Reagan is deployed as a spark of poetic energy. The 
novel’s final words are a Reagan quote, from his 1986 State of the Union Address: 
Never has there been a more exciting time to be alive, a time of rousing wonder and heroic 
achievement. As they said in the film Back to the Future, ‘Where we’re going, we don’t need 
roads.’56 
The quote subtitles an artwork by Vija Celmins entitled Concentric Bearings B: two images—
one of the night sky, the other of a falling plane. While for Didion, Reagan is a cypher around 
which the imagined institution of Washington gathers, Lerner draws Reagan as an object of 
inevitable power, profundly inspiring. That final Reagan quote incorporates a line from a 
Hollywood blockbuster and was of course written by a speechwriter rather than Reagan 
himself. These themes of citation, performance, the sometimes disorienting thrill of the 
present, and the naïvely hopeful gaze towards the future are explicitly confronted throughout 
the novel. 
About halfway through 10:04 there is a passage in which the narrator, walking alone late 
at night, describes feeling  
the small thrill I always felt to a lesser or greater degree when I looked at Manhattan’s 
skyline and the innumerable illuminated windows tiny from such distance combining 
but not dissolving into the larger architecture of the skyline that was the expression, 
the material signature, of a collective person who didn’t yet exist, a still-uninhabited 
second person plural to whom all the arts, even in their most intimate registers, were 
nevertheless addressed.57 
He explains his reaction to this transcendent experience in which he tries to ‘take in the 
skyline’ but is instead ‘taken in by it,’ and imagines the world to come in which ‘the past will 
be citable in all its moments.’ He finishes the passage in the subjunctive: 
You might have seen me sitting there on the bench that midnight, my hair matted 
down from the bandanna, eating an irresponsible quantity of unsulfured mango, and 
having, as I projected myself into the future, a mild lacrimal event.58 
This euphemism for crying, detached but somehow still vulnerable, recurs in the novel, 
underscoring this sense of poetic dissociation the book invokes.  
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This passage is followed by a longish speech, unattributed until it is revealed, (though it is 
not especially difficult to discern) when the audience applauds, that the speaker is the narrator, 
speaking at Columbia’s School of the Arts. The speech begins: 
It’s always a projection back into the past, the idea that there was a single moment 
when you decided to become a writer, or the idea that a writer is in a position to know 
how or why she became a writer, if it makes sense to think of it as a decision at all, but 
that’s why the question can be interesting, because it’s a way of asking a writer to 
write the fiction of her origins, of asking the poet to sing the song of the origins of 
song, which is one of the poet’s oldest tasks.59 
The interaction between future and past and the work of art as it relates to the ‘still-
uninhabited second person plural’ are the notions that 10:04 traces, showing that it does not 
make sense to consider them resolvable, or to seek to resolve them. During the talk, the 
narrator (a poet, like Lerner) declares himself unable to trace his poetic origins directly, but 
‘In the story I’ve been telling myself lately the Challenger disaster on January 28, 1986 marks 
their beginning.’60 He remembers watching the shuttle disintegrate live, as do all his friends. 
But, in fact, most people didn’t see it live, as it took place in the middle of a weekday, when 
few people were watching CNN: ‘you didn’t witness it,’ the narrator explains ‘in the present 
tense.’61  
For the narrator, the conclusion of Reagan’s speech, penned by Peggy Noonan, which 
proclaims that the astronauts ‘slipped the surly bonds of earth’ to ‘touch the face of God…lent 
the speech a sense of authority and dignity, of mourning and reassurance—I felt it in my 
chest; the sentence pulled me into the future.’ This admission, likely Lerner’s own (the talk 
reveals a shared birth-year, 1979), detaches poetry from notions of the mystical and the high 
canon.  
As a child, our narrator did not know that Reagan was in fact quoting John Magee’s ‘High 
Flight,’ and delivering words he had not written. Self-consciously, he confesses: ‘I think I 
became a poet because of Ronald Reagan and Peggy Noonan.’62 He explains that he went on 
to discover that ‘High Flight’ itself is largely plagiarised from a poetic anthology on flight. ‘I 
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find this,’ the narrator tells the audience, ‘less scandalous than beautiful.’ He sees Reagan as 
the final step in an ‘elegy cycle,’ mirrored by the suddenly ubiquitous, vulgar schoolyard jokes 
that made light of the disaster.63 It is these ‘modes of recycling’ as poetry with which he fell 
in love.64  
Didion and Lerner’s descriptions of Reagan are equally disdainful, equally knowing, yet 
they each model completely different forms of collectivity. Where Didion sees an absent 
center, Lerner finds the beauty of poetry. The Columbia speech ends with the admission that 
‘High Flight’ is ‘a terrible poem,’ that he considers Reagan a ‘mass murderer’, and knows now 
that the schoolyard Challenger jokes were unfunny: 
But I wonder if we can think of them as bad forms of collectivity that can serve as 
figures of real possibility: prosody and grammar as the stuff out of which we build a 
social world, a way of organizing meaning and time that belongs to nobody in 
particular but courses through us all.65 
Lerner’s inspirational Reagan—the charismatic Hollywood actor who parlayed his minor 
stardom into superficially convincing presidential power—is not undone by Lerner’s 
discovery of the superficiality, nor by Didion’s description of Reagan as the bumbling, barely 
functional mouthpiece. Both live simultaneously in the American imagination; both Reagans 
are valid (and powerful) in certain contexts. The knowingness with which Lerner and Didion 
deploy their descriptions is, I believe, a form of the bad yet hopeful collectivity that Lerner 
imagines. It is a signal of understanding that, while risking pretention, can also permit a kind 
of positive social organisation.  
‘In The Realm of the Fisher King’ ends with an anecdote Reagan related to ‘any number 
of people over the years’: the story of a hypothetical conversation he imagined having with 
Gorbachev. He would take the leader of the Soviet Union on a flight above Los Angeles, and 
explain the virtues of US capitalism: 
When the plane came in low over the middle-class subdivisions that stretch from the 
San Bernardino mountains to LAX, he would direct the leader of the Soviet Union to 
the window, and point out the swimming pools below. ‘Those are the pools of the 
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capitalists,’ the leader of the Soviet Union would say. ‘No,’ the leader of the free world 
would say. ‘Those are the pools of the workers.’66 
That a president is so prone to fantastical speculation is noteworthy; Reagan’s was what the 
political historian Jeffrey K. Tulis called a ‘rhetorical presidency’. Didion quotes Tulis 
recounting the significance of speeches in the Reagan White House, with policy frequently 
depending on rhetoric rather than the more sensible reverse. Speechwriters would 
manufacture an issue long before a speech was delivered, only in order to ensure that the 
speech would be substantive.67 Didion argues that D’Souza’s hagiographical acrobatics, which 
allow him to spin Reagan’s possessing a knowledge that ‘came not from books but from within 
himself’ as a virtue, make the same leaps which transformed the White House ‘into kind of a 
cargo cult.’68 Reagan’s behavior throughout his career, Didion maintains, can be best 
comprehended if he’s considered an actor rather than a politician. D’Souza reads Reagan’s 
tendency never again to associate with those who had worked for him once they had left his 
employ as a sign of leadership. Didion identifies this interpretation as ridiculous; rather, ‘the 
ability to work with people for a decade and never call them again precisely reflects the intense 
but temporary camaraderie of the set.’69  
Reagan’s fabricating stories—including telling the Prime Minister of Israel that he ‘filmed 
Nazi death camps for the Signal Corps,’ when, in fact, he’d spent the war in Culver City—is 
credited to his sense of the presidency as a starring role. This can ‘be seen to derive from his 
tendency to see the presidency as a script waiting to be solved.’70 Similarly, Didion attributes 
the Iran Contra scandal to the pursuit of Hollywood logic, the path to the scandal evoking 
‘the addled inspiration of script meetings.’71 So it is America’s failure to distinguish between 
substance and surface that lends Reagan his quality of mystery or apparently magical 
competence. But here, revealing the mundane secrets of the magician’s trick does not dispel 
the magic. Belief is desirable. American delusions—the belief that the aura of Hollywood is 
general—persist.   
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In The Anatomy of National Fantasy, Berlant identifies the Statue of Liberty as an example 
of the ‘National Symbolic,’ on which the American fantasy of nationwide unity and individual 
citizenship depends. In 1986, she writes, Reagan cannily  
turned the responsibility for the statue from the National Park Service over to the 
American ‘people’: and, many proclaimed, it was a ‘wise decision,’ because it gave the 
nation for the second time the opportunity collectively to acknowledge and to 
demonstrate ‘our’ spiritual obligations, ‘debts’ we owe both to ‘the Lady’ and to ‘the 
nation’.72  
These are the triumphs of a film’s final act. For Berlant and Didion, the America that Reagan 
hawks is a spectacular illusion, but it is a substantial and consequential illusion, largely 
unavoidable. For Lerner, the fact of the illusion is poetic, transcending (or dispensing with) 
immediate political morality. These actions, seen poetically, take place in a different tense.  
This paradox, the reality of this American illusion, is the subject of Political Fictions. 
Didion, the author-character, shows the reader that this dissonance does not indicate a puzzle 
to be solved, but is instead a feature of the system. Wittgenstein famously asserted that the 
aim of philosophy is ‘to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle’.73 The fly bottle for Didion 
is not the environment the reader finds themselves in, but the conventional mode of thinking 
about narratives and reality; the crisis confronted is that the same language and logic might 
be used to describe a film and a presidency, and that such an error can seem sensible. The 
evaluations of the Reagan administration position Didion as troubling the illusions by 
acknowledging them. The knowing tone allows for the reader and author to distance 
themselves slightly from the crisis at hand yet still remain implicated in the collective. This 
is because the knowingness joins them as social convention might.  
Berlant concludes National Fantasy, foreshadowing Cruel Optimism (written 20 years later), 
by suggesting that in order to ‘avoid the melancholy insanity of the self-abstraction that is 
citizenship’ the subject must ‘develop tactics for refusing the interarticulation, now four 
hundred years old, between the United States and America, the nation and utopia’: 
For just as there is everyday life in the United States, although there is not in 
‘America,’ utopian social relations might be sought or effected without reference to 
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the national frame, which has been sullied by its long exploitation of the dream of 
political happiness it has expressed.74 
Knowingness is one such tactic. In Political Fictions, the nation and its deluded utopian dream 
are irretrievably entangled. While there are no tactics for an exit, Didion implies, 
distinguishing between the two Americas, acknowledging the difference, provides inherently 
valuable literary nourishment, a kind of commiseration. The strategy is to describe the 
challenge of living an ordinary life while embedded in a mediated landscape that refuses the 
ordinary: Didion navigates contradictions by describing them with her trademark 
detachment, from which the reader can deduce her character and take responsibility for their 
response both to the author and her material.  
Here are the last words of ‘The Lion King’, the image Didion leaves us with: 
This was a president who understood viscerally…that what makes a successful motion 
picture is exactly a foolish enterprise, a lonely quest, a lost cause, a fight against the 
odds: undertaken, against the best advice of those who say it cannot be done, by 
someone America can root for. Cut, print.75 
That an actor can be so convincingly, if unsettlingly, presidential exposes a fundamental 
strangeness in American politics and public life, both founded on national fantasy. Didion 
exposes this absurdity and Lerner—writing as the administration is being consigned to 
history, to a deeper past tense—is able to locate the genuine possibility of poetry facilitated 
by this Hollywood simulacrum. Lerner’s speech is no more a resuscitation of history than 
Didion’s account is a justification of the administration’s injustices; both describe a collapse 
of affects, tenses and politics across the realms of the perceived and the actual. These cultural 
systems make no sense in the commodified, administrative terms they use to describe 
themselves. Lerner shows that Didion’s description of profound administrative incompetence 
does not lead necessarily or exclusively to mourning and condemnation. To observe that 
tragedies occur and that incompetence is fostered does not require that a remedy be proposed. 
Both good and bad emerge from such events. It can simply be a mode, as Lerner submits, of 
‘organizing meaning,’ affirming a social world in which we depend on one another for our 
senses of art and personhood. We are all complicit in the evil, Didion reminds us; 
axiomatically, Lerner shows, we are all complicit in the poetry.  
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Knowingness can be harmful, useful, or both. And, as with all sentiments, it has degrees of 
intensity. The instances examined here provide a way of imagining collectives that might 
otherwise be invisible. The inflection of the reader’s response, and the egregiousness of the 
author’s self-assurance are what determine the particular quality of the knowingness: whether 
it is a gift, a trap, or something in between. As a gift, it helps the reader imagine a collective 
in which they are implicated, and Young shows that prompting the reader to imagine such 
collectives can be politically urgent.  
Speaking squarely from the cultural centre of American literary life, the knowingness of 
Lerner and Didion can, at times, reinforce the picture of a collective that is self-congratulatory 
in its cynicism, and distanced from questions of personal responsibility. It could be described 
as manipulative, it could be seen as putting a certain kind of reader (or literary critic) at risk 
of succumbing to their charming superiority and the literary force of their prose, thus failing 
to usefully critique the political crises they are describing. It may cause a reader to appreciate 
the text for the fact that it causes them to feel superior rather than simply nourished, edified, 
or entertained. These are debatable criticisms. Yet these writers are not inevitably read this 
way, because the value of their writing does not alone depend on its knowingness. 
Knowingness is shaped by how the reader positions themselves in relation to the author, and 
how they imagine the author to be something like a person, a figure with whom they are 
finding a connection. If a reader recognises an author’s attitude with this in mind, they are 
leaving room for the possibility of further connection and collectivity once the special 
knowledge has been shared, once it has met the limits of its usefulness as a way of showing 
off the author’s world. In this way, knowingness can come to depend upon what humanity is 
shared rather than what knowledge is shown. 
  
  
 
146 
5 
Identification 
And in this, Sir, I am of so nice and singular a humour, that if I thought you was able to form the 
least judgment or probable conjecture to yourself, of what was to come in the next page,—I would tear 
it out of my book. 
Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy 
 
Other people are there to populate our masturbation fantasies. 
Adam Phillips, On Kindness 
-- 
Knowing Ourselves 
There is a moment near the end of Teju Cole’s novel, Open City, in which Julius, the narrator 
and protagonist—who, until this point, has been a sort of culturally sophisticated Virgil, 
leading the reader through the artistic, political, and literal landscapes of Manhattan, 
Brussels, and Nigeria—is confronted by a woman, Moji, who accuses him of having sexually 
assaulted her: 
And then, with the same flat affect, she said that, in late 1989, when she was fifteen 
and I was a year younger, at a party her brother had hosted at their house in Ikoyi, I 
had forced myself on her. Afterward, she said, her eyes unwavering from the bright 
river below, in the weeks that followed, in the months and years that followed, I had 
acted like I knew nothing about it, had even forgotten her, to the point of not 
recognizing her when we met again, and had never tried to acknowledge what I had 
done.1 
He does not apologise, push back, or deny, and the event is recounted with the matter of fact, 
analytical, Sebaldian tone that characterises the rest of the narration. Julius’s only discernible 
response is relief that, after accusing him, Moji does not cry.  
                                               
1 Teju Cole, Open City (London: Faber and Faber, 2011), 244. 
  
 
147 
Here, without warning, the reader is shown that Julius is not the person they took him to 
be. In my reading of the novel, I was left feeling that the character and author who I thought 
I had come to understand had been instantly transformed, that my assumptions up to that 
moment had been based on a false picture, and I wondered what this meant for my conception 
of both narrator and writer who, previously familiar to me, had suddenly been made strangers.  
While the protagonist of Open City is a psychiatrist-in-training rather than an author, the 
voice of the novel resembles that of Ben Lerner’s 10:04: diaristic, intimate, and instructive— 
so it is particularly challenging to separate the pleasure of being edified by the narrator’s 
voice from an evaluation of the author and narrator’s character. Cole’s essayistic style 
heightens the sense that the accusation unsettles how we might perceive the author in 
addition to how we might perceive his protagonist. It is notable that in the otherwise positive 
New York Times review, Miguel Syjuco describes the moment as ‘discomfiting,’ declaring that 
it ‘feels unnecessary, either a misstep by a young author or an overstep by a persuasive 
editor.’2 
The revelation exemplifies what is at risk when a reader offers their trust to an author. Of 
course the sort of shocks that might cause a reader’s trust to be withdrawn or regretted do 
not necessarily determine the quality of the book, but they do tell us something about the 
reader’s attachment to the text and to the person who wrote it, their affective relation with 
the personal voice. I describe this passage because I think it clarifies what rides on the reader’s 
relationship with the text’s personal voice, elucidating the stakes associated with a reader’s 
intimacy with an author, and the manner in which a reader evaluates a text. This thesis began 
with an examination of how an author might gain a reader’s trust and belief. In this final 
chapter, I examine the structure of this trust by asking two questions: What can happen when 
a reader finds a text relatable (to use that much maligned term)? And what can we gain by 
describing a reader’s experience with the author as a kind of intimacy? In searching for an 
answer, I bring together the methods of inquiry used throughout this thesis, particularly 
ordinary language philosophy and psychoanalytic thinking.  
In Intimacies, co-written by Adam Phillips and Leo Bersani, Phillips describes the 
psychoanalytic relation as follows: 
The psychoanalyst becomes intimate with someone by not taking what they say 
personally. The patient acknowledges the most intimately anonymous part of himself, 
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his desire, through not, as we say, getting to know the analyst. What kind of love is 
this? Or, to put it more transitively, to give it an object, what could this be a love of, 
or a love for?3  
A similar question could be asked about a reader’s love for a text. But to ask such questions 
is to ignore, or marginalise, our own experience: we know what it means to experience 
intimacy in reading. A reader might feel revealed by a text if it expresses a feeling they 
recognise, or wish to recognise, and a reader might feel privileged (or included) when an 
author reveals themselves and their desires— ‘the most intimately anonymous part of 
himself’—in this setting that resembles a conversation. One way a text can invoke a feeling 
of intimacy is by oscillating between the general and the particular, providing specific details 
of their persona that give readers a sense of the person with whom they are building a relation. 
The Personal and the Relatable 
Early on in Joan Didion’s second essay collection, The White Album, she includes an 
unintroduced page-long excerpt from a psychiatric report detailing, among other things, ‘an 
attack of vertigo and nausea,’ and ‘increasing inability to mediate the world of reality and to cope with 
normal stress,’ that ‘basic reality contact is obviously and seriously impaired at times’ and that the 
patient has ‘alienated herself almost entirely from the world of other human beings…It is as though 
she feels deeply that all human effort is foredoomed to failure.’ Revealing that the patient is, of 
course, herself, Didion remarks that ‘an attack of vertigo and nausea does not now seem to 
me an inappropriate response to the summer of 1968.’4 She then strings together a series of 
narrative fragments including buying a dress for Linda Kasabian (erstwhile member of the 
Manson Family), hanging out with The Doors in-studio, and an interview with Black Panther 
activist Huey Newton. The reception of each of these stories will be shaped by the preceding 
information that the narrator is or has been, according to the medical establishment, 
profoundly dissociated from reality. This personalisation, preceding the storytelling, is 
simultaneously strategic and a shedding of strategy.  
The psychiatric report establishes a point of view that distinguishes Didion from the 
reader, distinguishes the past Didion from the present Didion, and plays with the desire of 
diagnosis: medicalisation becomes a form of validation. If the reader comes to know Didion, 
                                               
3 Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips, Intimacies (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 92. 
4 Joan Didion, We Tell Ourselves Stories In Order to Live: Collected Nonfiction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 
187-88. 
  
 
149 
they come to know her through these kinds of personal examples. Any recognition or 
knowledge requires a reorientation of details to fit the reader’s personal schemata: this shift 
is often initiated by the presence of particularities to which the reader can attach, and Didion’s 
presence is indeed shaped by the careful presentation of particular examples. Some examples 
may draw the reader in, others may push them away, some may be recognisable, others 
opaque, and the pattern of recognition or relatability or alienation allows for the possibility 
of connection.  
While many of the essays in The White Album make significant generalisations about, for 
example, the state of American politics, the personal voice is shaped by the frequent disclosure 
of personal feelings and actions. Describing the moments that Didion personalises, or makes 
personally particular, and the points at which she generalises—presuming to know the 
reader’s mind, society’s mind, or both—shows how the presentation of the author-figure acts 
as a kind of demonstration, inviting the reader to interpret the text using the tools with which 
the author interprets her subject. While this strategy would not make sense with all texts 
(and in no way needs to in order for my argument to stand), it nonetheless provides a way of 
thinking about the kind of personal and polemical essays that have an especially prominent 
or identifiable personal voice.  
Here, Toril Moi’s reminder to attend to particular examples rather than seeking 
generalising theories is helpful. In Revolution of the Ordinary, Moi argues that the compulsion 
to create generalisable feminist theories prevents the development of an understanding of ‘the 
infinite differences among women in all their particularity.’5 (Moi is not taking feminism to 
be an especially egregious offender in this department, she is simply using it as an example.) 
The argument begins with Wittgenstein’s ‘perspicacious diagnosis of the ills besetting theory 
today,’ described early in Wittgenstein’s The Blue Book as a ‘craving for generality,’ or ‘the 
contemptuous attitude towards the particular case.’6 Moi cites Cora Diamond’s belief that 
‘Wittgenstein’s most fundamental commitment in philosophy…was to make us give up 
thinking in terms of Big Questions.’7 
For Moi the alternative to Big Questions (which are alluring but misleading), as provided 
by ordinary language philosophy, is ‘thinking through examples,’ a mode of reading and 
writing, and a way of undertaking criticism, that acts as an ‘appeal to the reader’s experience’. 
                                               
5 Toril Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary Studies After Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press), 93. 
6 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 92. 
7 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 109. 
  
 
150 
Moi explains that this appeal is influenced by Cavell’s model of philosophising as the taking 
up of an invitation: 
The ordinary language philosopher, Cavell writes, attempts to get the reader to test 
something against her own experience. She is saying: ‘Look and find out whether you 
can see what I see, wish to say what I wish to say.’ This is not an order, but an 
invitation, what Simone de Beauvoir would call an appeal to the other’s freedom.8 
Didion, in describing herself, is making an appeal to the reader’s experience, and it is in 
thinking (and writing) through the particulars of her life—simultaneously exposed and 
mediated—that this appeal takes place. And to attend to this appeal as a reader or critic is to 
identify with—or recognise, or relate to—a text’s personal voice.  
To consider particular examples of an author’s experience as constituting an appeal to the 
reader is to think in terms of ordinary language philosophy, in which a philosophical appeal 
grounds language firmly in its everyday use, which means understanding the appeal as being 
grounded in the social. It is important to note that ‘ordinary’ here does not mean unrefined 
or unintellectual or dull. In ‘The Avoidance of Love,’ Cavell provides a useful definition: 
This is all that ‘ordinary’ in the phrase ‘ordinary language philosophy’ means, or ought 
to mean. It reminds us that whatever words are said and meant are said and meant by 
particular men, and that to understand what they (the words) mean you must 
understand what they (whoever is using them) mean, and that sometimes men do not 
see what they mean, that usually they cannot say what they mean, that for various 
reasons they may not know what they mean, and that when they are forced to 
recognize this they feel they do not, and perhaps cannot, mean anything, and they are 
struck dumb.9  
In ‘Knowing and Acknowledging’ he explains, more briefly, what ‘the phrase ‘ordinary 
language’ meant to its Oxford coiners: ‘a view of words free of philosophical preoccupation.’10 
To read with this view is to be reminded that it is reasonable to assume, when reading a text, 
that the words were meant by its author, and are to be taken seriously in the context in which 
they are presented. This means that there is no reason to exalt the text as being more 
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susceptible to interpretation, or more separate from its creator, than any other voice we 
encounter in our everyday experience.  
Moi proposes that ordinary language 
is, simply, language that works, language that helps us to draw useful distinctions, 
carry out tasks, engage fruitfully with others—in short, language as the medium in 
which we live our lives, language as it is used every day in myriad different speech 
acts. Ordinary language, in short, comprises the full resources of human language, all 
its powers to draw distinctions.11 
To think in terms of ordinary language philosophy is to think about the relationship between 
universal claims and particular examples, because language that depends on universals often 
fails to draw distinctions (or work) in the way that language grounded in particular examples 
can.  
In The Claim of Reason, Cavell outlines the ordinary’s relation to particular examples, 
explaining that the purpose of Wittgenstein’s theory of ‘family resemblances’  
is to make us dissatisfied with the idea of universals as explanations of language, of 
how a word can refer to this and that and that other thing, to suggest that it fails to 
meet ‘our real need’. Once we see that the expression ‘what is common’ has ordinary 
uses, and that these are different from what universals are meant to cover; and, more 
importantly, see that concepts do not usually have, and do not need ‘rigid limits’, so 
that universals are neither necessary nor even useful in explaining how words and 
concepts apply to different things (cf. §68); and again, see that the grasping of a 
universal cannot perform the function it is imagined to have, for a new application of 
a word or concept will still have to be made out, explained, in the particular case, and 
then the explanations themselves will be sufficient to explain the projection; and see, 
finally, that I know no more about the application of a word or concept than the 
explanations I can give, so that no universal or definition would, as it were, represent 
my knowledge (cf. §73) — once we see all this, the idea of a universal no longer has 
its obvious appeal, it no longer carries a sense of explaining something profound.12 
                                               
11 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 161. 
12 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University 
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The ‘craving for generality’ that Moi describes is misleading because it reinforces a mistaken 
belief that a theory must account for all possible applications, that it must go above and 
beyond the ordinary. In this circumstance, that might mean attempting to establish a text’s 
personal voice as an organising scheme that would allow us to interpret or perhaps finalise a 
text’s nature and meaning, or determine precisely what or who the text is a product of, or to 
decide that such things are indeterminate. Instead, I would say that my examination of the 
personal voice constitutes an attempt to locate and describe a feeling that can be more or less 
intense, and more or less relevant depending upon the circumstances of particular readings. 
I want to suggest that the appeal of a text’s personal voice, the reason a reader can connect 
to it, is partly that the text itself is unable to account for every possible reader or experience. 
The identification of the personal voice requires nothing more of the reader than that they 
pay attention to what the text is saying, while distinguishing it from—or discovering how it 
resembles—their own experience. This can mean finding oneself in the text, or drawing 
distinctions between oneself and the text (or, of course, some mixture of the two), and both 
these responses can constitute a profound (or perhaps merely pleasant or interesting, 
profundity is not required) attachment to a text’s personal voice.  
The fear of reducing a reader’s experience to relatability or their recognition of an author 
seems to be an ethical fear, and is, I would say, a reasonable concern. In Uses of Literature, Rita 
Felski writes that 
Ethics means accepting the mysteriousness of the other, its resistance to conceptual 
schemes; it means learning to relinquish our own desire to know. Seeking to link a 
literary work to one’s own life is a threat to its irreducible singularity.13 
For Felski, since presuming certain types of knowledge can reduce the value of the text to its 
relatability, the reader is best served by accepting that the other cannot be wholly known. I 
accept that a text’s value should not be determined only by its relatability, and that to do so 
is to dispense with literature’s potential to present unknown or unfamiliar experiences and 
perspectives. However, I contend that relatability (not entirely dissimilarly from 
knowingness) can also clarify the shape of a text’s voice, inviting a reader in. 
Part of relatability’s (often deservedly) poor reputation in English departments seems to 
be caused by its frequent citation by undergraduates as a final justification for their 
attachment or disdain: their evaluation of a text depends upon whether they find a character, 
                                               
13 Rita Felski, Uses of Literature (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 27. 
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a storyline, a sentiment relatable. This claim appears to bring with it the threat of erasure, 
the implication that those who aren’t recognised as reflecting the self are not worth the 
attention of the reader who seeks only relatability. In 2014 Rebecca Mead wrote in The New 
Yorker that the contemporary meaning of the term ‘relatable’— ‘to describe a character or 
situation in which an ordinary person might see himself reflected’—derives from television 
and was popularised as recently as a decade before. A little less open than Felski to the natural 
enchantment of the artistic encounter relying on a degree of self-recognition, Mead concludes 
that 
to reject any work because we feel that it does not reflect us in a shape that we can 
easily recognize—because it does not exempt us from the active exercise of 
imagination or the effortful summoning of empathy—is our own failure. It’s a failure 
that has been dispiritingly sanctioned by the rise of ‘relatable.’ In creating a new word 
and embracing its self-involved implications, we have circumscribed our own critical 
capacities.14 
Mead distinguishes relatability from identification, arguing that while identification is ‘one of 
the pleasures of reading,’ relatability constitutes a demand that the work accommodate the 
preferences and desires of the reader, ultimately serving their vanity. 
To reject a work because we cannot easily recognise ourselves in it is, of course, misguided. 
And to pursue vanity as artistic teleology is surely dangerous. But I would argue that 
relatability is not inevitably reductive; it can offer a productive point of entry to texts, as long 
as it doesn’t remain the exclusive criterion of value. To relate might mean to empathise, to 
understand, or to sense that you are understood. In ‘Beware the Furrow of the Middlebrow: 
Searching for Paradise on the Oprah Winfrey Show,’ Timothy Aubry considers the cultural 
implications of Oprah’s Book Club, with particular reference to an episode featuring Toni 
Morrison discussing her novel Paradise. Such a forum inevitably simplifies the text, placing 
disproportionate focus on the author’s intention and causing readers in the audience (and 
Oprah’s best friend Gayle) to declaim their failure to ‘get it’. So is having the conversation in 
this sort of setting worthwhile or productive? Aubry warns that ‘The greater danger, 
especially from a political perspective, is that identification’s wide net might be cast too far, 
assimilating and conflating radically divergent experiences, thus effacing crucial 
                                               
14 Rebecca Mead, ‘The Scourge of “Relatability”,’ The New Yorker, August 1, 2014, 
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particularities.’ Yet, at the same time, he accepts that ‘a fantasy of sameness functioning as a 
bolstering device [might be] necessary to launch oneself into the more dangerous and 
forbidding territory of otherness.’15 This literary relatability is perhaps a version of Felski’s 
‘recognition,’ which Felski describes as ‘bring[ing] together likeness and difference in one 
fell swoop.’16 In the chapter dedicated to the concept, Felski writes that 
When we recognize something, we literally ‘know it again’; we make sense of what is 
unfamiliar by fitting it into an existing scheme, linking it to what we already know… 
Recognition, in the sense I’ve been using it so far, refers to a cognitive insight, a 
moment of knowing or knowing again. Specifically, I have been puzzling over what it 
means to say, as people not infrequently do, that I know myself better after reading a 
book.17 
Something Like Celebrity 
The two authors discussed in this thesis who are perhaps most prone to inducing recognition 
in their readers (or at least within certain demographic subsets of their readers—often those 
who share their class, ethnicity, and/or anxieties) are David Foster Wallace and Joan Didion. 
This tendency is surely at least partially due to the peculiar features of their nonfiction 
writing explored throughout this thesis: their self-deprecation, their confessional style, their 
willingness to speak confidently on behalf of the reader, alternating between admonishment 
and flattery.  
In Wallace’s 2005 Kenyon College commencement address, which has perhaps become his 
most-read (and heard) piece of writing—he lays out a simplified, deliberately corny version 
of his personal philosophy, a cross between Alcoholics Anonymous rhetoric and Zen 
Buddhism: 
…in the day-to-day trenches of adult life, there is actually no such thing as atheism. 
There is no such thing as not worshipping. Everybody worships. The only choice we 
get is what to worship.18 
The most personal detail in the speech is a vague admission of solipsism: 
                                               
15 Timothy Aubry, ‘Beware the Furrow of the Middlebrow: Searching for Paradise on The Oprah Winfrey Show,’ 
in Modern Fiction Studies, 52, no. 2, 2006: 360. 
16 Felski, Uses of Literature, 25. 
17 Felski, Uses of Literature, 25, 29. 
18 David Foster Wallace, This is Water (New York: Little Brown, and Company, 2009), 96-100. 
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…a huge percentage of the stuff that I tend to be automatically certain of is, it turns 
out, totally wrong and deluded. Here’s one example of the utter wrongness of 
something I tend to be automatically sure of. Everything in my own immediate 
experience supports my deep belief that I am the absolute center of the universe, the 
realest, most vivid and important person in existence. We rarely talk about this sort 
of natural, basic self centeredness, because it’s so socially repulsive, but it’s pretty 
much the same for all of us, deep down.19 
Following Wallace’s death, This is Water was published as the sort of little impulse-purchase 
book you see piled on bookshop counters, the text generously spaced to make it seem more 
like a book worth the asking price. Didion exists in a similar realm of literary celebrity having 
experienced a recent popular resurgence due to the publication of two memoirs (in 2005 and 
2011) about the deaths of her husband and daughter respectively, The Year of Magical 
Thinking and Blue Nights. All three texts could all be viewed as self-help books—showing the 
reader how they might deal with suffering—and have been received as such. And, as in the 
self-help genre, the author is dubiously transformed into a sage.  
When the first biography of Didion was published in 2015, it was followed by a spate of 
articles and blog posts considering her literary celebrity. ‘Why Loving Joan Didion is a Trap’ 
in NY Magazine, ‘Joan Didion’s Eternal Cool’ in The Daily Beast, ‘How Joan Didion Became 
the Ultimate Literary Celebrity’ in New Republic and ‘Exploring the cult of Joan Didion’ in 
The Guardian. Each of these articles mentions Didion’s surprise appearance in January 2015 
as the 80-year-old cover girl for high fashion brand Céline.  
The End of the Tour, a 2015 film set during the final days Wallace’s Infinite Jest book tour, 
starring Jason Segel and Jesse Eisenberg, perpetuates the Wallace of the This is Water 
commencement speech, pitching him as tender, sad, and wise. Wallace’s biographer, DT Max, 
argued in The Guardian against the sort of sanctifying work done by the film:  
These days, especially given the new film The End of the Tour…I’m sure fewer people 
know DFW as a writer than as a public figure, and that figure is a sort of laical saint, 
a professor of gentle, sustaining wisdom to whom we can turn in moments of 
confusion.20 
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As with figures like Norman Mailer, Tom Wolfe, Truman Capote, and Gore Vidal (all 
novelist-journalists), Wallace and Didion’s celebrity outgrew their readership, but more than 
many of their peers and influences, they have continued to be cast as role models, constructive 
or destructive influences, depending on who you ask. Similar characterisations also occur with 
essayists who make their name as political activists, whose characters are determined by their 
status as interviewees and speech-makers, in addition to their writing. 
Writing in The Atlantic about how fame changed both the public perception of his writing 
and his self-perception, Ta-Nehisi Coates revealed that becoming a literary celebrity brought 
about an unwelcome change, transforming his once-ordinary life, and his goal to be ‘a good 
father, a good partner, a decent friend’: 
Fame fucked with all of that. I would show up to do my job, to report, and become, if 
not the scene, then part of it. I would take my wife out to lunch to discuss some 
weighty matter in our lives, and come home, only to learn that the couple next to us 
had covertly taken a photo and tweeted it out. The family dream of buying a home, 
finally achieved, became newsworthy. My kid’s Instagram account was scoured for 
relevant quotes. And when I moved to excise myself, to restrict access, this would only 
extend the story.21 
Any degree of literary fame means that the story of the author becomes inextricably 
implicated in the stories that they write. As I have argued throughout this thesis, who the 
reader takes the author to be will inevitably be incorporated into their reading.  
In The One vs. The Many Alex Woloch, describes the role played by minor characters in 
fiction, and explores how the reader attends to them. To do so, he develops the concept of the 
character-space: ‘that particular and charged encounter between an individual human 
personality and a determined space and position within the narrative as a whole.’22 If we 
accept, as I argued in chapter one, that essayists can function as characters within their essays, 
then I would propose that as the reader comes to know more about a writer, from both inside 
and outside the text, the character-space they inhabit alters and expands. And, as these writers 
become increasingly known, the spectre of relatability as a final determinant of their value 
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rears its head, threatening, as Felski writes, a text’s (and person’s) irreducible singularity. 
The fulfilment of this threat is not inevitable, but it looms. 
So what does reading that avoids this threat look like? I want to emphasise Felski’s claim 
that recognition involves ‘knowing again,’ and suggest that while recognition and relatability 
usually take the form of ‘knowing again,’ this concept can offer a springboard to a more 
productive curiosity. Recognition as it relates to the form of the essayistic I am imagining 
may go beyond ‘fitting [whatever is recognised] into an existing scheme;’ rather, recognition 
in the essayistic can illuminate the incompatibility of an existing scheme. ‘A neurosis,’ Adam 
Phillips writes, ‘in Freud’s language, is a way of not knowing what one wants; as though one 
has learnt a language and then forgotten how to speak it. This implies, of course, that wants 
are knowable, that in psychoanalysis, at least, wants can be the objects of knowledge.’23  
In The Art of Cruelty, Maggie Nelson offers a neat transition from Phillips’s thinking on 
self-knowledge, to thinking about self-knowledge in literature, and the desire for revelation. 
‘After all,’ Phillips writes, ‘what else can we do with crimes—and with people—but 
find them out?’ And here, Phillips explains, is where the Enlightenment Freud and 
the post-Freudian Freud part ways: the former is more interested in what the patient 
cannot afford to let himself know that he knows (the repression of which constitutes 
the unconscious); the latter recognises that the acquiring of knowledge is but one 
means of knowing, and further, that knowing itself is but one means of experiencing. 
In which case, as Phillips explains, psychoanalysis gets interesting when it shifts the 
focus from making us more intelligible to ourselves to helping us become more curious 
about how strange we really are. And so, I would argue, does art.24 
This distinction is significant. The possibility that relatability can be more than the 
confirmation and clarification of who we are, that it can make us curious, suggests there is 
room for a more positive picture of relatability.  
As a reader becomes increasingly familiar with a text’s personal voice, any sense of 
relatability they might have can be complicated by the complexity of the reading experience, 
and the obvious particularity of the author. And so, relatability provides tools to the reader 
that they can use to move past the initial recognition, into a realm of curiosity about the newly 
discovered strangeness of both themselves and the voice they are getting to know. At issue 
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here are some questions asked in the first chapter of this thesis: What does it mean to know 
someone, and what does it mean to know yourself?  
In wrestling with such questions, it is useful to link the approach of ordinary language 
philosophy to psychoanalysis, a project founded on listening closely to what people have to 
say. Cavell’s philosophy owes a significant debt to psychoanalysis, and his version of the 
methodology, similar to that of Bersani and Phillips, does not axiomatically lead to a 
hermeneutics of suspicion.25 While psychoanalytic reading is frequently credited as a 
significant influence on modes of suspicious reading, and the seemingly indefatigable nature 
of critique as the predominant mode of intellectual engagement, it also offers tools that 
account for (or acknowledge the difficulty of accounting for) how we describe relationships.  
Phillips explains that while analysis seeks to familiarise the strangers we are to ourselves, 
some personal territory cannot be unlocked or made familiar. 
But if one source of strangeness, in Freud’s view, is the unacceptable—made strange, 
defamiliarized, as a defensive measure—the other source, less amenable to 
psychoanalytic (or any other) description, is what might be called the unintelligible: 
whatever in our experience does not seem subject to our sense-making; whatever 
baffles, or inspires because it baffles, our powers of representation. The other 
unconscious—that which is out of bounds, but not by law (repression), like the fact of 
one’s infancy, or the fact of one’s forthcoming death, or the future itself—is a way of 
describing both the limits of what we can know and the areas of our lives in which 
knowing, and the idea of expertise, may be inappropriate.26  
In reading The White Album, we witness Didion coming up against the edge of sense-making 
and mapping out its limits by describing her own life. A reader can then measure their own 
life against this attempt. Focusing on the exemplary in the context of how a writer makes 
sense of their own world is one way of thinking through what it might mean to know or 
believe in the personal voice of a text.  
So when writing of the ordinary and the urge to generalise, my interest is in how an 
author’s disclosure of personal details—ordinary and particular—can mark out similarity and 
distinction, how they give the reader something to pay attention to, a tool to interpret both 
the text and their own experience. How does the particular become applicable to the reader’s 
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experience? And what do the limitations of this transfer (the necessary flaws of universalising, 
or the misrepresentation inherent in it) reveal about the limits, and therefore substance, of 
the reader’s relationship with the author-figure? If intimacy requires a certain kind of 
knowledge (some knowledge is a prerequisite of intimacy), is it possible to develop or possess 
such knowledge about an author? Again, why would it be so strange for a reader to call Joan 
Didion or David Foster Wallace a friend? Conversely, would it make sense for a reader to 
claim that Teju Cole, in revealing his protagonist to be something other than his reader had 
thought him to be, betrayed them? 
Acknowledging Identity 
Many of the critics, theorists, and philosophers cited in this thesis are interested in what we 
can mean when we claim to know (and evaluate) an object, as well as the limits of these claims. 
In the work of Cavell, Moi, and Sianne Ngai, this inquiry is significantly influenced by 
ordinary language philosophy and, in addition to Wittgenstein, the work of J. L. Austin. 
Austin lectured Cavell while visiting Harvard, and Cavell taught Ngai at Harvard. Austin’s 
theory of speech acts, established in How To Do Things With Words, provides a fruitful line of 
thought when considering what it means when, for instance, a reader claims to know an 
author.27 
When we speak of knowing a person, we might be putting the verb to one of two distinct 
uses. The first is the ordinary use of knowing: it can, for example, in certain contexts, be 
sensible to claim to know Didion or Wallace or their work, or to know a friend or a fact. The 
second is the broader metaphysical use of knowing: the possibility that we might know 
another mind entirely, as if one could exist within it (a possibility Wallace seems to hope for, 
and Ben Lerner seems to be wistful for), or a fundamental truth about the person. The gap 
between the metaphysical and ordinary possibilities of knowing is a prominent anxiety in the 
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with poststructuralist attempts to turn him into a theorist of performatives and performativity’ (7). 
 
  
 
160 
contemporary American essay genre, though the direction of the fear varies. What and whom 
can we properly claim to know?  
In ‘Other Minds,’ Austin clarifies the philosophical difficulty that the word ‘knowing’ 
presents. The meaning of the question ‘How do you know?’ depends entirely on its context, 
and an answer might be governed by belief, experience, discrimination, authority, or skill. In 
an ordinary sense, the question can make a wide variety of demands, and is not fundamentally 
reducible to precise criteria. Austin’s work here is an instance of what Cavell terms his taking 
‘up the cause of the ordinary against what I have described as philosophy’s metaphysical flight 
from the ordinary,’ a cause he shares with Wittgenstein.28 Central to Austin’s conception of 
knowledge is that we can recognise something (‘a surly look or the smell of tar’) yet be 
incapable of describing with additional precision what is recognisable.29 This premise—that 
the verb ‘to know’ is slippery and context-dependent, and that it cannot be broken down into 
constituent parts—is fundamental to my understanding of how we can recognise, identify 
with, or claim to have knowledge of a text or its personal voice.  
Some of Cavell’s most (for me) overwhelming writing on recognition appears in The Claim 
of Reason, when, in an instance of personal essayistic particularity, he discusses his daughter’s 
use of the word ‘kitty’ to refer initially to a kitten, and then, to his surprise then acceptance, 
to a fur piece. The ‘inaccurate’ use of the word causes Cavell to realise that kittens, as such, 
do not yet exist in the daughter’s world 
the way God or love or responsibility or beauty do not exist in our world; we have not 
mastered, or we have forgotten or we have distorted, or learned through fragmented 
models, the forms of life which could make utterances like ‘God exists’ or ‘God is dead’ 
or ‘I love you’ or ‘I cannot do otherwise’ or ‘Beauty is but the beginning of terror’ bear 
all the weight they could carry, express all they could take from us. We do not know 
the meaning of the words. We look away and leap around.30 
Cavell’s daughter is learning the language, as are we. And, in a way, the misnaming is not a 
mistake:  
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In each case her word was produced about a soft, warm furry object of a certain size, 
shape and weight. What did she learn in order to do that? What did she learn from 
having done it? If she had never made such leaps she would never have walked into 
speech. Having made it, meadows of communication can grow for us.31 
When we sit with an essay and philosophise or learn or disagree, our relationship with the 
text is formed by negotiation. We bring to bear our ordinary experience, an experience that 
the essay will adjust, and the reader will adapt to the reading accordingly. The effects of the 
author’s presence can be reassuring or convincing or subversive or repellent, and the 
recognition or identification experienced in reading is not a cleanly classifiable affect, distinct 
from other forms of (social) recognition. Such things cannot be broken down for parts. As 
Cavell’s daughter sees a fur piece as a cat, we may see an author as someone we know, or as a 
figure who has meant something in our past, or as an enemy. But no matter how we view 
them, it cannot be said that our recognition of an author belongs to some metaphysical 
category of other that lies beyond the scope of our ordinary lives.  
Reviewing Phillips’s Terrors and Experts, Cavell responds to Phillips’s wish to ‘correct the 
idea that acknowledgment is a function of expertise,’ asserting that  
The more you know about an object the less likely that what you know, barring a 
crisis of knowledge, will be completely overthrown, that what you have grounds to 
claim is a hawk will turn out on further examination to be a handsaw; but about a 
human subject, likely or not, perhaps never more unlikely than not, overthrow 
remains in question, crisis is around the corner, redescription may at any time be called 
for, the duck turns out as in a dawning to be a swan. Horror movies anxiously toy 
with this realisation; melodramas act it out; comedies revel in it.32 
Essays, I would add, or at least those discussed in this thesis, inquire after the conditions that 
make the crisis of intersubjectivity, or the appearance of imminent crisis, possible (or 
inevitable). In fact, this is exactly the crisis that Open City acts out when revealing its 
narrator’s serious moral transgression. This also relates to what Nelson takes from Terrors 
and Experts: art can navigate the crisis by refusing to accept knowledge as the only form of 
experience, because knowledge by itself does not necessarily offer any kind of resolution. 
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In Cruel Optimism, Lauren Berlant points out that 
existentially and psychoanalytically speaking, intersubjectivity is impossible. It is a 
wish, a desire, and a demand for an enduring sense of being with and in x and is related 
to that big knot that marks the indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition 
and misrecognition.33  
Austin’s theory of speech acts provides a way of thinking about how knowledge and 
identification may not work in the ways we expect, and, usefully, provides a way out of 
thinking that the impossibility of pure intersubjectivity (if such a phrase is even meaningful) 
constitutes a failure. To think in such a way is a misapplication of the verb ‘to know’. As 
Wittgenstein states, ‘philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.’ Why 
would we expect to be able to comprehend the inside of another’s head exhaustively? Why 
would a reader desire it?  
Austin’s concept of the performative utterance is proposed in How To Do Things With 
Words as the context ‘in which to say something may be to do something, or in saying 
something we do something.’34 Less commonly accounted for is that this definition is 
presented in the context of how difficult it is to define such an utterance. The lectures 
delivered at Harvard that comprise How To Do Things with Words are described thus by 
Cavell, who attended them: ‘His first lecture had attracted several hundred people; the last 
half-dozen we were down to a core of some twelve to fifteen souls, and not all of these few 
were happy. But this only means that not everyone is interested in the need for revolution.’35 
In the final lecture, Austin concedes, in relation to his increasingly numerous and refined 
categories of utterances, ‘I am not putting any of this forward as in the very least definitive.’ 
He refers to one class of utterance as seeming both to be included in other classes and ‘unique 
in a way that I have not succeeded in making clear even to myself. It could well be said that 
all aspects are present in all my classes.’ He ends the lecture by, perhaps, joking ‘I have as 
usual failed to leave enough time in which to say why what I have said is interesting.’36 So the 
philosophy of speech acts is founded on an attempt to clarify the points at which speech fails 
to satisfy us and accepting that certain things probably cannot be clarified. Austin slyly 
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minimises the remark by styling it as self-deprecatory, but the substance of this claim is 
inherent to the language and its determining the nature of our social relations. That does not 
mean, however, that notions such as performativity cannot be usefully applied. It simply 
means that universalising performativity is both contrary to the spirit of Austin’s inquiry, and 
not especially practical.37  
Phillips, thinking through Judith Butler’s notion of performativity, refers to her concept 
of gender as performative as ‘exhilarating,’ and formulates the questions prompted by Butler’s 
account of mourning as follows:	
But if, as Butler suggests, ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ are formed and consolidated 
through identifications that are composed in part of disavowed grief, what would it be 
like to live in a world that acknowledged and sanctioned such grief, that allowed us, 
as it were, the full course of our bereavement of disowned or renounced gender 
identities? What would have to happen in the so-called psychoanalytic community for 
an ethos to be created in which patients were encouraged to mourn the loss of all their 
repressed gender identities?38 
Phillips concludes:  
These seem to me to be questions of considerable interest provided they do not entail 
the idealization of mourning—its use as a spurious redemptive practice, as a kind of 
ersatz cure for repression or the anguishes of uncertainty.39 
This caveat is important, because it is a reminder that such mourning doesn’t necessarily need 
to resolve itself in a redemptive resolution. This idea recalls the previously discussed 
arguments of Heather Love in Feeling Backward and Bersani in The Culture of Redemption, 
around the possibilities of redemption in literature, and the risks it entails. Phillips takes 
Butler to be describing the kind of mourning that opens up possibilities rather than 
foreclosing them. How does this application translate to the fantasised conversation that 
reading can constitute? If something, in the process of identification, is being mourned, what 
                                               
37 The concept of the performative utterance is famously taken up by Judith Butler in order to theorise gender 
as performative. After praising Butler’s Gender Trouble as a powerful feminist work, Moi remarks ‘That Butler 
goes on to produce a general theory of meaning, which in turn becomes a general theory of identity (it’s always 
performative), in precisely the way I find unhelpful, is a different matter’ (102). Moi offers an extended 
interrogation of Butler’s approach to gender in the titular essay of her 1999 book, What is a Woman?: and Other 
Essays. 
38 Adam Phillips, ‘Keeping it Moving: Commentary on Judith Butler’s “Melancholy Gender—Refused 
Identification”,’ in Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 5, no. 2, 1995, 183. 
39 Phillips, ‘Keeping it Moving,’ 184. 
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object is the reader imagining? Are they wondering whether they could have been the author? 
Are they mourning their differences?  
Niklas Forsberg, describing why Austin’s sense of ordinary language does not mean that 
what is ordinary ‘is simply a given,’ reminds us that  
Ordinary language, by itself, does not offer a way out of philosophical problems by 
means of supplying us with a standard of correctness or some kind of blueprint for 
how to solve all philosophical problems. It’s the first word. Not the last.40 
Indeed, it provides a context from which to ask questions; a prompt to begin an investigation. 
In this manner, to explore what it means for a reader to identify with an author requires a 
rigorous examination of the subtleties of the language before us, and the methodology 
demands that we take the reader’s claim seriously. Forsberg argues that, for literary studies, 
this mode of philosophising can take the form of an invitation to defamiliarise the familiar, ‘to 
learn that we are not as at home as we think we are in the language we call ours.’41 For this 
sort of thinking, psychoanalysis—a way of thinking that renews our attention for the 
familiar—is especially useful, and it is why I have returned to Phillips and Bersani, in 
particular, throughout this thesis.  
Fragmented Selves 
John Frow links the ego’s uncertainty about identification to the notion of literary character. 
In Character and Person, Frow quotes Phillips’s interpretation—which is ‘the ego likening 
itself to what it once loved’—linking his concept of identification to the formation of 
character, and goes on to write that 
What is striking and innovative in Freud’s thought is not the postulation of a love of 
self, which in itself is a commonplace, but the fact that this is understood as occurring 
through the taking of the ego as a possible love object; and the fact that the actual 
positions of subject and object may be less important than the fantasised positions 
(which may indeed both be internal to the ego).42 
                                               
40 Niklas Forsberg, ‘Carver, Cavell, and the Uncanniness of the Ordinary’ in New Literary History 49, no. 1 
(Winter 2018), 3. 
41 Forsberg, ‘Carver, Cavell, and the Uncanniness of the Ordinary’, 6. 
42 John Frow, Character & Person (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 51. 
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The sense of absence brought on by how we fantasise the other is illuminated by Ngai through 
her conception of the ‘merely interesting’ aesthetic, which I have discussed in previous 
chapters. The aesthetic exposes another instance of the affective openness of knowing. 
Describing how the judgment blends scientific and aesthetic methods of approach, Ngai 
declares that 
What is striking is the consistency of the judgment’s function: that of ascribing value 
to that which seems to differ, in a yet-to-be-conceptualized way, from a general 
expectation or norm whose exact concept may itself be missing at the moment of 
judgment.43 
The ‘interesting’ here, as an aesthetic judgment, has to do with the indescribable nature of 
the knowledge being articulated or judged. By emphasising the impact of the ‘interesting’ 
Ngai demonstrates the aesthetic power of judgment withheld. To declare something 
interesting is to declare it worthy of further examination, but resist a final claim about, for 
instance, the object’s beauty or ugliness. In the essayistic, this equivocation comes to 
characterise the author-figure. The affective experience of the essay has to do with 
equivocating about the possibilities of judgment, evaluation, and knowledge.  
This intersection of explanations about performativity, mourning, identity, and our 
dreams of what knowledge might be, brings together many of the aspects of the personal 
voice of the essay. In my view, the essayists examined are concerned with or interrogating 
the nature of these fantasised positions, as held and imagined by the reader and author. The 
power of both parties is contingent upon the nature of their knowledge about one another.  
With this contingency in mind, I wish to examine the binary subject-object position to 
which the reader-author and author-subject relations tend to map, and how essays can be a 
more fleshed-out picture of human relations. To help establish how contemplating these 
positions in an essay can help us recognise its personal voice, I will return to Didion, who 
seems so often to be at once distancing herself from her reader and making herself available, 
through an offer of intimacy. Of course, there is nothing wrong with thinking in terms of a 
binary; the subject-object division makes for such an appealing picture because it is genuinely 
useful and often feels true. However, when accepted as a governing principal it can draw 
                                               
43 Sianne Ngai, Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2012), 112. 
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attention away from the ways in which reading (or, say, conversation) demands that the 
boundaries delimiting the self are never clean lines.  
The White Album’s title essay comprises several numbered fragments; the seventh, covering 
just over one page, is similar in format and similarly confessional to the psychological report. 
It begins with a list of personal effects under the headings: ‘TO PACK AND WEAR’ and ‘TO 
CARRY’. The list, Didion explains, was taped inside her closet door during a period in which 
she was frequently called away on assignment. It allowed her to pack for any trip at a 
moment’s notice. The list accounts for bourbon, slippers, cigarettes, shampoo, aspirin, and 
several skirts, but lacks one vital item: 
It should be clear that this was a list made by someone who prized control, yearned 
after momentum, someone determined to play her role as if she had the script, heard 
her cues, knew the narrative. There is one significant omission, one article I needed 
and never had: a watch.44 
Didion fractures herself using a favourite device: cinema. The past Didion, separate from the 
author who now (it seems) controls the narrative, was making decisions based on what she 
presumed her role to be. Didion the author observes her past self from a similar vantage point 
to that of the reader. The shift between third and first person means that the subject of this 
essay simultaneously is and is not the narrator. The actions of the Didion described in the 
third person are inexplicable, her behaviour irrational. The first-person Didion, recognising 
this inexplicability, proves herself to be more capable, but retains traces of the shortcomings 
described.  
This fragment reads as if Didion were taking her own advice from an earlier oft-quoted 
essay ‘On Keeping a Notebook’: 
I think we are well advised to keep on nodding terms with the people we used to be, 
whether we find them attractive company or not. Otherwise they turn up 
unannounced and surprise us, come hammering on the mind's door at 4 a.m. of a bad 
night and demand to know who deserted them, who betrayed them, who is going to 
make amends.45 
In this essay, the first-person plural depersonalises the advice. Whoever is doing the advising 
might best be thought of using the term referred to in the first chapter, the ‘paredros’: a third 
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presence, not necessarily the reader or writer, that orients narration, as theorised by Frow. 
Didion is not advising the reader directly, but instead including herself among those being 
addressed. Again, there is a fracturing. She is positioning herself with the reader as being 
equally in need of instruction, taking the same stance, feeling on the same side.  
Wondering about this distant person who was so impractical as to forget to bring a watch 
when travelling, Didion works to come to terms with herself, and assumes (surely accurately) 
that we, her readers, are working to come to terms with ourselves. Phillips, describing a 
particular version of Freud’s project as ‘re-acquainting patients with themselves, of 
humanising their gods,’ proclaims that ‘The analyst, like a good host, goes on making 
introductions.’46 Something like this is happening here, for both the reader and Didion. Given 
what the author assumes of the reader, and what the reader assumes of the author, Didion’s 
essay goes on reintroducing us to versions of herself and, prompts us to consider our own 
past selves.  
Concluding her contemplation, Didion speculates that ‘This may be a parable, either of my 
life as a reporter during that period or of the period itself.’47 The placement of the comma in 
this final sentence reinforces the equivocation. To begin with, the list of personal items 
excluding a watch despite needing a watch, may or may not be a parable; and if it is a parable 
it may or may not be a parable of Didion’s life; and it may or may not be a parable of the 
period. If the list and the watch’s absence is in fact not a parable, if it is meaningless, this 
meaninglessness becomes representative of the fragmented non-narrative nature of Didion’s 
life. If useless to the reader (a parable would presumably be useful to the reader), it is 
interesting in its uselessness, or in the fact that its usefulness is indeterminate. This text is 
axiomatically allegorical, and allegorically unstable. 
For Adorno, this kind of fragmentary openness is fundamental to the possibilities of the 
essay. In ‘The Essay as Form,’ he argues that doubt, openness and playfulness distinguish the 
essay as a genre and provide its value. ‘The essay,’ Adorno writes, 
thinks in fragments, just as reality is fragmentary, and finds its unity in and through 
the breaks and not by glossing them over. An unequivocal logical order deceives us 
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about the antagonistic nature of what order is imposed upon. Discontinuity is essential 
to the essay; its subject matter is always a conflict brought to a standstill.48  
While I find Adorno’s writing useful in thinking about how the essay genre tends to operate, 
it does contain an irreconcilable contradiction: His essay argues firmly for what an essay 
‘always’ does, while claiming that the virtue of the genre is grounded in its equivocation, its 
potential to remain undecided about generalised conclusions. What I take from Adorno, then, 
is his suggestion that essays are especially effective in conveying the contradictory and 
unresolved. The fact that Adorno’s undermining of his own argument actually performs this 
fact is rather neat, regardless of whether he meant this to be the case.  
The White Album is notably concerned with resembling a social reality of the particular 
that both suggests the possibility of identification and, in the same gesture, notes the limits 
of the general. Adorno describes how this oscillation can take place as a form of undecidability: 
The essay uses equivocations not out of sloppiness, nor in ignorance of the scientific 
ban on them, but to make it clear—something the critique of equivocation, which 
merely separates meanings, seldom succeeds in doing—that when a word covers 
different things they are not completely different; the unity of the word calls to mind 
a unity, however hidden, in the object itself.49 
Didion equivocates and leads the reader to equivocate. While equivocation generally suggests 
deferral or a teleology, Didion’s writing is compatible with Ngai’s ‘merely interesting’ 
aesthetic, which describes the sorts of equivocations that do not necessarily expect to reach 
an end. The perpetually ‘interesting’ essay lives most vitally in its working through ideas of 
openness, drawing the reader’s attention to the process of observation, contemplation and 
judgment, along with gesturing towards the points where judgment cannot be made, or is 
withheld.  
In ‘The White Album,’ the watch’s absence is a free-floating symbol: it tells us something 
about Didion, though exactly what remains unclear. It also tells us, as readers, something 
about ourselves. I have mentioned previously that Phillips wonders at the resistance of 
psychoanalysts to ‘thinking of their work as mind-reading or fortune-telling…despite the fact 
that most ordinary conversation is exactly this.’50 The mind-reading we enact as part of 
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49 Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’, 22. 
50 Phillips, Terrors and Experts, 18. 
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ordinary personal relationships survives (and is, perhaps, amplified) when we turn to a book, 
employing the tools we have developed in the social sphere, through conversation, 
acquaintance, and friendship, to produce something like a relationship with an author or 
character.  
An Appeal to the Reader’s Experience 
Just as Adorno begins Notes on Literature Vol. 1 with an essay on the form of the essay, Leo 
Bersani begins his collection of essays Thoughts and Things with a preface entitled ‘Against 
Prefaces?’. The authors share a concern with the possibility and difficulty of exhaustive 
summary. Bersani’s book questions a notion that has underpinned much post-enlightenment 
western philosophy and psychoanalysis: subject-object difference, or ‘a difference of being 
between the subject and the world.’  
Bersani goes on to provide a way of thinking about the desire for knowledge of others as 
a defensive strategy: 
If otherness is reduced to difference, the hatred of the world that Freud speaks of—
which we might rephrase as a paranoid suspicion of the world’s difference—is, as he 
suggests, the affective basis of a logically coherent strategy of defense. The desire to 
know the other is inseparable from the need to master the other. The desire for 
mastery motivates the desire to know, and knowledge is the precondition of mastery.51 
Apply this picture to reading and it becomes easy to imagine the reader-author relation as 
one in which the desire for knowledge, the desire to understand difference, and the desire for 
intimacy, are inextricably linked. Similar to his work with Phillips in Intimacies, Bersani’s 
project involves seeking out relational modes of exchange ‘that depend on the anti-Cartesian 
assumption of a commonality of being among the human subject and both the human and 
nonhuman world.’52 Attempting to describe alternatives to thinking of the subject and object 
as fundamentally distinct, he lists several anti-Cartesian philosophical concepts that ‘collapse 
the subject-object dualism’, including 
Wittgenstein’s notion of the ‘dawning of an aspect,’ which could be read as a 
reformulation of fantasy as grounded in the perception of external reality (the real 
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object and its relations become ‘echoes’ of our thought; we surround an object with 
our fictions in a perception at once new and unchanged)…53 
I am not enamoured of Bersani’s use of the term ‘fictions’ to describe what we bring to an 
object, but this application of Wittgenstein’s thought describes what is in my view most 
important about the reader-author relation: namely, that it cannot be accurately described as 
one object acting on another, but adjusts and readjusts as a conversation does. This 
formulation, alongside Bersani’s broader argument in Thoughts and Things, describes a reader-
author relation that does not oscillate between similarity and difference. Wittgenstein uses 
the famous duck-rabbit sketch to illustrate the ‘dawning of an aspect,’ and Bersani’s picture 
of alterity is equally malleable. It is useful to think of the multiplicity of alterities available in 
any one reading as depending on the angle from which a light is shone. The moment of 
recognising another is a moment of recognising something in the self. This picture relates to 
how Felski describes recognition: ‘bring[ing] together likeness and difference in one fell 
swoop.’  
Bersani and Cavell share an impulse to have belief in the intimate power of a relation, 
protesting the assumption that linguistic and phenomenological slipperiness mean that the 
social sphere depends upon false premises. They carefully dispense with excessive scepticism 
(with the threat that the relation may be false or that every utterance eludes total 
understanding, and that the fulfilment of this threat would destroy the integrity of and 
possibilities available in a social relation, or belief in an author). When Didion marvels at what 
exactly led her to embarrassedly ‘ask the desk for the time every half hour or so,’ she includes 
the reader in feeling her vulnerabilities and strengths. Her bafflement at that past self is 
mutually experienced.  
I want to expand on this appeal to the reader’s experience that I have spent much of this 
thesis exploring by returning to Ngai’s conception of the ‘interesting’ as an aesthetic 
judgment that relates to ongoingness. Ngai cites Wallace explicitly as being among the 
authors who perpetuated the ‘interesting’ as a dominant aesthetic, arguing that:  
In these sprawling encyclopedic works often explicitly about seriality or ongoingness, 
the authors seem to have deliberately increased the proportion of boredom in the ratio 
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of boredom to interest, as if engaging in an experimental quest to discover what the 
absolute minimal conditions of ‘interesting’ might be.54 
Ngai is referring primarily to the aesthetics of the novel, and an inverse argument could be 
made about Wallace’s essays, in which he attempts to maximise the interesting in order to 
lure the reader into agreement or empathy. Endnotes in Infinite Jest fracture the reading 
experience; footnotes in his essays litter the narrative with interesting but not necessarily 
vital details. It is worth recalling Wallace’s comment that the narrator of his Harper’s essays 
conveys a ‘certain persona that’s a little stupider and schmuckier than I am.’55 The virtue or 
hook of personal details in the McCain and Lynch essays (discussed in chapter three), for 
instance, about both himself and his subjects, is that they are unequivocally interesting, 
verging on gossip (a rhetoric always inflected with stupidity). Didion’s confessions—the 
psychiatric report is a good example, as is the admission that a family vacation in Hawaii is 
taking place ‘in lieu of filing for divorce’—are similar, and the aesthetics of these claims, along 
with the response they invite (how they call upon the reader or take the reader by the hand), 
are illuminated by Ngai’s argument. 
Considering how we can arrive at a consensus of feeling when making an aesthetic 
judgment, Ngai is curious about the philosophical tendency to conflate conceptual and 
affective ‘evidentiary justification’, which allows a claim that an object is interesting to be 
simultaneously an aesthetic and nonaesthetic judgment.56 Cavell regards aesthetic judgment 
‘as a pleasure-based claim that the subject is compelled to make public by speaking, which is 
what Kant’s analysis of the beautiful implies.’57 As with the ‘interesting,’ this construction is 
bound up in how a claim made about an object can be taken up by an interlocutor. In ‘Aesthetic 
Problems of Modern Philosophy’, Cavell takes up this Kantian view of aesthetics, relating it 
to Wittgenstein’s argument that justifications for judgment, at some point, come to an end. 
In aesthetics, this endpoint constitutes an appeal to the other’s judgment, ‘because if you do 
not see something, without explanation, then there is nothing further to discuss.’ Cavell then 
points out that this does not mean the critic can do nothing else: ‘he can start training and 
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instructing and preaching at you—a direction in which criticism invariably will start to 
veer.’58 
Ngai quotes Cavell’s description of his own method of criticism, which upholds the 
interesting as affirming the aesthetic object to be worthy of attention, and prompts further 
inquiry:  
Criticism in my writing often tends either to invoke the idea that Kant established for 
‘critique,’ namely articulating the conditions which allow a coherent utterance to be 
made, or a purposeful action to enter the world, or else to provide an explication or 
elaboration of a text…that accounts for, at its best increases, which is to say, appreciates, my 
interest in it.59 
Drawing on Cavell’s philosophy of aesthetics, Ngai argues for the interesting to be taken as 
seriously as the beautiful, flattening and complicating the plane of aesthetic judgment by 
showing how the place of judgment and justification are dependent upon—and modified by—
relationality: 
I would therefore slightly amend Cavell’s compelling definition of aesthetic judgments 
to speech acts that shift the power of gauging the act’s felicity from the ‘I’ to the 
listening ‘you’ (thus explicitly soliciting a response from the other) by noting that not 
all judgments of aesthetic quality do this equally. Facilitated by the very features that 
at first glance seemed to disqualify the interesting as an aesthetic judgment proper, 
the judgment of ‘interesting’ seems to solicit a ‘why’ from others precisely in order to 
create an occasion for the judge to make her evidence or reasons public.60 
Didion, describing her list, but coming up with incomplete explanations for what it might 
mean, is implicitly submitting them as interesting, and testing them against a listening ‘you’. 
The allegorical and aesthetic value of this potential parable, in its unavailability, or 
undecidability, is worth thinking about. Didion’s thinking dwells somewhere between feeling 
and justification, prompting further inquiry.  
As Ngai writes: 
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In recognizing how it diverts our attention from feeling-based judgments 
(quick/instantaneous) to concept-based justifications (slow/ongoing) and thus how 
its relation to justification connects to its relation to time, we can see what most 
significantly sets ‘interesting’ apart from other aesthetic evaluations.61 
The ongoingness and absence that this aesthetic invokes do not preclude a sense of intimacy 
with the personal voice; rather, they facilitate that intimacy. Along with Ngai’s ‘interesting,’ 
Cavell’s notion of the ordinary is useful here because thinking about how a reader might 
accept or reject the character of, for example, Didion or Wallace, as they appear in their work, 
demands an ordinary (rather than metaphysical) conception of these writers. They are 
‘merely’ people as we have known them, rather than sages who can offer us total knowledge 
of their characters or the issues on which they write. In his review of Phillips’ Terrors and 
Experts, Cavell clarifies a fundamental point about his philosophical procedure, comparing it 
to the process of psychoanalysis: 
In philosophical exchange, as I have had occasion to put a founding experience of 
ordinary language procedure, we are all in the same boat, I know no more than you, 
nor you than I, about what we say.62 
Cavell understands that the originality of Wittgenstein (and Freud) is not in recognising that 
a speaker may not know what he means or say what he has wished to say, but, crucially, ‘in 
finding ways to prevent [this notion] from defeating itself so easily, ways to make it 
methodical.’63 Sharing a language, a grammar, a form of life, and being able to understand 
and be understood constitutes, for Cavell, an expertise. In the case of reading, this expertise 
facilitates the leap of intuition required to imagine the author as, in John Frow’s term, ‘a 
person-shaped figure’. This leap, grounded in the ordinary, relates to Berlant’s take on the 
ordinary in Cruel Optimism, which I quoted in the previous chapter: 
The ordinary is an intersecting space where many forces and histories circulate and 
become ‘ready to hand’ in the ordinary, as Stanley Cavell would put it, for inventing 
new rhythms for living, rhythms that could, at any time, congeal into norms, forms 
and institutions.64 
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Berlant contextualises cruel optimism in the ordinary because doing so allows her to trace 
how capital asserts itself over the everyday, and how capital shapes the development and 
maintenance of desire. In shared forms of the everyday, we find ‘norms, forms and 
institutions,’ and the reader-author relationship is one such accepted norm.  
An Illumination 
By closely examining essayists I have sought to reveal more precisely how their confessions 
are mediated. In their writing, variations on what is deemed interesting within norms, forms 
and institutions reveal the sort of writers we take them to be, and why we might wish to, for 
instance, call them a friend (or discover reasons to avoid doing so). To focus again on Didion 
and Wallace, we have seen Didion revealing personal details, often weaknesses or failures, in 
order to pre-empt the reader from holding her personality against her. She is defending 
herself, strictly demarcating boundaries. But when Wallace reveals his weaknesses, they are 
inflected with an unspoken assumption that the reader shares them, or shares weaknesses that 
resemble them. Wallace, by revealing neuroses and anxieties and eccentricities, is seeking 
empathy, or seeking to make the reader feel empathised with. It is in the dialogue that Wallace 
seeks communion. Didion, on the other hand, is out for a more cautious identification. Their 
mode of thinking through this author-reader connection overlaps in the fact that they both 
write about its limits.  
What does it mean to recursively think through the limits of a process while the process 
itself is being undertaken? How can this phenomenon best be articulated? Adorno and 
György Lukács regard the essay’s self-reflection as an opportunity. A central theme of 
Adorno’s ‘The Essay as Form’ is the extent to which an essay can reveal, and how its 
revelations are distinct, and this process of revelation is repeatedly conceptualised as a 
shedding of light. It begins with an epigraph from Goethe’s Pandora: ‘Destined to see what is 
illuminated, not the light.’ Adorno then notes Germany’s disdain for the essay as an art form, 
and academia’s exclusion of the writing of essayists because 
the academic guild accepts as philosophy only what is clothed in the dignity of the 
universal and the enduring—and today perhaps the originary. It gets involved with 
particular cultural artifacts only to the extent to which they can be used to exemplify 
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universal categories, or to the extent to which the particular becomes transparent 
when seen in terms of them.65 
Allegories of light, illumination, shadow, and transparency work particularly well in thinking 
through the personal revelations and particulars of the essay, because they separate the light 
and what is lit, how things may be differently illuminated, and prompts questions about what 
transparency reveals:  
The essay has to cause the totality to be illuminated in a partial feature, whether the 
feature be chosen or merely happened upon, without asserting the presence of the 
totality.66 
Lukács, in ‘On the Nature and Form of the Essay,’ seeking to describe the essay as an art 
form, compares the abstraction shared by poetry and the essay (which he refers to as ‘the two 
poles of possible literary expression’): 
the separation of image and significance is itself an abstraction, for the significance is 
always wrapped in images and the reflection of a glow from beyond the image shines 
through every image.67 
He argues that the essay is a form uniquely suited to reach beyond the image, able to conjure 
a world-view, a perspective, that nothing else can: 
were one to compare the forms of literature with sunlight refracted in a prism, the 
writings of the essayists would be the ultra-violet rays.68 
Cavell also invokes the metaphor of light when suggesting we take seriously Wittgenstein’s 
self-deprecation in the preface to Philosophical Investigations. As with Adorno’s polemic, this 
imagery has to do with how we might embrace a philosophy or form completely. 
Wittgenstein’s preface describes his book as existing ‘in its poverty and in the darkness of 
this time’. Cavell argues that 
Its declaration of its poverty is not a simple expression of humility but a stern 
message: the therapy prescribed to bring light into the darkness of the time will 
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present itself, will in a sense be, starvation; as if our philosophical spirit is indulged, 
forced to the point of death.69  
A part of what forces philosophy ‘to the point of death,’—by which I take Cavell to mean an 
inquiry that, in pursuing its own desire for the absolute, will refuse to recognise where its 
methodology is inadequate (or excessive)—is the craving for generality. And in addressing 
the reader, with these personal confessions, Didion is struggling (not because she is incapable, 
but because the struggle is productive) with what it is possible to shift from the particular to 
the universal, and whether the universal is necessary or even possible in this type of social 
relationship, the reader-author relationship. This struggle, in Adorno’s words, is the ‘conflict 
brought to a standstill’. So here is one way to think about the metaphor of light in terms of 
the reader-author relation: describing the relationship as a process of illumination does not 
demand a definition of the source of the light or the illuminated object, but rather prompts a 
description of the light itself, the process illumination as the literary exchange.  
The focus on personalised particularity, exemplified by writers I have examined 
throughout this thesis, invites a reading that, to use Cavell’s phrase, appreciates the reader’s 
interest. The reader’s interest, here, is a methodology of illumination that shows us the 
possibility of identification and intimacy, something a reader can then choose to do with what 
they will. Accepting Bersani’s notion that the boundaries demarcating the subject and object 
are ever-shifting means that the reader needn’t decide whether the list might stand in for 
Didion or fail as a metaphor. What Bersani calls a ‘commonality of being among the human 
subject and both the human and nonhuman world’ means that the text prompts the reader to 
do the sort of work being done by the author, to take it up and perpetuate the text’s thinking 
through examples. It does not encourage a mimesis, but rather encourages an adoption of the 
tools exemplified, both to read the piece and to take those tools along with this new common 
experience into the world. In Intimacies, Phillips proclaims that 
To have the courage of one’s narcissism—to find a version of narcissism that is 
preservative at once of survival and pleasure—would be to have the courage of one’s 
wish for more life rather than less.70 
This is the sort of narcissism, a mutual narcissism, that an essay can perform and invite.  
                                               
69 Stanley Cavell, ‘Declining Decline: Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Culture,’ in Inquiry, 31, no. 3, 1998: 263. 
70 Bersani and Phillips, Intimacies, 98. 
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But the problems that Didion and Wallace interrogate are by no means universal. It is in 
their particularity that they become interesting. In order to more fully illuminate where 
Didion and Wallace’s thinking recognises that its teleology lies outside the text, and why 
these writers appear to regard this inability to reach a conclusion as failure, I will return to 
The Argonauts. Reflecting on her own intellectual practice, Nelson writes that ‘part of the 
horror of speaking, of writing’ is that ‘There is nowhere to hide’: 
When you try to hide the spectacle can grow grotesque. Think of Joan Didion’s 
preemptive attempt, in Blue Nights, to quash any notion that her daughter Quintana 
Roo’s childhood was a privileged one. ‘“Privilege” is a judgment. “Privilege” is an 
opinion. “Privilege” is an accusation. “Privilege” remains an area to which—when I 
think of what [Quintana] endured, when I consider what came later—I will not easily 
cop.’ These remarks were a pity, since her account of ‘what came later’—Quintana’s 
death, on the heels of the death of Didion’s beloved husband—underscores Didion’s 
more interesting, albeit disavowed subject, which is that the economic privilege does 
not protect against all suffering.71 
On the following page, Nelson implicitly shows that the brutality of Didion’s claim is a 
linguistic brutality and is wary about repeating Didion’s attempt to generalise a 
depersonalisation of the author. Instead, Nelson acknowledges that the reader will illuminate 
the writing in their own way, and this illumination cannot be prevented by a preemptive 
defence. Nelson declares that she herself is  
Afraid of assertion. Always trying to get out of ‘totalizing’ language, i.e., language 
that rides roughshod over specificity; realizing this is another form of paranoia.72 
Reading Lerner’s 10:04, Nelson appears to see the potential for an alternative. In her 
review of the novel in the Los Angeles Review of Books, she writes that 
As the narrator vacillates between his own commentary and its suspension, we too 
learn something about the enjoyable, even ethical rhythm to be found in allowing 
ourselves our loquacity, then holding ourselves in a state of negative capability while 
we allow others theirs.73 
                                               
71 Maggie Nelson, The Argonauts (Minneapolis: Graywolf Press, 2015), 97. 
72 Nelson, The Argonauts, 98. 
73 Maggie Nelson, ‘Slipping the Surly Bonds of Earth: On Ben Lerner’s Latest,’ Los Angeles Review of Books, 
August 24, 2014, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/95063/. 
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Lerner creates this rhythm by allowing space for the voices of others, but never pretending 
that the voice of the novel is not his own. Even the novel’s final words, ‘I know it’s hard to 
understand / I am with you, and I know how it is’—the first line a quote from Reagan’s eulogy 
for the astronauts who died in the Challenger disaster, the second from Whitman’s ‘Crossing 
Brooklyn Ferry’—are made new on the page, transfigured through Lerner’s personal voice. 
Lerner sees no clear boundary between quotation and originality, nor fiction and reality. 
Nelson is wary about the role and appeal of reductive generalising. They present a different, 
less angst-ridden, more earnest kind of openness than the sort of paranoia arrived at (and 
encouraged) by Didion and Wallace. Lerner and Nelson are better acquainted with the nature 
of the ordinary, as defined by Cavell, and thus more comfortable with what cannot be said.  
This philosophy offers a return to thinking through ordinary examples, and finding value 
in paying attention to individuals, conceiving of evaluation as a process that depends on the 
limits of what we can understand about other people, the limits of our intimacy. Attentiveness 
of this kind means that points at which the reader and author coincide illuminate various and 
undecidable elements of an aspect of their experience. The shared and the distinct blend. 
In Uses of Literature, Felski reminds us that  
As John Frow remarks, ‘there is no escape from the discourse of value,’ which is 
neither intrinsic to the object nor forged single-handedly by a subject, but arises out 
of a complex interplay between institutional structures, interpretive communities, and 
the idiosyncrasies of individual taste.74 
Ngai, applying this kind of thinking to the ‘merely interesting’, writes that 
The interesting thus shows us a way out of the deadlock between the old idea that the 
task of criticism is to produce verdicts of artistic greatness versus mediocrity, or of 
artistic success versus failure, and the more generally accepted idea that criticism 
should try to purge itself of aesthetic evaluation entirely (since, given its institutional 
context, it cannot help but tend to reproduce values already set in place).75 
Recognising a text’s personal voice, and attending to how we might identify with it, is one 
way of reorienting the task of criticism, encouraging an aesthetic and affective evaluation that 
accounts for the reader’s sense that, as they read, the author is present.  
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A simpler version of this chapter’s argument could go something like this: Art and writing 
are complex, as is the relationship between the person who created the art and their audience; 
they evoke complex feelings that exist on the same spectrum as the feelings we experience in 
response to the people in our lives; the task of criticism can simply be to articulate these 
particular feelings, while remaining alert to the craving for generality and its risks. When it 
comes to essays, we may well feel that by recognising or identifying with the writer we are 
experiencing a kind of intimacy, as if we knew the person writing, as if they might know us. 
Such identification can be blinkered or vigilant, limiting or productive, conservative or 
adventurous. Regardless, we should pay it attention. 
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Conclusion 
It seems to me that growing up (in modern culture? in capitalist culture?) is learning that most of 
what is said is only more or less meant—as if words were stuffs of fabric and we saw no difference 
between shirts and sails and ribbons and rags. 
Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason 
-- 
This is not the sort of project that resolves its opening question with a definitive answer. 
Rather, in having responded to the question of how authors enter our lives, I hope now to 
better understand its stakes, along with the impulse that drove the inquiry. Here, I briefly 
summarise what I believe to be the central tenets of my thesis and attempt to explain what it 
would mean to go on with this kind of work.  
Attending to Examples 
If I have achieved what I set out to do, this thesis has made no exhaustive claims or 
generalising arguments. Rather, I have attempted to practice a kind of reading and thinking 
that describes the possibilities that become available when we acknowledge the particularity 
of a reader’s relationship with a text and its author, a relationship influenced by mood, style, 
demeanour, expectation, and experience.  
If this thesis were reduced to a single ambition, it would be to encourage readers, 
professional and otherwise, to treat their reading lives with the same degree of particularity 
with which they treat their social lives. What this means for readers, undergraduates, and 
academics is a willingness to view their belief in an author as existing on a social spectrum, 
prompting the kind of questions we ask of those in our social circles. What I have tried to 
discern about the examined essayists is: How do they shape the pictures of themselves that 
are conveyed to the reader, how might readers respond to such invitations, and what do these 
invitations and responses share with the conventions of sociality? 
These questions can be affectionate, marvelling at the sense of connection and assurance 
that reading can provoke. They can also be critical or self-reflexive, when they prompt 
wariness about our tendencies to be too readily charmed by flattery, or too easily awestruck, 
or beguiled by performative self-deprecation that paves the way for a dazzling intellect. We 
do not, ordinarily, engage in conversation to learn about conversation; we do so to understand 
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another person and, in turn, to be understood. Equally, reading to learn about reading as 
some kind of exhaustive concept would be to ignore the specificities of invitation and response 
that comprise each distinct encounter.   
My wish throughout has been to avoid demanding that my descriptions be universally 
applicable beyond their ordinary use. As Stanley Cavell writes about philosophy,  
We impose a demand for absoluteness (typically of some simple physical kind) upon a 
concept, and then, finding that our ordinary use of this concept does not meet our 
demand, we accommodate this discrepancy as nearly as possible. 
Cavell goes on to say that ‘One of Wittgenstein’s greatest services, to my mind, is to show 
how constant a feature of philosophy this pattern is,’ to diagnose it, and to show a way out.1 
Likewise in literary studies, because the structure of an argument desires a dramatic and 
encapsulating conclusion, it is often tempting to make the value of claims dependent upon 
their grandiosity or comprehensiveness, leading us to take the primary use of the example at 
hand as evidence from which to extrapolate. Resisting this temptation is difficult but 
rewarding.  
In the introduction, I quoted Toril Moi’s claim that Wittgenstein shows that ‘We don’t 
pay attention to use, because we keep looking for something firmer, deeper, something that 
can ground use itself, something like the ultimate explanation of meaning as such.’2 I am 
entirely persuaded by Moi’s argument that recognising such a pursuit as misguided can be 
revolutionary in the field of literary studies, yet to follow it is to embrace a kind of scholarly 
humility that, from the outside, does not appear to have the same conceptual or political 
weight as an approach that depends on universalising, world-changing concepts. So we must 
find a way to take humility seriously. To adapt Sianne Ngai’s strategy from Our Aesthetic 
Categories, it is worth coming to terms with the fact that what we might call minor inquiries 
(studies that are less grand, less exhaustive) can discover depth, resonance, and meaning 
without succumbing to the craving for generality. What does this mean in the context of my 
thesis? It means that there is value in locating similarities between a reader’s response to a 
text and their response to a person, and that drawing attention to this fact while discouraging 
                                               
1 Stanley Cavell, ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,’ in Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969), 71. 
2 Toril Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary Studies After Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press), 35. 
  
 
182 
the urge to deduce some general theory from it is a sufficiently substantial task to constitute 
what we call literary studies.  
The Social Invitation 
In the final chapter of The Limits of Critique, Rita Felski writes that questioning critique does 
not constitute an abandonment of progressive values but, rather, ‘is motivated by a desire to 
articulate a positive vision for humanistic thought in the face of growing scepticism about its 
value.’3 When I advocate for generous reading or suggest that we reflect on our relationship 
with an author as we would reflect on a social relationship, I understand the positivity in these 
acts to emerge from a belief in a version of the humanities that delights in the nuance and 
variety of literature and its relation to the complex, irreducible web of experience, rather than 
isolating or exalting it as a discourse disconnected from the ordinary. Embracing this spirit 
of inquiry may mean putting aside the imperative to undo or dismantle a text. Yet it also 
allows for the use of a vocabulary or grammar that accounts for the full spectrum of affective 
response that conversation permits, which can of course include critique.  
To relate the reader’s belief in the author to their belief in other people suggests a 
representation of reading that resembles a conversation. Both interactions require an opening 
invitation, neither is necessarily instrumental, and both can traverse a path that follows no 
rational or linear course. Of course, an author cannot respond in the way an interlocutor can, 
but the comparison still remains useful. Consider the many varieties of conversation that we 
engage in. We can approach a conversation sceptically or charitably; we can find our 
interlocutor frustrating or charming; we can choose to walk away or feel compelled (or 
obliged) to continue. We might be disappointed by what comes after a promising invitation, 
or come to be pleasantly surprised at the unreasonable scepticism of our initial expectations. 
I have not used conversation as the primary metaphor for reading in this thesis because a 
reader cannot (usually) speak back, and it raises too many questions that would distract from 
my central contentions. But I do think it is worth contemplating the fact that part of what it 
means to be a reader is to ask questions of a text and develop a sense of whether those 
questions are acknowledged or ignored, answered or unanswered. It is not necessarily the 
case that the provision of answers improves the reading experience or that the withholding 
of answers detracts, just as we would not necessarily characterise a conversation as being a 
waste of time because a secret was kept. Viewing reading as a dialogue simply contributes to 
                                               
3 Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 186. 
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the feeling that both conversation and reading are informed by our curiosity about the nature 
of the lives of others and how we are implicated in those lives.  
Most importantly, comparing reading to conversation prompts close attention to the value 
of judgment and how it can be applied. To judge a text or its author in the manner that I 
would an interlocutor can mean that I am listening closely, or coming to understand what 
distinguishes us, or recognising a feeling I have experienced myself, or admiring courage, or 
realising that I am being conned, or critiquing political blindness, or interpreting a specific 
view within a historical or cultural context; it could include all these responses over the course 
of a single reading. As is always the case in literary studies, what I witness then becomes 
evidence for a particular reading and prompts further questions. However, by placing reading 
on a spectrum of sociality I am reminded that, as with conversation, the work of literary 
studies does not need to be premised on the justification of reading as teleological. I see you 
speaking with someone, be it a stranger with whom you just now shared a moment, or an old 
friend; I ask: ‘What purpose did that conversation serve?’ There can be reasons for this 
question, but it does sound strange.  
Do You See? 
I have reached a point at which I simply want to say that sometimes, when I am reading, I 
have a sense of the author’s character, and my feelings towards them are similar to those I 
have for people I have met. What I hope to have provided here is a way of speaking about 
literature and authors that accounts for this feeling. I’ve written about the sense of how 
essayists manifest as characters in their works, existing in a kind of continuous presentness; 
I’ve discussed how they deploy literary devices and disclose personal details to give the reader 
a sense of their character; I’ve examined the risks and rewards of a reader finding themselves 
reflected in a writer. Yet all this depends on a reader for whom my picture of the reader-
author relationship resonates. A question fundamental to this thesis is: Do you see what I see? 
For Moi, this question characterises a Cavellian philosophical appeal from which literary 
studies can learn: 
If I don’t speak up, I will never discover whether there can be a community that 
includes me. Maybe there isn’t, at least not right now. To write is to risk rebuff. But 
to give up the search for the right words is to give up the search for reason.4 
                                               
4 Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, 19. 
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It may well be the case that the experience this thesis describes does not resonate with certain 
readers, or even many readers. What that means for my argument is for those readers to 
decide. It is possible that they cannot know what I know. If the gap is unbridgeable that is 
alright.  
But here is what I know. I know what it means when a friend tells me that they love an 
author, or that they cannot stand an author. I know what it means to eagerly anticipate the 
release of a new novel or essay collection from an author whose previous work I have 
cherished. I know what it means to return to an author I once disliked—having been 
persuaded I was insufficiently generous towards them—and to see them in a new light and 
discover aspects of their writing to which I had previously been blind. I know what it means 
to pity or admire an author when I read an interview in which they reveal some personal 
hardship. I know what it means to review and withdraw my affection when an author is shown 
to have been cruel to others, when that cruelty is suddenly visible in their work. I know what 
it means to have contradictory, irresolvable feelings about an author whose behaviour I find 
abhorrent but whose work I find captivating. I know what it means to begin a text finding 
the author and their style strange and inaccessible only to discover that their unfamiliar 
perspective can be learned, providing me with new ways to see the world. I know what it 
means to be made grindingly, oppressively, unendingly bored by an author, so much so that 
finishing their book (or discarding it) instils a kind of spiteful triumph, the exacting of some 
personal vendetta. I know what it means to discover slowly or quickly that a particular author 
is or is not for me. I know what it means to witness an author articulating my own thoughts 
and fears and loves better than I ever could.  
I know what it means to have a picture of an author in my mind. It is a picture of a person.
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